§4.5#1ἔστι δʼ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἄμφω ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι·
The doctrine of Protagoras also comes from the same opinion, and it is necessary that both alike either exist or do not exist.
εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη εἶναι πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ (πολλοὶ γὰρ τἀναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), καὶ εἰ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντʼ ἀληθῆ (τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες· εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύσουσι πάντες).
For if all things that seem and appear are true, it is necessary that all things be at the same time both true and false (for many think contraries to one another, and consider those who do not think the same as themselves to be deceived; so that it is necessary for the same thing both to be and not to be), and if this is so, it is necessary that all things that seem be true (for those who are deceived and those who speak truly think things that are opposite to each other; if then beings are in this state, all will speak truly).
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσὶ διανοίας ἀμφότεροι οἱ λόγοι, δῆλον·
Therefore, it is clear that both doctrines come from the same thought.
ἔστι δʼ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς ἅπαντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται οἱ δὲ βίας.
But the manner of addressing them is not the same for all; for some need persuasion and others force.
ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπορῆσαι ὑπέλαβον οὕτως, τούτων εὐΐατος ἡ ἄγνοια (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ἡ ἀπάντησις αὐτῶν)· ὅσοι δὲ λόγου χάριν λέγουσι, τούτων δʼ ἔλεγχος ἴασις τοῦ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.
For as many as came to think thus from being in difficulty, their ignorance is easy to cure (for the response to them is not directed to their words but to their thought); but as many as speak for the sake of argument, the cure for them is the refutation of the spoken word and the words they use.
ἐλήλυθε δὲ τοῖς διαποροῦσιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἅμα τὰς ἀντιφάσεις καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ὁρῶσιν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα τἀναντία·
For those who are in difficulty, this opinion has come from sensible things; on the one hand, the opinion that contradictions and contraries exist at the same time came from their seeing contraries arising from the same thing.
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, προϋπῆρχεν ὁμοίως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄμφω ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας μεμῖχθαι πᾶν ἐν παντί φησι καὶ Δημόκριτος· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ πλῆρες ὁμοίως καθʼ ὁτιοῦν ὑπάρχειν μέρος, καίτοι τὸ μὲν ὂν τούτων εἶναι τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν.
If then it is impossible for non-being to come to be, the thing must have existed before as both, just as Anaxagoras says that everything is mixed in everything, and Democritus too; for he also says that the void and the full are equally present in any part whatever, although one of these is being and the other non-being.
πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντας ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ὀρθῶς λέγουσι τρόπον δέ τινα ἀγνοοῦσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὂν λέγεται διχῶς, ὥστʼ ἔστιν ὃν τρόπον ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἔστι δʼ ὃν οὔ, καὶ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ· δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελεχείᾳ δʼ οὔ.
To those, then, who think from these reasons, we shall say that in a way they speak correctly, and in a way they are ignorant; for being is spoken of in two ways, so that there is a way in which it is possible for something to come to be from non-being, and there is a way in which it is not, and for the same thing to be at the same time both being and non-being, but not in the same respect; for in potentiality it is possible for the same thing to be contraries at the same time, but in actuality it is not.
ἔτι δʼ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν.
Furthermore, we shall require them to believe that there is also another substance of beings to which belongs neither motion nor destruction nor generation at all.
—ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν.
Similarly, the truth about appearances has also come to some from sensible things.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι, τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ γευομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πικρόν, ὥστʼ εἰ πάντες ἔκαμνον ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, δύο δʼ ἢ τρεῖς ὑγίαινον ἢ νοῦν εἶχον, δοκεῖν ἂν τούτους κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν τοὺς δʼ ἄλλους οὔ·
For they think that truth ought not to be judged by large or small numbers, but the same thing seems sweet to some who taste it and bitter to others; so that if all were sick or all were mad, and only two or three were healthy or sane, these would seem to be sick and mad, and the others not.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τἀναντία φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐ ταὐτὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀεὶ δοκεῖν.
Furthermore, they see that many of the other animals receive impressions contrary to ours, and even to each individual himself, things do not always seem the same according to sensation.
ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως.
Which of these, then, are true or false is unclear; for these are no more true than those, but equally so.
διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γʼ ἄδηλον.
Therefore, Democritus says that either nothing is true, or at least to us it is unclear.
ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δʼ εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος τοιαύταις δόξαις γεγένηνται ἔνοχοι.
In general, because they conceive sensation to be thought, and this to be alteration, they say that what appears according to sensation is of necessity true; for from these reasons both Empedocles and Democritus and, so to speak, each of the others have become subject to such opinions.
καὶ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μεταβάλλοντας τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ τὴν φρόνησιν· "
πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἐναύξεται ἀνθρώποισιν. "
καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις δὲ λέγει ὅτι
"
ὅσσον δʼ ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ
καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο. "
καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ ἀποφαίνεται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· "
ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτʼ ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυκάμπτων,
τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ
ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει, μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν
καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα. "
Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτʼ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν.
For Empedocles says that as people change their state, they change their thought: "For wisdom grows in men according to what is present." And in other passages he says that: "Insofar as they changed into different beings, so far did it always happen to them to think different thoughts." Parmenides also declares in the same manner: "For as on each occasion the mixture of the flexible limbs is, so does mind present itself to men; for it is the same thing which thinks, namely the nature of the limbs in men, both in each and in all; for that which is more is thought." An Anaxagorean saying is also remembered, addressed to some of his companions, that things will be for them such as they suppose them to be.
φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλλʼ οὐ ταὐτά.
And they say that Homer also appears to have held this opinion, because he made Hector, when he was out of his mind from the blow, lie thinking other thoughts, as though even those who are out of their minds think, but not the same thoughts.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, εἰ ἀμφότεραι φρονήσεις, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἅμα οὕτω τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.
It is clear, then, that if both are thoughts, beings also are at the same time both so and not so.
ᾗ καὶ χαλεπώτατον τὸ συμβαῖνόν ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ οἱ μάλιστα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς ἑωρακότες—οὗτοι δʼ εἰσὶν οἱ μάλιστα ζητοῦντες αὐτὸ καὶ φιλοῦντες—οὗτοι τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς δόξας καὶ ταῦτα ἀποφαίνονται περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ἀθυμῆσαι τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγχειροῦντας;
And it is in this way that the consequence is most difficult; for if those who have seen the truth as far as possible—and these are they who seek it most and love it—if these hold such opinions and declare these things about the truth, how is it not fitting that those who attempt to philosophize should lose heart?
τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἂν εἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
For to seek the truth would be to chase flying things.
—αἴτιον δὲ τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δʼ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον·
The cause of this opinion for these people is that they were inquiring into the truth about beings, but they supposed beings to be only sensible things.