§6.3Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν τὸ μὴ καθʼ ἕτερον ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ πρῶτον λεγόμενον ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τὸ τοιοῦτο χρόνῳ ἐνυπάρχειν.
It is necessary also that the 'now' which is so called not in virtue of something else but in itself and primarily, should be indivisible, and that such a 'now' should be inherent in all time.
ἔστιν γὰρ ἔσχατόν τι τοῦ γεγονότος, οὗ ἐπὶ τάδε οὐθέν ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὗ ἐπὶ τάδε οὐθέν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονότος· ὅ δή φαμεν ἀμφοῖν εἶναι πέρας.
For there is some extreme of the past, on this side of which there is nothing of the future, and again of the future, on this side of which there is nothing of the past; which we indeed say is the limit of both.
τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν δειχθῇ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν καὶ ταὐτόν, ἅμα φανερὸν ἔσται καὶ ὅτι ἀδιαίρετον.
And if this is shown to be of such a kind and to be identical, it will at the same time be manifest that it is also indivisible.
ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ νῦν τὸ ἔσχατον ἀμφοτέρων τῶν χρόνων· εἰ γὰρ ἕτερον, ἐφεξῆς μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη θάτερον θατέρῳ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι συνεχὲς ἐξ ἀμερῶν, εἰ δὲ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον, μεταξὺ ἔσται χρόνος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ συνεχὲς τοιοῦτον ὥστʼ εἶναί τι συνώνυμον μεταξὺ τῶν περάτων.
It is necessary indeed that the 'now' which is the extreme of both times should be the same; for if they were different, the one could not be consecutive to the other, because that which is continuous cannot be composed of indivisibles; and if each is separate, there will be time between them; for everything continuous is such that there is something of the same name between its limits.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ χρόνος τὸ μεταξύ, διαιρετὸν ἔσται· πᾶς γὰρ χρόνος δέδεικται ὅτι διαιρετός.
But indeed, if the intermediate is time, it will be divisible; for every time has been shown to be divisible.
ὥστε διαιρετὸν τὸ νῦν.
Consequently the 'now' will be divisible.
εἰ δὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ νῦν, ἔσται τι τοῦ γεγονότος ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν τῷ γεγονότι· καθʼ ὃ γὰρ ἂν διαιρεθῇ, τοῦτο διοριεῖ τὸν παρήκοντα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον.
But if the 'now' is divisible, there will be something of the past in the future and of the future in the past; for at whatever point it may be divided, this will limit the past and the future time.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἂν καθʼ αὑτὸ εἴη τὸ νῦν, ἀλλὰ καθʼ ἕτερον· ἡ γὰρ διαίρεσις οὐ καθʼ αὑτό.
And at the same time, the 'now' would not exist in itself, but in virtue of something else; for division is not in virtue of itself.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοῦ νῦν τὸ μέν τι γεγονὸς ἔσται τὸ δὲ μέλλον, καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γεγονὸς ἢ μέλλον.
Moreover, of the 'now' one part will be past and another future, and it will not always be the same part that is past or future.
οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ νῦν τὸ αὐτό· πολλαχῇ γὰρ διαιρετὸς ὁ χρόνος.
Nor indeed will the 'now' be the same; for time is divisible in many ways.
ὥστʼ εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχ ειν, ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ νῦν.
So that if these things are impossible to obtain, it is necessary that the 'now' in each should be the same.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ταὐτό, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον· εἰ γὰρ διαιρετόν, πάλιν ταὐτὰ συμβήσεται καὶ ἐν τῷ πρότερον.
But indeed, if it is the same, it is manifest that it is also indivisible; for if it were divisible, the same consequences will follow again as before.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστιν τι ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἀδιαίρετον, ὅ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ νῦν, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
That there is, then, something indivisible in time, which we say is the 'now', is clear from what has been said.
ὅτι δʼ οὐθὲν ἐν τῶ νῦν κινεῖται, ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν ἐστιν.
And that nothing moves in the 'now' is manifest from what follows.
εἰ γάρ, ἐνδέχεται καὶ θᾶττον κινεῖσθαι καὶ βραδύτερον.
For if it were possible, it is possible for a thing to move both faster and slower.
ἔστω δὴ τὸ νῦν ἐφʼ ᾧ N, κεκινήσθω δʼ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θᾶττον τὴν AB. οὐκοῦν τὸ βραδύτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐλάττω τῆς AB κινηθήσεται, οἶον τὴν ΑΓ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ βραδύτερον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ νῦν κεκίνηται τὴν ΑΓ, τὸ θᾶττον ἐν ἐλάττονι τούτου κινηθήσεται, ὥστε διαιρεθήσεται τὸ νῦν.
Let the 'now' be represented by N, and let the faster have moved in it through the distance AB. Consequently, the slower will move in the same time through a distance less than AB, say AC. But since the slower has moved through AC in the whole of the 'now', the faster will move through it in less time than this, so that the 'now' will be divided.
ἀλλʼ ἦν ἀδιαίρετον.
But it was indivisible.
οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ νῦν.
Therefore, it is not possible to move in the 'now'.
ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδʼ ἠρεμεῖν· ἠρεμεῖν γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ πεφυκὸς κινεῖσθαι μὴ κινούμενον ὅτε πέφυκεν καὶ οὗ καὶ ὥς, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐθὲν πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδʼ ἠρεμῖν.
But indeed, neither is it possible to be at rest; for we say that a thing is at rest which, being naturally capable of motion, is not moving when, where, and as it is its nature to do so; so that since nothing is naturally capable of motion in the 'now', it is clear that neither is it possible to be at rest.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέν ἐστι τὸ νῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χρόνοιν, ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν μὲν κινεῖσθαι τὸν δʼ ἠρεμεῖν ὅλον, τὸ δʼ ὅλον κινούμενον τὸν χρόνον ἐν ὁτῳοῦν κινηθήσεται τῶν τούτου καθʼ ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ὡσαύτως ἠρεμήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἠρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἔσχατον τῶν χρόνων ἀμφοτέρων, τὸ νῦν.
Furthermore, if the 'now' is the same in both times, and it is possible for a thing to be in motion through the whole of the one time and to be at rest through the whole of the other, and that which is in motion through the whole of a time will move in any part of it in which it is naturally capable of moving, and that which is at rest will likewise be at rest, it will result that the same thing is at the same time at rest and in motion; for the same extreme of both times is the 'now'.
ἔτι δʼ ἠρεμεῖν μὲν λέγομεν τὸ ὁμοίως ἔχον καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ μέρη νῦν καὶ πρότερον· ἐν δὲ τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ πρότερον, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἠρεμεῖν.
Furthermore, we say that a thing is at rest when both itself and its parts are in the same state now and formerly; but in the 'now' there is no 'formerly', so that neither is it possible to be at rest.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἠρεμεῖν τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.
It is necessary, therefore, both that that which is in motion should move in time, and that that which is at rest should be at rest in time.