§3.3Καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δὲ φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ· ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ.
And the puzzle is also resolved, in that it is clear that motion is in the movable; for it is the fulfillment of this by the mover.
καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινητικοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐντελέχειαν ἀμφοῖν·
And the activity of the mover is not other than this; for there must be a fulfillment of both.
κινητικὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν τῷ δύνασθαι, κινοῦν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὥστε ὁμοίως μία ἡ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἕν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἄναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες·
For it is a mover by being capable, but it moves by being active, yet it is active upon the movable, so that the activity of both is likewise one, just as the same interval is one to two and two to one, and the upward slope and the downward slope.
ταῦτα γὰρ ἕν μέν ἐστιν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἶς·
For these are one, but their definition is not one.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου.
And it is likewise also in the case of the mover and the moved.
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν
λογικήν·
But it has a logical puzzle.
ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἴσως εἶναί τινα ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ· τὸ μὲν δὴ ποίησις, τὸ δὲ πάθησις, ἔργον δὲ καὶ τέλος τοῦ μὲν ποίημα, τοῦ δὲ πάθος.
For it is perhaps necessary that there is some activity of the active and of the passive; the one is acting, the other being-acted-upon, and the work and end of the one is an act, and of the other a passion.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄμφω κινήσεις, εἰ μὲν ἕτεραι, ἐν τίνι;
Since, then, both are motions, if they are different, in what are they?
ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ κινουμένῳ, ἢ ἡ μὲν ποίησις ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἡ δὲ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταύτην ποίησιν καλεῖν, ὁμώνυμος ἂν εἴη).
For either both are in the patient and the moved, or the acting is in the agent and the being-acted-upon is in the patient (and if we must call this latter also 'acting', it would be homonymous).
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινοῦντι ἔσται (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου), ὥστʼ ἢ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν κινήσεται, ἢ ἔχον κίνησιν οὐ κινήσεται.
But indeed if this is so, motion will be in the mover (for the same argument applies to the mover and the moved), so that either every mover will be moved, or having motion it will not be moved.
εἰ δʼ ἄμφω ἐν τῷ κινουμένω καὶ πάσχοντι, καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις, καὶ ἡ δίδαξις καὶ ἡ μάθησις δύο οὖσαι ἐν τῷ μανθάνοντι, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ ἑκάστου οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὑπάρξει, εἶτα ἄτοπον δύο κινήσεις ἅμα κινεῖσθαι·
But if both are in the moved and the patient, both the acting and the being-acted-upon, and teaching and learning, being two, are in the learner, first of all, the activity of each will not belong to each, and secondly, it is absurd for two motions to be moved at the same time.
τίνες γὰρ ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις δύο τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ εἰς ἕν εἶδος;
For what will be two alterations of the one thing into one form?
ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον.
But this is impossible.
ἀλλὰ μία ἔσται ἡ ἐνέργεια.
But [then] the activity will be one.
ἀλλʼ ἄλογον δύο ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν εἶναι ἐνέργειαν·
But it is irrational for the activity of two things different in species to be one and the same.
καὶ ἔσται, εἴπερ ἡ δίδαξις καὶ ἡ μάθησις τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις, καὶ τὸ διδάσκειν τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ πάσχειν, ὥστε τὸν διδάσκοντα ἀνάγκη ἔσται πάντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ποιοῦντα πάσχειν.
And it will be so, if indeed teaching and learning are the same, and acting and being-acted-upon, and to teach is the same as to learn, and to act as to be-acted-upon, so that it will be necessary for the teacher to learn everything and the agent to be acted upon.
ἤ
οὔτε τὸ τὴν ἄλλου ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἶναι ἄτοπον (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ δίδαξις ἐνέργεια τοῦ διδασκαλικοῦ, ἔν τινι μέντοι, καὶ οὐκ ἀποτετμημένη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε, οὔτε μίαν δυοῖν κωλύει οὐθὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι (μὴ ὡς τῷ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλʼ ὡς ὑπάρχει τὸ δυνάμει ὄν πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργοῦν), οὔτʼ ἀνάγκη τὸν διδά· σκοντα μανθάνειν, οὐδʼ εἰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, μὴ μέντοι ὥστε τὸν λόγον εἶναι ἕνα τὸν 〈τὸ〉τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα, οἷον ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ Θήβηθεν Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Θήβας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον;
Or is it that neither is it absurd for the activity of one thing to be in another (for teaching is the activity of the teacher-like, in something indeed, and not cut off, but of this in that), nor does anything prevent one and the same activity from belonging to two (not as being the same in essence, but as the potential being is related to the active), nor is it necessary for the teacher to learn, even if acting and being-acted-upon are the same, yet not so that the definition stating the essence is one, as 'mantle' and 'cloak', but as the road from Thebes to Athens and that from Athens to Thebes, as was also said before?
οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντα ὑπάρχει τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἶς τὸ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό.
For not all the same things belong to things that are the same in any way whatsoever, but only to those whose essence is the same.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ εἰ ἡ δαδαξις τῇ μαθήσει τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν τῷ διδάσκειν, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ εἰ ἡ διάστασις μία τῶν διεστηκότων, καὶ τὸ διίστασθαι ἐνθένθε ἐκεῖσε κἀκεῖθεν δεῦρο ἕν καὶ τὸ αὐτό.
Indeed, not even if teaching is the same as learning, and to learn as to teach, just as if the distance of two separated things is one, to go from here to there and from there to here is not therefore one and the same.
ὅλως δʼ εἰπεῖν οὐδʼ ἡ δίδαξις τῇ μαθήσει οὐδʼ ἡ ποίησις τῇ παθήσει τὸ αὐτὸ κυρίως, ἀλλʼ ᾦ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, ἡ κίνησις· τὸ γὰρ τοῦδε ἐν τῶδε καὶ τὸ τοῦδε ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἕτερον τῷ λόγῳ.
To speak generally, neither teaching is the same as learning nor acting as being-acted-upon in the strict sense, but that in which these belong, namely motion; for to be the activity 'of this in that' and 'of this by that' is different in definition.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν κίνησις εἴρηται καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον πῶς ὁρισθήσεται τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον αὐτῆς·
What motion is, then, has been said both generally and particularly; for it is not unclear how each of its species will be defined.
ἀλλοίωσις μὲν γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ᾖ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἐντελέχεια.
For alteration is the fulfillment of the alterable, as alterable.
ἔτι δὲ γνωριμώτερον, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ, ᾖ τοιοῦτον, ἀπλῶς τε καὶ πάλιν καθʼ ἕκαστον, ἢ οἰκοδόμησις ἢ ἰάτρευσις.
Still more clearly, [the fulfillment] of what is potentially active and passive, as such, both generally and again in each case, e.g. house-building or healing.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λεχθήσεται τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων ἑκάστης.
And the same account will be given concerning each of the other motions.