§1.4.14 Ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, διὰ τί οὐκ ἄνωθεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι ἐμπεριλαβόντες ἅμα ἓν γένος ἄμφω προσηγόρευσαν οἱ ἅνθρωποι, ὃ περιέχει τά τε ἔνυδρα καὶ τὰ πτηνὰ τῶν ζῴων.
4 One might ask why people did not from above, embracing them under a single name, call both of them at once a single genus, which contains both the aquatic and the winged animals.
ἔστι γὰρ ἔνια πάθη κοινὰ καὶ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἅπασιν.
For there are some attributes common both to these and to all the other animals.
ἀλλʼ ὅμως ὀρθῶς διώρισται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
But nevertheless they have been correctly defined in this way.
ὅσα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τῶν γενῶν καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ταῦτα ὑπέζευκται ἑνὶ γένει, ὅσα δʼ ἔχει τὸ ἀνάλογον, χωρίς·
For those of the genera which differ by excess and the 'more and less' are placed under a single genus, while those that have an analogical relation are separate.
λέγω δʼ οἷον ὄρνις ὄρνιθος διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ μακρόπτερον τὸ δὲ βραχύπτερον), ἰχθύες δʼ ὄρνιθος τῷ ἀνάλογον (ὃ γὰρ ἐκείνῳ πτερόν, θατέρῳ λεπίς).
I mean, for example, that bird differs from bird by the 'more' or by 'excess' (for one is long-winged, the other short-winged), but fish from bird by 'analogy' (for what is a feather to the former is a scale to the latter).
τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὐ ῥᾴδιον· τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ ζῷα ἀνάλογον ταὐτὸ πέπονθεν.
But to do this in all cases is not easy; for most animals have the same attribute by analogy.
§1.4.22 ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐσίαι μέν εἰσι τὰ ἔσχατα εἴδη, ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀδιάφορα, οἷον Σωκράτης, Κορίσκος, ἀναγκαῖον τὰ καθόλου ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον εἰπεῖν ἢ πολλάκιςς ταὐτὸν λέγειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται.
2 Since the ultimate species are substances, and these are indistinguishable in form, such as Socrates and Coriscus, it is necessary to speak of the universally existing attributes first, or else to say the same thing many times, as has been said.
τὰ δὲ καθόλου κοινά· τὰ γὰρ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχοντα καθόλου λέγομεν.
And the universal attributes are common; for we call those that belong to more than one thing universal.
ἀπορίαν δʼ ἔχει περὶ πότερα δεῖ πραγματεύεσθαι.
But there is a difficulty as to which of the two we ought to deal with.
ᾗ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἄτομον, κράτιστον, εἴ τις δύναιτο περὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἴδει θεωρεῖν χωρίς, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω μὴ περὶ ὄρνιθος (ἔχει γὰρ εἴδη τὸ γένος τοῦτο), ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὄρνιθος τῶν ἀτόμων, οἷον ἢ στρουθὸς ἢ γέρανος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον.
For insofar as the individual in species is a substance, it is best, if one were able, to investigate separately the particulars and the individuals in species, just as one does about man, and so not about bird (for this genus has species), but about any of the individual birds, such as the sparrow or the crane or some such.
ᾗ δὲ συμβήσεται λέγειν πολλάκις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάθους διὰ τὸ κοινῇ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν, ταύτῃ δʼ ἐστὶν ὑπάτοπον καὶ μακρὸν τὸ περὶ ἑκάστου λέγειν χωρίς.
But insofar as it will happen that one says the same attribute many times because of its belonging in common to more than one, in this way it is rather absurd and tedious to speak of each separately.
§1.4.33 ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὰ μὲν κατὰ γένη κοινῇ λέγειν, ὅσα λέγεται καλῶς ὡρισμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἔχει τε μίαν φύσιν κοινὴν καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς μὴ πολὺ διεστῶτα, ὄρνις καὶ ἰχθύς, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμον μέν, τῷ γένει δʼ ὁμοίως περιέχει τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ εἴδη· ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαύτα, καθʼ ἕκαστον, οἷον περὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν.
3 Perhaps, then, it is right to speak in common according to genera of all those that are spoken of as being well defined by people, and which have both a single common nature and species within them that do not differ much, such as bird and fish, and if there is any other that is indeed nameless, but similarly contains the species within itself as a genus; and of all those that are not of this kind, to speak of them individually, such as about man and if there is any other such.
σχεδὸν δὲ τοῖς σχήμασι τῶν μορίων καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὅλου, ἐὰν ὁμοιότητα ἔχωσιν, ὥρισται τὰ γένη, οἷον τὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων γένος πρὸς αὐτὰ πέπονθε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τὰ μαλάκιά τε καὶ τὰ ὄστρεια.
And the genera are defined, one might say, by the shapes of the parts and of the whole body, if they have a resemblance, just as the genus of birds is in relation to itself, and that of fishes, and the mollusks, and the testaceans.
τὰ γὰρ μόρια διαφέρουσι τούτων οὐ τῇ ἀνάλογον ὁμοιότητι, οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἰχθύι πέπονθεν ὀστοῦν πρὸς ἄκανθαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν, οἷον μεγέθει μικρότητι, μαλακότητι σκληρότητι, λειότητι τραχύτητ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅλως δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
For the parts of these differ not by analogical resemblance, as bone is to fish-spine in man and fish, but rather by bodily properties, such as size and smallness, softness and hardness, smoothness and roughness and such things, and in general by the 'more and less'.
§1.4.4πῶς μὲν οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ τὴν περὶ φύσεως μέθοδον, 4 καὶ τίνα τρόπον γίνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ θεωρία περὶ αὐτῶν ὁδῷ καὶ ῥᾷστα, ἔτι δὲ περὶ διαιρέσεως, τίνα τρόπον ἐνδέχεται μετιοῦσι λαμβάνειν χρησίμως, καὶ διότι τὸ διχοτομεῖν τῇ μὲν ἀδύνατον τῇ δὲ κενόν, εἴρηται.
How, then, one must accept the method concerning nature, and in what way the investigation of these things might proceed systematically and most easily, and furthermore concerning division, in what way it is possible for those who pursue it to grasp it usefully, and why dichotomy is in one way impossible and in another way empty, has been said.
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς λέγωμεν, ἀρχὴν τήνδε ποιησάμενοι.
These things having been defined, let us speak about what follows, making this our starting point.