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Aristotle · Metaphysics §13.7#3

Differentiation of Indivisible Units and Number Composition

Passage 144 of 159 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle argues against the absurdity of making units different based on their indivisibility, exploring the consequences for the composition of numbers and Ideas, and discusses the difficulty of whether counting is by addition or by parts.

§13.7#3καὶ οὐχ ὅτι ἀδιαίρετοι, διοίσουσι διὰ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ αἱ στιγμαὶ ἀδιαίρετοι, ἀλλʼ ὅμως παρὰ τὰς δύο οὐθὲν ἕτερον ἡ δυὰς αὐτῶν. —ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι συμβαίνει προτέρας καὶ ὑστέρας εἶναι δυάδας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀριθμούς.
And they will not differ just because they are indivisible; for points too are indivisible, but nevertheless the dyad of them is nothing other than the two points.—But indeed, we must not overlook this either, that it turns out that there are prior and posterior dyads, and likewise also with the other numbers.
αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τετράδι δυάδες ἔστωσαν ἀλλήλαις ἅμα· ἀλλʼ αὗται τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀκτάδι πρότεραί εἰσι, καὶ ἐγέννησαν, ὥσπερ ἡ δυὰς ταύτας, αὗται τὰς τετράδας τὰς ἐν τῇ ὀκτάδι αὐτῇ, ὥστε εἰ καὶ ἡ πρώτη δυὰς ἰδέα, καὶ αὗται ἰδέαι τινὲς ἔσονται.
For let the dyads in the tetrad be simultaneous with one another; but these are prior to those in the octad, and they generated—just as the dyad generated them—the tetrads in the octad-itself, so that if the first dyad is an Idea, these too will be certain Ideas.
ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μονάδων· αἱ γὰρ ἐν τῇ δυάδι τῇ πρώτῃ μονάδες γεννῶσι τὰς τέτταρας τὰς ἐν τῇ τετράδι, ὥστε πᾶσαι αἱ μονάδες ἰδέαι γίγνονται καὶ συγκείσεται ἰδέα ἐξ ἰδεῶν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖνα ὧν ἰδέαι αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι συγκείμενα ἔσται, οἷον εἰ τὰ ζῷα φαίη τις συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ ζῴων, εἰ τούτων ἰδέαι εἰσίν.
And the same argument applies also to the units; for the units in the first dyad generate the four in the tetrad, so that all the units become Ideas, and an Idea will be composed of Ideas; so that it is clear that those things of which these are Ideas will also be composed, as for example if one were to say that animals are composed of animals, if there are Ideas of these.
—ὅλως δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰς μονάδας διαφόρους ὁπωσοῦν ἄτοπον καὶ πλασματῶδες (λέγω δὲ πλασματῶδες τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν βεβιασμένον)· οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ὁρῶμεν διαφέρουσαν μονάδα μονάδος, ἀνάγκη τε ἢ ἴσον ἢ ἄνισον εἶναι ἀριθμόν, πάντα μὲν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὸν μοναδικόν, ὥστʼ εἰ μήτε πλείων μήτʼ ἐλάττων, ἴσος· τὰ δὲ ἴσα καὶ ὅλως ἀδιάφορα ταὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς.
—But in general, to make the units different in any way whatsoever is absurd and fictional (and by "fictional" I mean forced to suit a hypothesis); for neither in quantity nor in quality do we see a unit differing from a unit, and it is necessary that a number is either equal or unequal, all numbers but especially that which consists of units, so that if it is neither more nor less, it is equal; and things that are equal and entirely non-different we assume to be identical in the case of numbers.
εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδʼ αἱ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δεκάδι δυάδες ἀδιάφοροι ἔσονται ἴσαι οὖσαι· τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν ἕξει λέγειν ὁ φάσκων ἀδιαφόρους εἶναι;
Otherwise, not even the dyads in the Decad-itself will be non-different, though they are equal; for what reason will he have to give who asserts that they are non-different?
ἔτι εἰ ἅπασα μονὰς καὶ μονὰς ἄλλη δύο, ἡ ἐκ τῆς δυάδος αὐτῆς μονὰς καὶ ἡ ἐκ τῆς τριάδος αὐτῆς δυὰς ἔσται ἐκ διαφερουσῶν τε, καὶ πότερον προτέρα τῆς τριάδος ἢ ὑστέρα;
Again, if every unit and another unit make two, the dyad composed of the unit from the Dyad-itself and the unit from the Triad-itself will be composed of different units, and will this be prior or posterior to the triad?
μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔοικε προτέραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἅμα τῇ τριάδι ἡ δʼ ἅμα τῇ δυάδι τῶν μονάδων.
For it seems more likely that it must be prior; for one of the units is simultaneous with the triad, and the other with the dyad of units.
καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅλως ἓν καὶ ἕν, καὶ ἐὰν ᾖ ἴσα ἢ ἄνισα, δύο εἶναι, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον· οἱ δʼ οὕτως λέγοντες οὐδὲ τὰς μονάδας.
And while we assume that in general 'one' and 'one', whether they are equal or unequal, are two (for example, the good and the bad, and a man and a horse), those who speak thus do not allow this even in the case of units.
εἴτε δὲ μὴ ἔστι πλείων ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῆς τριάδος αὐτῆς ἢ ὁ τῆς δυάδος, θαυμαστόν· εἴτε ἐστὶ πλείων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἴσος ἔνεστι τῇ δυάδι, ὥστε οὗτος ἀδιάφορος αὐτῇ τῇ δυάδι.
And if the number of the Triad-itself is not greater than that of the Dyad-itself, it is wonderful; and if it is greater, it is clear that there is also a number in it equal to the dyad, so that this is non-different from the Dyad-itself.
ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, εἰ πρῶτός τις ἔστιν ἀριθμὸς καὶ δεύτερος.
But this is not possible, if there is a certain first and second number.
οὐδὲ ἔσονται αἱ ἰδέαι ἀριθμοί.
Nor will the Ideas be numbers.
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν οἱ διαφόρους τὰς μονάδας ἀξιοῦντες εἶναι, εἴπερ ἰδέαι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον· ἓν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, αἱ δὲ μονάδες εἰ ἀδιάφοροι, καὶ αἱ δυάδες καὶ αἱ τριάδες ἔσονται ἀδιάφοροι.
For this very point is rightly stated by those who claim that the units are different, if they are to be Ideas, as was said before; for the form is one, but if the units are non-different, the dyads and triads will also be non-different.
διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖσθαι οὕτως, ἓν δύο, μὴ προσλαμβανομένου πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς λέγειν (οὔτε γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἔσται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος, οὔτʼ ἰδέαν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι· ἐνυπάρξει γὰρ ἑτέρα ἰδέα ἐν ἑτέρᾳ, καὶ πάντα τὰ εἴδη ἑνὸς μέρη)· διὸ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν, ὅλως δʼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀναιροῦσιν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γʼ αὐτὸ ἔχειν τινὰ φήσουσιν ἀπορίαν, πότερον, ὅταν ἀριθμῶμεν καὶ εἴπωμεν ἓν δύο τρία, προσλαμβάνοντες ἀριθμοῦμεν ἢ κατὰ μερίδας.
Therefore they must also say that numbering proceeds thus, "one, two," without adding to what is already there (for otherwise there will be no generation from the indefinite dyad, nor is it possible for there to be an Idea; for one Idea will be present in another, and all the forms will be parts of one form); therefore, in relation to their hypothesis they speak rightly, but in general not rightly; for they destroy many things, although they will say that this very point presents some difficulty, whether, when we count and say "one, two, three," we count by addition or by separate parts.
ποιοῦμεν δὲ ἀμφοτέρως· διὸ γελοῖον ταύτην εἰς τηλικαύτην τῆς οὐσίας ἀνάγειν διαφοράν.
But we do it in both ways; wherefore it is ridiculous to trace this back to so great a difference in substance.

Notes

  1. ¦25¦καὶ οὐχ ὅτι ἀδιαίρετοι, διοίσουσι διὰ τοῦτο — The subject is "the units" (αἱ μονάδες) continued from the previous context (1082a21-23). `οὐχ ὅτι...` is a construction introducing a rejected reason ("not because..."), modifying `διοίσουσι` (the third-person plural future of `διαφέρω`).
  2. ¦15¦μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔοικε προτέραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι — The verb `ἔοικε` ("it seems") is used impersonally, taking the accusative-with-infinitive clause `προτέραν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι` ("that it must be prior"). The grammatical subject of the infinitive, represented by the feminine accusative singular adjective `προτέραν`, is the dyad (ἡ δυάς) mentioned in the preceding sentence, which is composed of the unit from the Dyad-itself and the unit from the Triad-itself.
  3. ¦30¦μὴ προσλαμβανομένου πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι — A genitive absolute construction. The present passive participle `προσλαμβανομένου` (genitive singular) is used impersonally (or with an implied number or unit) to mean "without anything being added to what is already there (πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρχοντι)". This refers to the Platonists' non-additive method of counting.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Metaphysics §13.7#3. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:13.7%233

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