§4.2#1τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ δʼ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυὲς εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς), ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα τούτοις,— οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλʼ ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν·
But being is spoken of in many ways, yet with reference to one thing and some one nature, and not homonymously, but just as everything "healthy" is related to health, one thing by preserving it, another by producing it, another by being a sign of health, and another because it is receptive of it; and the "medical" is related to medicine (for one thing is called medical by having the art of medicine, another by being naturally suited to it, another by being a work of medicine), and we shall find other things spoken of in a similar way to these— so also being is spoken of in many ways, but all with reference to one principle.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δʼ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δʼ ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμεν.
For some things are called "beings" because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a route to substance, or destructions or privations or qualities, or productive or generative of substance or of things spoken of with reference to substance, or negations of some of these or of substance; which is why we say that even non-being "is" non-being.
καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἁπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Just as, then, there is one science of all healthy things, this is likewise true of other things as well.
οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθʼ ἓν λεγομένων ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ λέγονται καθʼ ἕν.
For it belongs to one science to contemplate not only things spoken of according to one thing, but also those spoken of with reference to one nature; for these too, in a way, are spoken of with reference to one.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα μιᾶς θεωρῆσαι ᾗ ὄντα.
It is clear, then, that it belongs to one science to contemplate beings qua beings.
πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, καὶ διʼ ὃ λέγονται.
But everywhere science is chiefly of that which is first, and upon which the other things depend, and because of which they are spoken of.
εἰ οὖν τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.
If, then, this is substance, the philosopher must possess the principles and causes of substances.
—ἅπαντος δὲ γένους καὶ αἴσθησις μία ἑνὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οἷον γραμματικὴ μία οὖσα πάσας θεωρεῖ τὰς φωνάς·
Now of every single genus there is one perception and one science, as for example grammar, being one, contemplates all vocal sounds.
διὸ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ὅσα εἴδη θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει, τά τε εἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν.
Therefore, to contemplate all the species of being qua being belongs to a science that is one in genus, and the species of the species as well.
εἰ δὴ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ταὐτὸν καὶ μία φύσις τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ δηλούμενα (διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν οὐδʼ ἂν ὁμοίως ὑπολάβωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ἔργου μᾶλλον)· ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὢν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερόν τι δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐπαναδιπλούμενον τὸ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἷς ὢν ἄνθρωπος (δῆλον δʼ ὅτι οὐ χωρίζεται οὔτʼ ἐπὶ γενέσεως οὔτʼ ἐπὶ φθορᾶς), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ πρόσθεσις ἐν τούτοις ταὐτὸ δηλοῖ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὸ ἓν παρὰ τὸ ὄν, ἔτι δʼ ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία ἕν ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν τι· —ὥσθʼ ὅσα περ τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὄντος· περὶ ὧν τὸ τί ἐστι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει θεωρῆσαι, λέγω δʼ οἷον περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.
If, indeed, being and one are the same and a single nature by following each other as principle and cause do, but not as being indicated by a single definition (though it makes no difference even if we conceive them similarly—indeed it is rather helpful for our task); for "one man" and "man" are the same, and "existing man" and "man" are the same, and the verbal repetition in "one man" and "one existing man" does not indicate anything different (and it is clear that they are not separated either in generation or in destruction), and likewise in the case of "one," so that it is manifest that the addition in these cases indicates the same thing, and "one" is nothing different besides "being," and further, the substance of each thing is "one" not by accident, and likewise it is some "being"— so that there are as many species of "one" as there are of "being"; to contemplate the essence of which belongs to the same science in genus, I mean, for instance, about the same, the like, and other such things.
σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται τἀναντία εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην· τεθεωρήσθω δʼ ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ τοσαῦτα μέρη φιλοσοφίας ἔστιν ὅσαι περ αἱ οὐσίαι· ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα πρώτην καὶ ἐχομένην αὐτῶν.
And nearly all contraries are reduced to this principle; let these be considered by us in our "Selection of Contraries." And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are substances; so that it is necessary that there is some first philosophy and another following it.
ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχον τὸ ὂν· διὸ καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀκολουθήσουσι τούτοις.
For being has genera immediately, and therefore the sciences will follow these.
ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος ὥσπερ ὁ μαθηματικὸς λεγόμενος· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἔχει μέρη, καὶ πρώτη τις καὶ δευτέρα ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἄλλαι ἐφεξῆς ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.
For the philosopher is like the one called a mathematician; for this science also has parts, and there is a certain first and second science, and others in order among the mathematical sciences.
—ἐπεὶ δὲ μιᾶς τἀντικείμενα θεωρῆσαι, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ ἀντίκειται πλῆθος—ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἓν οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἡ στέρησις (ἢ γὰρ ἁπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο, ἤ τινι γένει· ἔνθα μὲν οὖν †τῷ ἑνὶ ἡ διαφορὰ πρόσεστι παρὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει†, ἀπουσία γὰρ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἐκείνου ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τῇ στερήσει καὶ ὑποκειμένη τις φύσις γίγνεται καθʼ ἧς λέγεται ἡ στέρησις) —ὥστε καὶ τἀντικείμενα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, τό τε ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα λέγεται ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἕν, τῆς εἰρημένης γνωρίζειν ἐπιστήμης· ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἐναντιότης· διαφορὰ γάρ τις ἡ ἐναντιότης, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἑτερότης.
But since it belongs to one science to contemplate opposites, and to "one" is opposed "plurality"—and it belongs to one science to contemplate negation and privation because both contemplate the "one" of which there is the negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or in some genus; in the former case, then, †the difference is added to the one besides what is in the negation†, for negation is the absence of that thing, but in privation there is also some underlying nature of which the privation is spoken)—so that it belongs to the aforementioned science to know the opposites of the things mentioned, namely the other, the unlike, the unequal, and whatever else is spoken of either according to these or according to plurality and the one, among which is also contrariety; for contrariety is a certain difference, and difference is otherness.