§6.8Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν ἢ κινεῖται ἢ ἠρεμεῖ τὸ πεφυκὸς ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ οὗ καὶ ὥς, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἱστάμενον ὅτε ἵσταται κινεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ κινεῖται, ἠρεμήσει, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἠρε. μίζεσθαι τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.
Since everything that is naturally capable of moving or being at rest, when it is so capable, where and how, either moves or is at rest, that which is coming to a stand must move when it is coming to a stand; for if it does not move, it will be at rest, but that which is at rest cannot be coming to rest.
τούτου δʼ ἀποδεδειγμένου φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἵστασθαι ἀνάγκη (τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ κινεῖται, τὸ δʼ ἱστάμενον δέδεικται κινούμενον, ὥστε ἀνάγκη ἐν χρόνῳ ἵστασθαι)· ἔτι δʼ εἰ τὸ μὲν θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ἐν χρόνῳ λέγομεν, ἵστασθαι δʼ ἔστιν θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον, ἐν ᾧ δὲ χρόνῳ πρώτῳ τὸ ἱστάμενον ἵσταται, ἐν ὁτῳοῦν ἀνάγκη τούτου ἵστασθαι.
And this having been demonstrated, it is clear that it must also come to a stand in time (for that which moves moves in time, and that which is coming to a stand has been shown to be moving, so that it must come to a stand in time); furthermore, if we speak of 'faster' and 'slower' in time, and coming to a stand can be faster and slower, in whatever primary time that which is coming to a stand comes to a stand, it must come to a stand in any part of this.
διαιρεθέντος γὰρ τοῦ χρόνου εἰ μὲν ἐν μηδετέρῳ τῶν μερῶν ἵσταται, οὐδʼ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ, ὥστʼ οὐκ ἂν ἵσταιτο τὸ ἱστάμενον· εἰ δ᾿ ἐν θατέρῳ, οὐκ ἂν ἐν πρώτῳ τῷ ὅλῳ ἵσταιτο· καθʼ ἕτερον γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ἵσταται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινουμένου πρότερον.
For the time having been divided, if it comes to a stand in neither of the parts, neither does it in the whole, so that that which is coming to a stand would not be coming to a stand; but if in one of the two, it would not be coming to a stand in the whole primarily; for it comes to a stand in this in virtue of another part, just as was said also of that which moves previously.
ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ κινεῖται, οὕτως οὐδʼ ἐν ᾧ ἵσταται τὸ ἱστάμενον· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι οὔτε τοῦ ἵστασθαί ἐστίν τι πρῶτον.
And just as for that which moves there is no primary time in which it moves, so neither is there a primary time in which that which is coming to a stand comes to a stand; for neither of moving nor of coming to a stand is there any first part.
ἔστω γὰρ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἵσταται ἐφʼ τὸ AB. τοῦτο δὴ ἀμερὲς μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (κίνησις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῳ ἀμερεῖ. διὰ τὸ κεκινῆσθαί τι ἂν αὐτοῦ, τὸ δʼ ἱστάμενον δέδεικται κινούμενον)· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ἶσταται· τοῦτο γὰρ δέδεικται πρότερον, ὅτι ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἵσταται, ἐν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν ἐκείνου ἵσταται.
For let the primary time in which it comes to a stand be AB. This indeed cannot be partless (for there is no motion in an indivisible because some part of it would have moved, but that which is coming to a stand has been shown to be moving); but indeed, if it is divisible, it comes to a stand in any of its parts; for this has been shown before, that in whatever primary time it comes to a stand, it comes to a stand in any of its parts.
ἐπεὶ οὖν χρόνος ἐστὶν ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἵσταται, καὶ οὐκ ἄτομον, ἅπας δὲ χρόνος εἰς ἄπειρα μεριστός, οὐκ ἔσται ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἵσταται.
Since therefore the time in which it primarily comes to a stand is a time, and not an atom, and all time is divisible into infinites, there will not be a primary time in which it comes to a stand.
οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ
ἠρεμοῦν ὅτε πρῶτον ἠρέμησεν ἔστιν.
