§5.4#1Μία δὲ κίνησις λέγεται πολλαχῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἓν πολλαχῶς λέγομεν.
A single motion is spoken of in many ways; for we speak of "one" in many ways.
γένει μὲν οὖν μία κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας ἐστί (φορὰ μὲν γὰρ πάσῃ φορᾷ τῷ γένει μία, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ φορᾶς ἑτέρα τῷ γένε), εἴδει δὲ μία, ὅταν τῷ γένει μία οὖσα καὶ ἐν ἀτόμῳ εἴδει ᾖ.
Genetically, then, a motion is one according to the schemata of the categories (for every locomotion is genetically one with every other locomotion, but alteration is genetically different from locomotion); and specifically one, when, being genetically one, it is also in an indivisible species.
οἷον χρώματος μὲν εἰσὶ διαφοραί—τοιγαροῦν ἄλλη τῷ εἴδει μέλανσις καὶ λεύκανσις —λευκότητος δʼ οὐκέτι· διὸ τῷ εἴδει μία λεύκανσις λευκάνσει πάσῃ.
For example, there are differences of color—wherefore blackening and whitening are specifically different—but there are no longer differences of whiteness; hence whitening is specifically one with every other whitening.
εἰ δʼ ἔστιν ἀτθ’ ἃ καὶ γένη ἅμα καὶ εἶδη ἐστίν, δῆλον ὡς ἔστιν ὡς εἴδει μία ἔσται, ἁπλῶς δὲ μία εἴδει οὔ, οἷον ἡ μάθησις, εἰ ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶδος μὲν ὑπολήψεως, γένος δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.
And if there are certain things which are at the same time genera and species, it is clear that in a sense a motion will be specifically one, but not absolutely specifically one, for example learning, if knowledge is a species of belief, but a genus of knowledges.
ἀπορήσειν δʼ ἄν τις εἰ εἴδει μία ἡ κίνησις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ μεταβάλλῃ, οἷον ἡ μία στιγμὴ ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου εἰς τόνδε τὸν τόπον πάλιν καὶ πάλιν.
But someone might raise a difficulty as to whether a motion is specifically one when the same thing changes from the same to the same, for example, when a single point moves from this place to this place again and again.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ, ἔσται ἡ κυκλοφορία τῇ εὐθυφορίᾳ ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κύλισις τῇ βαδίσει.
For if this is so, circular motion will be the same as rectilinear motion, and rolling the same as walking.
ἢ διώρισται, τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ τῷ εἴδει, ὅτι ἑτέρα ἡ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ περιφερὲς τοῦ εὐθέος ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει;
Or is it defined that if that in which the motion occurs is different in species, the motion is different, and that the circular is specifically different from the straight?
γένει μὲν οὖν καὶ
εἴδει κίνησις μία οὕτως, ἀπλῶς δὲ μία κίνησις ἡ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μία καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ τίς δʼ ἡ τοιϲύτη, δῆλον διελομένοις.
Genetically and specifically, then, motion is one in this way; but absolutely one is that which is one in essence and in number. And what kind of motion this is will be clear to those who divide it.
τρία γάρ ἐστι τὸν ἀριθμὸν περὶ ἃ λέγομεν τὴν κίνησιν, ὃ καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὅτε.
For there are three things in number about which we speak of motion: that which, that in which, and when.
λέγω δʼ ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι τὸ κινούμενον, οἶον ἄνθρωπον ἢ χρυσόν, καὶ ἔν τινι τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, σἴον ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν πάθει, καὶ ποτέ· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶν κινεῖται.
I mean that there must be something which is moved, for example, a man or gold, and that this must be moved in something, for example, in place or in affection, and at some time; for everything is moved in time.
τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴδει μίαν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πράγματι ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, τὸ δʼ ἐχομένην ἐν τῷ χρόννῳ τὸ δʼ ἀπλῶς μίαν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις·
And of these, to be one in genus or in species is in the thing in which it is moved, to be continuous is in the time, and to be absolutely one is in all of these.
καὶ ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἓν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἄτομον, οἶον τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ ὅτε, οἶον τὸν χρόνον ἕνα καὶ μὴ διωαλείπειν, καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἓν εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν μελαίνεσθαι καὶ Κορίσκον βαδίζειν (ἓν δὲ Κορίσκος καὶ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός), μηδὲ κοινόν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἅμα δύο ἀνθρώπους ὑγιάζεσθαι τὴν αὐτὴν ὑγίανσιν, οἷον ὀφθαλμίας· ἀλλʼ οὐ μία αὕτη, ἀλλʼ εἴδει μία.
For that in which must be one and indivisible, for example, the species, and the when, for example, the time, must be one and not leave a gap, and that which is moved must be one, not accidentally, as when the white becomes black and Coriscus walks (for Coriscus and the white are one, but only accidentally), nor must it be common; for it would be possible for two men to be cured of the same disease at the same time, for example, of ophthalmia, yet this is not one motion, but only specifically one.
τὸ δὲ Σωκράτη τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τῷ εἴδει, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται τὸ φθαρὲν πάλιν ἓν γίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ, εἴη ἂν καὶ αὕτη μία, εἰ δὲ μή, ἡ αὐτὴ μέν, μία δʼ οὔ.
But as for Socrates undergoing the same alteration in species, at one time and again at another, if indeed it is possible for what has perished to become one again in number, then this motion would also be one, but if not, it is the same, but not one.
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν ταύτῃ παραπλησίαν καὶ πότερον μία ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅλως αἱ ἕξεις καὶ τὰ πάθη τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν· κινούμενα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ ἔχοντα καὶ ῥέοντα.
There is a difficulty close to this, namely, whether health and generally states and affections are one in essence in bodies; for the things that have them appear to be moved and to be in flux.
εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία ἡ ἔωθεν καὶ νῦν ὑγίεια, διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν καὶ ὅταν διαλ ιπὼν λάβη πάλιν τὴν ὑγίειαν, καὶ αὕτη κἀκείνη μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἂν εἴη;
If, then, the morning health and the present health are the same and one, why, when after an interval one recovers health, should not this and that also be one in number?
ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος·
For the argument is the same.
πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο, διʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὡς τῷ ἀριθμῷ, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀνάγκη (μία γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἐνέργεια ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ)·
Except that it differs to this extent: if they are two, for this very reason, as in number, the activities must also be two (for one activity in number is of one thing in number).
εἰ δʼ ἡ ἕξις μία, ἴσως οὐκ ἄν τῳ δόξειέ πω μία καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια εἶναι (ὅταν γὰρ παύσηται βαδίζων, οὐκέτι ἔστιν ἡ βάδισις, πάλιν δὲ βαδίζοντος ἔσται).
But if the state is one, perhaps it would not yet seem to anyone that the activity also is one (for when one stops walking, the walking is no longer, but when one walks again, it will be).
εἰ δʼ οὖν μία καὶ ἡ αὐτή, ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν καὶ φθείρεσθαι καὶ εἶναι πολλάκις.
But if, then, they are one and the same, it would be possible for the same and one thing both to perish and to exist many times.