§3.4#3πάντων δὲ καὶ θεωρῆσαι χαλεπώτατον καὶ πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι τἀληθὲς ἀναγκαιότατον πότερόν ποτε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὂν τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ δὲ ὄν ἐστιν, ἢ δεῖ ζητεῖν τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἄλλης φύσεως.
Of all things, both the most difficult to examine and the most necessary for knowing the truth is whether "being" and "one" are the substances of existing things, and each of them is, without being anything else, respectively "one" and "being", or whether we must inquire what "being" and "one" are, on the assumption that some other nature underlies them.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνως οἱ δʼ οὕτως οἴονται τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν.
For some think that nature is in the former way, and others in the latter way.
Πλάτων μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι·
For Plato and the Pythagoreans think that "being" and "one" are not anything else, but that this is their very nature, on the ground that the substance of them is the very being one and being.
οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὡς εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀνάγων λέγει ὅ τι τὸ ἕν ἐστιν· δόξειε γὰρ ἂν λέγειν τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (αἰτία γοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ ἓν εἶναι πᾶσιν), ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δʼ ἀέρα φασὶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ὄντα εἶναί τε καὶ γεγονέναι.
But those who study nature, such as Empedocles, reduce it to what is more familiar and state what the "one" is; for he would seem to say that this is "love" (at least this is the cause of being one for all things); while others say that this "one" and "being" is fire, and others air, from which existing things both exist and have been generated.
ὣς δʼ αὔτως καὶ οἱ πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοσαῦτα λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν ὅσας περ ἀρχὰς εἶναί φασιν.
And in the same way also those who posit more than one element; for it is necessary for these too to say that "one" and "being" are as many as they say the principles are.
συμβαίνει δέ, εἰ μέν τις μὴ θήσεται εἶναί τινα οὐσίαν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι τῶν καθόλου μηθέν (ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τι ἓν αὐτὸ μηδʼ αὐτὸ ὄν, σχολῇ τῶν γε ἄλλων τι ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα καθʼ ἕκαστα), ἔτι δὲ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐσίας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδʼ ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ὡς κεχωρισμένη τις φύσις τῶν ὄντων (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς μονάδες, ἡ δὲ μονὰς ὅπερ ἕν τί ἐστιν)·
But it results that, on the one hand, if one does not posit "one" and "being" to be some substance, none of the other universals will exist (for these are the most universal of all, and if there is no "one itself" and "being itself", hardly would any of the other things exist apart from what are called particulars); and further, if "one" is not a substance, it is clear that neither would number exist as some separated nature of existing things (for number is monads, and the monad is precisely a certain one).
εἰ δʼ ἔστι τι αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ ὄν, ἀναγκαῖον οὐσίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν· οὐ γὰρ ἕτερόν τι καθόλου κατηγορεῖται ἀλλὰ ταῦτα αὐτά. —ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γʼ ἔσται τι αὐτὸ ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ ἕν, πολλὴ ἀπορία πῶς ἔσται τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, λέγω δὲ πῶς ἔσται πλείω ἑνὸς τὰ ὄντα.
But on the other hand, if there is a "one itself" and "being itself", it is necessary that their substance be the "one" and the "being"; for it is not some other universal that is predicated of them, but these very things. —But indeed, if there is to be some "being itself" and "one itself", there is much difficulty as to how there will be anything else besides these, I mean, how existing things will be more than one.
τὸ γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸν Παρμενίδου συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη λόγον ἓν ἅπαντα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ὄν.
For what is other than "being" is not, so that, according to the argument of Parmenides, it must result that all existing things are one, and this is "being".
ἀμφοτέρως δὲ δύσκολον· ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ᾖ τὸ ἓν οὐσία ἄν τε ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀδύνατον τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὐσίαν εἶναι.
But in either way it is difficult; for both if the "one" is not a substance, and if the "one itself" is, it is impossible for number to be a substance.
ἐὰν μὲν οὖν μὴ ᾖ, εἴρηται πρότερον διʼ ὅ· ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ, ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος.
Now, if it is not, the reason why has been stated before; but if it is, there is the same difficulty as about "being".
ἐκ τίνος γὰρ παρὰ τὸ ἓν ἔσται αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἕν;
For from what, besides the "one", will there be another "one" itself?
ἀνάγκη γὰρ μὴ ἓν εἶναι· ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ ἓν ἢ πολλὰ ὧν ἓν ἕκαστον.
For it must not be one; but all existing things are either one or many, of which each is one.
ἔτι εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ Ζήνωνος ἀξίωμα οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη (ὃ γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον μήτε ἀφαιρούμενον ποιεῖ μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον, οὔ φησιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, ὡς δηλονότι ὄντος μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος· καὶ εἰ μέγεθος, σωματικόν· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντῃ ὄν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πὼς μὲν προστιθέμενα ποιήσει μεῖζον, πὼς δʼ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐπίπεδον καὶ γραμμή, στιγμὴ δὲ καὶ μονὰς οὐδαμῶς)·
Further, if the "one itself" is indivisible, according to Zeno's axiom it would be nothing (for that which when added or subtracted makes nothing larger or smaller, he says is not one of existing things, on the obvious assumption that what exists is a magnitude; and if a magnitude, it is bodily, for this exists in every dimension; while other things, if added in one way will make something larger, but in another way nothing, like a plane and a line, but a point and a monad in no way).
ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ οὗτος θεωρεῖ φορτικῶς, καὶ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἀδιαίρετόν τι ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνόν τινʼ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν (μεῖζον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ποιήσει πλεῖον δὲ προστιθέμενον τὸ τοιοῦτον)· —ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς τοιούτου ἢ πλειόνων τοιούτων ἔσται μέγεθος;
But since he examines crudely, and it is possible for there to be something indivisible, so that there is some defense even against him (for such a thing when added will not make something larger, but will make them more); —but how indeed from one such thing or more than one such will there be a magnitude?
ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ τὴν γραμμὴν ἐκ στιγμῶν εἶναι φάσκειν.
For it is like saying that a line is made of points.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἴ τις οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνει ὥστε γενέσθαι, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλου μὴ ἑνός τινος τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ζητητέον διὰ τί καὶ πῶς ὁτὲ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέγεθος ἔσται τὸ γενόμενον, εἴπερ τὸ μὴ ἓν ἡ ἀνισότης καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἦν.
But indeed, even if someone supposes in such a way that, as some say, number is generated from the "one itself" and from some other "not-one", nonetheless we must inquire why and how the generated thing will be at one time a number and at another time a magnitude, if indeed the "not-one" was inequality and the same nature.
οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ ταύτης οὔτε ὅπως ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς καὶ ταύτης γένοιτʼ ἂν τὰ μεγέθη, δῆλον.
For neither how magnitudes could be generated from the "one" and this nature, nor from some number and this nature, is clear.