Nor indeed is there a time when that which is at rest first rested.
ἐν ἀμερεῖ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἠρέμησεν διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν ἐν ἀτόμῳ, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι (τότε γὰρ ἔφαμεν ἠρεμεῖν, ὅτε καὶ ἐν ὧ πεφυκὸς κινεῖσθαι μὴ κινεῖται τὸ πεφυκός· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ἠρεμεῖν, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχῃ νῦν καὶ πρότερον, ὡς οὐχ ἑνί τινι κρίνοντες ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τοῖν ἐλαχίστοιν· ὥστʼ οὐκ ἔσται ἐν ᾧ ἠρεμεῖ ἀμερές.
For it did not rest in an indivisible, because there is no motion in an atom, and in whatever there is being at rest, there is also moving (for we said then that it is at rest, when, being naturally capable of moving, it does not move at the time and in the respect in which it is so capable; and furthermore we also say that it is at rest when it is in the same state now and before, as judging not by some single now but by at least two; so that that in which it is at rest will not be indivisible).
εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, χρόνος ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ἠρεμήσει.
But if it is divisible, it must be a time, and it will be at rest in any of its parts.
τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον δειχθήσεται ὃν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον· ὥστʼ οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον.
For it will be shown in the same manner as in the previous cases; so that nothing will be first.
τούτου δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι ἠρεμεῖ μὲν καὶ κινεῖται πᾶν ἐν χρόνῳ χρόνος δʼ οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτος οὐδὲ μέγεθος οὐδʼ ὅλως συνεχὲς οὐδέν· ἅπαν γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρα μεριστόν.
And the cause of this is that everything rests and moves in time, and there is no primary time, nor magnitude, nor in general any continuous thing; for everything is divisible into infinites.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ κινεῖται καὶ ἔκ τινος εἴς τι μεταβάλλει, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ κινεῖται καθʼ αὑτὸν καὶ μὴ τῷ ἐν ἐκείνου τινί, ἀδύνατον τότε κατά τι εἶναι πρῶτον τὸ κινούμενον.
And since everything that moves moves in time and changes from something to something, in the time in which it moves in virtue of itself and not by some part of that time, it is impossible that the moving thing is primarily in something.
τὸ γὰρ ἠρεμεῖν ἐστιν τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι χρόνον τινὰ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον.
For to be at rest is to be in the same state for some time, both itself and each of its parts.
οὕτως γὰρ λέγομεν ἡρε· μέῖν, ὅταν ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῶν νῦν ἀληθὲς ᾖ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ μέρη.
For we say that it is at rest in this way, when in different nows it is true to say that both itself and its parts are in the same state.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔστι τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ μεταβάλλον κατά τι εἶναι ὅλον κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος διαιρετὸς ἅπας, ὥστε ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλῳ αὐτοῦ μέρει ἀληθὲς ἔσται εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστιν καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ μέρη.
But if this is being at rest, it is not possible for that which is changing to be as a whole in something during the primary time; for all time is divisible, so that in different parts of it, it will be true to say that both itself and its parts are in the same state.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἀλλʼ ἐν ἑνὶ μόνῳ τῶν νῦν, οὐκ ἔσται χρόνον οὐδένα κατά τι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πέρας τοῦ χρόνου.
For if not so, but in only one of the nows, it will not be in something for any time, but at the limit of the time.
ἐν δὲ τῷ νῦν ἔστιν μὲν ἀεὶ κατά τι μὲν ὄν, οὐ μέντοι ἠρεμεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ κινεῖσθαι οὔτʼ ἠρεμεῖν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ νῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ εἶναι κατά τι, ἐν χρόνῳ δʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι κατά τι ἠρεμοῦν· συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ φερόμενον ἠρεμεῖν.
But in the now it is indeed always in something indeed, but it is not, however, at rest; for it is not possible either to move or to be at rest in the now, but while it is true in the now not to be moving and to be in something, yet in time it is not possible to be in something while being at rest; for otherwise it would follow that what is in motion is at rest.