§4.2Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν καθʼ αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατʼ ἄλλο λέγεται, καὶ τόπος ὁ μὲν κοινός, ἐν ᾧ ἅπαντα τὰ σώματά ἐστιν, ὁ δʼ ἴδιος, ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ (λέγω δὲ οἷον σὺ νῦν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὗτος δʼ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ γῇ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ὅτι ἐν τῶδε τῷ τόπῳ, ὃς περιέχει οὐδὲν πλέον ἢ σέ), εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ τόπος τὸ πρῶτον περιέχον ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων, πέρας τι ἂν εἴη, ὥστε δόξειεν ἂν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἑκάστου ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ᾧ ὁρίζεται τὸ μέγεθος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἡ τοῦ μεγέθους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἑκάστου πέρας.
Now, since one thing is said to be in virtue of itself and another in virtue of something else, and place is on the one hand common, in which all bodies are, and on the other hand proper, in which a body is directly (I mean, for example, that you are now in the heaven because you are in the air, and this is in the heaven, and you are in the air because you are on the earth, and similarly on the earth because you are in this place, which contains nothing more than you), if indeed place is the first container of each of the bodies, it would be a limit, so that the form and shape of each thing might seem to be its place, by which the magnitude and the matter of the magnitude are bounded; for this is the limit of each thing.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν σκοποῦσιν ὁ τόπος τὸ ἑκάστου εἶδός ἐστιν· ᾗ δὲ δοκεῖ ὁ τόπος εἶναι τὸ διάστημα τοῦ μεγέθους, ἡ ὕλη·
Viewed in this way, then, place is the form of each thing; but in so far as place is thought to be the extension of the magnitude, it is the matter.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ μεγέθους, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ περιεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ ὡρισμένον, οἶον ὑπὸ ἐπιπέδου καὶ πέρατος, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον·
For this extension is different from the magnitude, and this is what is contained and bounded by the form, as if by a plane and a limit; and of such a nature is matter and the indeterminate.
ὅταν γὰρ ἀφαιρεθῇ τὸ πέρας καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς σφαίρας, λείπεται οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ὕλην.
For when the limit and the attributes of the sphere are taken away, nothing is left except the matter.
διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταὐτό φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ· τὸ γὰρ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἓν καὶ τοῦτόν.
Therefore Plato also says in the Timaeus that matter and space are the same; for the 'participant' and space are one and the same.
ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν, ὅμως τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο.
And although he spoke in another way of the 'participant' there and in the so-called unwritten doctrines, he nevertheless declared place and space to be the same.
λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, τί δʼ ἐστίν, οὗτος μόνος ἐπεχείρησεν εἰπεῖν. εἰκότως δʼ
ἐκ τούτων σκοπουμένοις δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι χαλεπὸν γναωρίσαι τί ἐστιν ὁ τόπος, εἴπερ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν ἐστίν, εἴτε ἡ ὕλη εἴτε τὸ εἶδος· ἄλλως τε γὰρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἔχει θέαν, καὶ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οὐ ῥᾴδιον γνωρίζειν.
For while everyone says that place is something, he alone attempted to say what it is. And reasonably, to those who consider from these things, it would seem hard to know what place is, if indeed it is either of these, whether matter or form; for on the one hand they require the highest contemplation, and on the other hand they are not easy to know apart from each other.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε ἀδύνατον ὁποτερονοῦν τούτων εἶναι τὸν τόπον, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.
But indeed, that it is impossible for place to be either of these is not hard to see.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη οὐ χωρίζεται τοῦ πράγματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον ἐνδέχεται· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἀὴρ ἦν, ἐν τούτῳ πάλιν ὕδωρ, ὥσπερ ἔφαμεν, γίγνεται, ἀντιμεθισταμένων ἀλλήλοις τοῦ τε ὕδατος καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων ὁμοίως, ὥστε οὔτε μόριον οὔθʼ ἕξις ἀλλὰ χωριστὸς ὁ τόπος ἑκάστου ἐστί.
For form and matter are not separated from the thing, but place can be; for in that in which there was air, in this again water comes to be, as we said, water and air replacing each other, and similarly other bodies, so that place is neither a part nor a state, but separable from each thing.
καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ τοιοῦτό τι εἶναι ὁ τόπος οἷον τὸ ἀγ· γεῖον (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός)· τὸ δʼ ἀγγεῖον οὐδὲν τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν.
For indeed place seems to be something like a vessel (for a vessel is a transportable place); but the vessel is nothing of the thing.
ᾗ μὲν οὖν χωριστὸςτοῦ πρά· γματος, ταύτῃ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος· ᾗ δὲ περιέχει, ταύτῃ δʼ ἕτερος τῆς ὕλης.
So in so far as it is separable from the thing, in this respect it is not the form; and in so far as it contains, in this respect it is different from the matter.
δοκεῖ δὲ ἀεὶ τὸ ὄν που αὐτό τε εἶναί τι καὶ ἕτερόν τι ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ, (Πλάτωνι μέντοι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ παρεκβάντας εἰπεῖν, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί, εἴπερ τὸ μεθεκτικὸν ὁ τόπος, εἴτε τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ὄντος τοῦ μεθεκτικοῦ εἴτε τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραφεν. ) ἔτι πῶς ἂν φέροιτο εἰς τὸν αὐτοῦ τόπον, εἰ ὁ τόπος ἡ ὕλη ἢ τὸ εἶδος;
And what is somewhere is always thought to be both something itself, and something else outside of it. (Yet we must ask Plato, if we may speak in a digression, why the Forms and numbers are not in a place, if indeed the participant is place—whether the participant is the great and the small, or matter, as he has written in the Timaeus.) Further, how could a thing be carried to its own place, if place is either matter or form?
ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὗ μὴ κίνησις μηδὲ τὸ ἄνω ἢ κάτω ἐστί, τόπον εἶναι. ὥστε ζητητέος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ τόπος.
For it is impossible for there to be place where there is neither motion nor up and down. So place must be sought among things of this kind.
εἰ δʼ ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ τόπος (δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ ἢ μορφὴ ἢ ὕλη), ἔσται ὁ τόπος ἐν τόπῳ· μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἅμα τῷ πράγματι καὶ κινεῖται καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀλλʼ οὗπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ὥστε τοῦ τόπου ἔσται τόπος.
And if place is in the thing itself (for it must be, if it is either form or matter), place will be in a place; for both the form and the indeterminate change and move along with the thing, not always in the same place but where the thing itself is; so that there will be a place of place.
ἔτι ὅταν ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ γένηται, ἀπόλωλεν ὁ τόπος· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ τὸ γενόμενον σῶμα·
Further, when water comes to be out of air, the place has perished; for the body that has come to be is not in the same place.
τίς οὖν ἡ φθορά;
What then is this perishing?
ἐξ ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις αὐτοῦ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴρηται.
The grounds, then, on which it is necessary that place should be something, and again those on which one might be in doubt about its substance, have been stated.