§13.8#2ἐκεῖνοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ὄντα λέγουσιν· τὰ γοῦν θεωρήματα προσάπτουσι τοῖς σώμασιν ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνων ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν. —εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη μέν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν ὄντων τι καθʼ αὑτό, τούτων εἶναί τινα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων, οὐθένα δὲ τούτων ἐνδέχεται, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀριθμοῦ τις τοιαύτη φύσις οἵαν κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες αὐτόν.
But those thinkers say that number is the existents; at any rate, they apply their theorems to bodies as though those bodies were composed of those numbers. —If, then, it is necessary, if indeed number is something self-existent among the existents, that it should be in one of these mentioned ways, and yet none of these is possible, it is clear that there is no such nature of number as those who make it separable construct. —Moreover, is each unit from the Great and the Small made equal, or is one from the Small and another from the Great?
—ἔτι πότερον ἑκάστη μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ἰσασθέντων ἐστίν, ἢ ἡ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ μικροῦ ἡ δʼ ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου; εἰ μὲν δὴ οὕτως, οὔτε ἐκ πάντων τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον οὔτε ἀδιάφοροι αἱ μονάδες (ἐν τῇ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέγα ἐν τῇ δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ὑπάρχει, ἐναντίον τῇ φύσει ὄν)·
If, indeed, it is in the latter way, neither is each unit composed of all the elements, nor are the units without difference (for in one the Great is present, and in another the Small, which is contrary in nature).
ἔτι αἱ ἐν τῇ τριάδι αὐτῇ πῶς;
Moreover, how is it with the units in the Triad itself?
μία γὰρ περιττή· ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἴσως αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ περιττῷ μέσον.
For one is odd; but perhaps because of this they make the One itself the middle in the odd.
εἰ δʼ ἑκατέρα τῶν μονάδων ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἐστὶν ἰσασθέντων, ἡ δυὰς πῶς ἔσται μία τις οὖσα φύσις ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ;
But if each of the units is from both made equal, how will the Dyad exist, being some single nature, composed of the Great and the Small?
ἢ τί διοίσει τῆς μονάδος;
Or how will it differ from the unit?
ἔτι προτέρα ἡ μονὰς τῆς δυάδος (ἀναιρουμένης γὰρ ἀναιρεῖται ἡ δυάς)· ἰδέαν οὖν ἰδέας ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν εἶναι, προτέραν γʼ οὖσαν ἰδέας, καὶ γεγονέναι προτέραν.
Moreover, the unit is prior to the Dyad (for when it is abolished, the Dyad is abolished); therefore, being prior to an idea, it must itself be an idea of an idea, and must have been generated prior to it.
ἐκ τίνος οὖν;
From what, then, was it generated?
ἡ γὰρ ἀόριστος δυὰς δυοποιὸς ἦν. —ἔτι ἀνάγκη ἤτοι ἄπειρον τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι ἢ πεπερασμένον· χωριστὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὥστε οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ οὐχὶ τούτων θάτερον ὑπάρχειν.
For the indefinite Dyad was the maker of two. —Moreover, it is necessary that number be either infinite or finite; for they make number separable, so that it is not possible that one of these should not belong to it.
ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον (οὔτε γὰρ περιττὸς ὁ ἄπειρός ἐστιν οὔτʼ ἄρτιος, ἡ δὲ γένεσις τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἢ περιττοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἢ ἀρτίου ἀεί ἐστιν· ὡδὶ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς εἰς τὸν ἄρτιον πίπτοντος περιττός, ὡδὶ δὲ τῆς μὲν δυάδος ἐμπιπτούσης ὁ ἀφʼ ἑνὸς διπλασιαζόμενος, ὡδὶ δὲ τῶν περιττῶν ὁ ἄλλος ἄρτιος· ἔτι εἰ πᾶσα ἰδέα τινὸς οἱ δὲ ἀριθμοὶ ἰδέαι, καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος ἔσται ἰδέα τινός, ἢ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἄλλου τινός· καίτοι οὔτε κατὰ τὴν θέσιν ἐνδέχεται οὔτε κατὰ λόγον, τάττουσί γʼ οὕτω τὰς ἰδέας)·
That it is not possible, then, for it to be infinite is clear (for the infinite is neither odd nor even, but the generation of numbers is always either of an odd number or of an even number: in one way, when the One falls into the even, it is odd; in another way, when the Dyad falls in, it is that which is doubled from the One; and in another way, when the odd numbers fall in, it is the other even; moreover, if every idea is of something, and numbers are ideas, the infinite also will be an idea of something, either of sensible things or of something else; and yet this is possible neither according to their thesis nor according to reason, at least they arrange the ideas in this way).
εἰ δὲ πεπερασμένος, μέχρι πόσου;
But if it is finite, up to what limit?
τοῦτο γὰρ δεῖ λέγεσθαι οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἀλλὰ καὶ διότι.
For this must be stated not only as a fact, but also with its reason.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὁ ἀριθμός, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν, πρῶτον μὲν ταχὺ ἐπιλείψει τὰ εἴδη—οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ τριὰς αὐτοάνθρωπος, τίς ἔσται ἀριθμὸς αὐτόιππος;
But indeed, if number goes up to the Decad, as some say, in the first place the forms will quickly run short—for example, if the Triad is Man-itself, what number will be Horse-itself?
αὐτὸ γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀριθμὸς μέχρι δεκάδος· ἀνάγκη δὴ τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἀριθμῶν τινὰ εἶναι (οὐσίαι γὰρ καὶ ἰδέαι οὗτοι)· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἐπιλείψει (τὰ τοῦ ζῴου γὰρ εἴδη ὑπερέξει)—.
For each number up to the Decad is some 'itself'; it is necessary, then, that it should be one of the numbers within these (for these are substances and ideas); but nevertheless they will run short (for the forms of animal will exceed them).
ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι εἰ οὕτως ἡ τριὰς αὐτοάνθρωπος, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τριάδες (ὅμοιαι γὰρ αἱ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀριθμοῖς), ὥστʼ ἄπειροι ἔσονται ἄνθρωποι, εἰ μὲν ἰδέα ἑκάστη τριάς, αὐτὸ ἕκαστος ἄνθρωπος, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωποί γε.
And at the same time it is clear that if in this way the Triad is Man-itself, so also are the other triads (for those in the same numbers are similar), so that there will be infinite men, if indeed each triad is an idea, each being Man-itself, and if not, at least they will be men.
καὶ εἰ μέρος ὁ ἐλάττων τοῦ μείζονος, ὁ ἐκ τῶν συμβλητῶν μονάδων τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ, εἰ δὴ ἡ τετρὰς αὐτὴ ἰδέα τινός ἐστιν, οἷον ἵππου ἢ λευκοῦ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται μέρος ἵππου, εἰ δυὰς ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
And if the smaller number is a part of the greater, being composed of the associable units in the same number, if indeed the Tetrad itself is the idea of something, for example of a horse or of white, man will be a part of a horse, if man is a Dyad.
ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς μὲν δεκάδος εἶναι ἰδέαν ἑνδεκάδος δὲ μή, μηδὲ τῶν ἐχομένων ἀριθμῶν.
And it is also absurd that there should be an idea of the Decad, but not of the Hendecad, nor of the subsequent numbers.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γίγνεται ἔνια καὶ ὧν εἴδη οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε διὰ τί οὐ κἀκείνων εἴδη ἔστιν;
Moreover, some things both exist and come to be of which there are no forms; why then are there not forms of those things as well?
οὐκ ἄρα αἴτια τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν.
Therefore, the forms are not causes.