§4.8διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὰ μοναχῶς λεγόμενα καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν ὥσπερ τινὲς λέγουσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐθὲν φάσκοντες ἀληθὲς εἶναι (οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύειν φασὶν οὕτως ἅπαντα εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι), οἱ δὲ πάντʼ ἀληθῆ.
These things having been defined, it is clear that it is also impossible for the one-sided assertions and those applied to all things to hold, as some people say—some asserting that nothing is true (for they say that nothing prevents all things from being so, just as the diagonal is commensurable), and others that all things are true.
σχεδὸν γὰρ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ Ἡρακλείτου· ὁ γὰρ λέγων ὅτι πάντʼ ἀληθῆ καὶ πάντα ψευδῆ, καὶ χωρὶς λέγει τῶν λόγων ἑκάτερον τούτων, ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἀδύνατα ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι.
For these arguments are virtually the same as that of Heraclitus; for he who says that all things are true and all things are false, also says each of these statements separately, so that if those former statements are impossible, it is also impossible for these to be.
ἔτι δὲ φανερῶς ἀντιφάσεις εἰσὶν ἃς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι—οὐδὲ δὴ ψευδεῖς πάσας· καίτοι δόξειέ γʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
Furthermore, there are clearly contradictions which cannot be true at the same time—nor indeed can they all be false, although it might seem more possible from what has been said.
ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αἰτεῖσθαι δεῖ, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω λόγοις, οὐχὶ εἶναί τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν τι, ὥστε ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ διαλεκτέον λαβόντας τί σημαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ τὸ ἀληθές.
But against all such arguments we must demand, as was also said in the discussion above, not that something is or is not, but that it signifies something, so that we must argue on the basis of definition, having grasped what "false" or "true" signifies.
εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ἄλλο τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ ὃ ἀποφάναι ψεῦδός ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως θάτερον εἶναι μόριον ἀληθές.
If to assert what is true is nothing other than that which it is false to deny, it is impossible for all things to be false; for one of the two parts of the contradiction must be true.
ἔτι εἰ πᾶν ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἀναγκαῖον, ἀδύνατον ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ εἶναι· θάτερον γὰρ μόριον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ψεῦδός ἐστιν.
Furthermore, if it is necessary either to affirm or to deny everything, it is impossible for both to be false; for one of the two parts of the contradiction is false.
συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν.
And indeed, that which is commonly said of all such arguments also happens to them, namely that they destroy themselves.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν.
For he who says that all things are true makes even the argument contrary to his own true, so that he makes his own not true (for the contrary says his is not true); while he who says all things are false makes himself false.
ἐὰν δʼ ἐξαιρῶνται ὁ μὲν τὸν ἐναντίον ὡς οὐκ ἀληθὴς μόνος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τὸν αὑτοῦ ὡς οὐ ψευδής, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπείρους συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτεῖσθαι λόγους ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς· ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής, τοῦτο δʼ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται.
And if they make exceptions, the former by treating the contrary argument as the only one that is not true, and the latter his own as not false, they nevertheless happen to demand an infinite number of true and false arguments; for he who says that the true argument is true is speaking truly, and this will go on to infinity.
—φανερὸν δʼ ὅτι οὐδʼ οἱ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν οὐδʼ οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι.
And it is clear that neither those who say that all things are at rest speak truly, nor those who say that all things are in motion.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ ἔσται, φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον (ὁ γὰρ λέγων ποτὲ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται)· εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀληθές· πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ· ἀλλὰ δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον.
For if all things are at rest, the same things will always be true and false, but this is seen to change (for the speaker himself once did not exist, and again will not exist); and if all things are in motion, nothing will be true, and so all things will be false; but it has been shown that this is impossible.
ἔτι ἀνάγκη τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλειν· ἔκ τινος γὰρ εἴς τι ἡ μεταβολή.
Furthermore, that which is must change, for change is from something to something.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντα ἠρεμεῖ ἢ κινεῖται ποτέ, ἀεὶ δʼ οὐθέν· ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτό.
But indeed, neither do all things rest or move at some time, while nothing always does so; for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first mover is itself unmoved.