§7.11#2οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αἰσθητὰ ταῦτα.
For these are not sensible objects.
ἢ οὐθὲν διαφέρει;
Or does it make no difference?
ἔσται γὰρ ὕλη ἐνίων καὶ μὴ αἰσθητῶν· καὶ παντὸς γὰρ ὕλη τις ἔστιν ὃ μὴ ἔστι τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ εἶδος αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ τόδε τι.
For there will be matter for some things even if they are not sensible; for indeed there is a certain matter for everything which is not essence and form itself in its own right, but a "this".
κύκλου μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ καθόλου, τῶν δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἔσται μέρη ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον· ἔστι γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μὲν αἰσθητὴ ἡ δὲ νοητή.
Therefore, these will not be parts of the universal circle, but of the individual circles, as has been said before; for there is sensible matter and intelligible matter.
δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ οὐσία ἡ πρώτη, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὕλη, ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπος ἢ τὸ ζῷον τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὡς καθόλου· Σωκράτης δὲ καὶ Κορίσκος, εἰ μὲν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ Σωκράτης, διττόν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ψυχὴν οἱ δʼ ὡς τὸ σύνολον), εἰ δʼ ἁπλῶς ἡ ψυχὴ ἥδε καὶ τὸ σῶμα τόδε, ὥσπερ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον.
It is also clear that the soul is the primary substance, and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken as universal; but Socrates and Coriscus, if indeed Socrates is also the soul, are twofold (for some understand him as soul, and others as the concrete whole); but if they are simply this soul and this body, they are like the universal and the individual.
πότερον δὲ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην τῶν τοιούτων οὐσιῶν τις ἄλλη, καὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν οὐσίαν ἑτέραν τινὰ οἷον ἀριθμοὺς ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, σκεπτέον ὕστερον.
But whether there is some other substance besides the matter of such substances, and whether one must seek another substance, such as numbers or something of that kind, must be considered later.
τούτου γὰρ χάριν καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσιῶν πειρώμεθα διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ δευτέρας φιλοσοφίας ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας θεωρία· οὐ γὰρ μόνον περὶ τῆς ὕλης δεῖ γνωρίζειν τὸν φυσικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, καὶ μᾶλλον.
For it is for the sake of this that we also attempt to define concerning sensible substances, since in a way the study of sensible substances is the work of physics and second philosophy; for the physicist must know not only about the matter but also about that which is according to the formula, and even more so.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὁρισμῶν πῶς μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ διὰ τί εἷς λόγος ὁ ὁρισμός (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἕν, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα τίνι ἕν, μέρη γε ἔχον; ), σκεπτέον ὕστερον.
But in the case of definitions, how the parts in the formula are parts, and why the definition is one formula (for it is clear that the thing is one, but by virtue of what is the thing one, since it has parts?), must be considered later.
τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ πῶς αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό, καθόλου περὶ παντὸς εἴρηται, καὶ διὰ τί τῶν μὲν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι ἔχει τὰ μόρια τοῦ ὁριζομένου τῶν δʼ οὔ, καὶ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὰ οὕτω μόρια ὡς ὕλη οὐκ ἐνέσται—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκείνης μόρια τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ τῆς συνόλου, ταύτης δέ γʼ ἔστι πως λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν· μετὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὕλης οὐκ ἔστιν (ἀόριστον γάρ), κατὰ τὴν πρώτην δʼ οὐσίαν ἔστιν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος·
What essence is, therefore, and how it is itself in its own right, has been stated universally of everything, and also why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of that which is defined, while that of others does not, and that in the formula of the substance those parts which are as matter will not be present—for indeed they are not parts of that substance, but of the concrete substance; and of this latter there is in a way a formula and in a way there is not; for with the matter there is not (for it is indefinite), but according to the primary substance there is, for example, the formula of the soul in the case of man.
ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐνόν, ἐξ οὗ καὶ τῆς ὕλης ἡ σύνολος λέγεται οὐσία, οἷον ἡ κοιλότης (ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῆς ῥινὸς σιμὴ ῥὶς καὶ ἡ σιμότης ἐστί)—ἐν δὲ τῇ συνόλῳ οὐσίᾳ, οἷον ῥινὶ σιμῇ ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἐνέσται καὶ ἡ ὕλη· καὶ ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τινῶν μὲν ταὐτό, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν, οἷον καμπυλότης καὶ καμπυλότητι εἶναι, εἰ πρώτη ἐστίν (λέγω δὲ πρώτην ἣ μὴ λέγεται τῷ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς ὕλῃ), ὅσα δὲ ὡς ὕλη ἢ ὡς συνειλημμένα τῇ ὕλῃ, οὐ ταὐτό, οὐδʼ εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕν, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ τὸ μουσικόν· ταῦτα γὰρ ταὐτὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
For the substance is the immanent form, from which and from matter the concrete substance is said to be, as for example concavity (for from this and the nose are the snub nose and snubness)—but in the concrete substance, for example in a snub nose or in Callias, the matter will also be present; and that the essence and the individual are in some cases the same, as in the case of primary substances, for example concavity and being concavity, if it is primary (and by "primary" I mean that which is not said of something being in something else, that is, in a subject as matter), but for those things which are as matter or as taken together with matter, they are not the same, nor if they are one by accident, such as Socrates and the musical; for these are the same by accident.