§10.3ἀντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ πλείους τρόπους, ὧν ἕνα τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢ διῃρημένον ἢ διαιρετὸν πλῆθός τι λέγεται, τὸ δὲ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ μὴ διῃρημένον ἕν.
The one and the many are opposed in several ways, of which one way is that the one and plurality are opposed as indivisible and divisible; for that which is either divided or divisible is called a certain plurality, whereas the indivisible or undivided is one.
ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τετραχῶς, καὶ τούτων κατὰ στέρησιν λέγεται θάτερον, ἐναντία ἂν εἴη καὶ οὔτε ὡς ἀντίφασις οὔτε ὡς τὰ πρός τι λεγόμενα.
Since, then, opposition is spoken of in four ways, and of these, one of the two is spoken of by privation, they would be contraries, and neither as a contradiction nor as relatives.
λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ δηλοῦται τὸ ἕν, ἐκ τοῦ διαιρετοῦ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον αἰσθητὸν τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ τὸ διαιρετὸν ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ὥστε τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ ἀδιαιρέτου διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.
And the one is spoken of and made clear from its contrary, the indivisible from the divisible, because plurality and the divisible are more perceptible than the indivisible, so that in definition plurality is prior to the indivisible because of perception.
ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἑνός, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων διεγράψαμεν, τὸ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους τὸ ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἄνισον.
And to the one belong, as we also diagrammed in the division of contraries, the same, the like, and the equal, while to plurality belong the other, the unlike, and the unequal.
λεγομένου δὲ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ πολλαχῶς, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον κατʼ ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν ἐνίοτε αὐτό, τὸ δʼ ἐὰν καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ᾖ, οἷον σὺ σαυτῷ καὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ ἕν· ἔτι δʼ ἐὰν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας εἷς ᾖ, οἷον αἱ ἴσαι γραμμαὶ εὐθεῖαι αἱ αὐταί, καὶ τὰ ἴσα καὶ ἰσογώνια τετράγωνα, καίτοι πλείω· ἀλλʼ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἰσότης ἑνότης.
Since the same is spoken of in many ways, in one way we sometimes speak of that which is same in number, and in another way if it is one both in definition and in number, as for instance you are one with yourself both in form and in matter; and furthermore, if the definition of the primary substance is one, as equal straight lines are the same, and equal and equiangular squares, although they are more than one; but in these cases equality is oneness.
ὅμοια δὲ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὰ ἁπλῶς ὄντα, μηδὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀδιάφορα τὴν συγκειμένην, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ταὐτὰ ᾖ, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τετράγωνον τῷ μικρῷ ὅμοιον, καὶ αἱ ἄνισοι εὐθεῖαι· αὗται γὰρ ὅμοιαι μέν, αἱ αὐταὶ δὲ ἁπλῶς οὔ.
And things are like if, while not being simply the same, and not being without difference in their composite substance, they are the same in form, just as the larger square is like the smaller, and unequal straight lines; for these are indeed like, but simply the same they are not.
τὰ δὲ ἐὰν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἔχοντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐγγίγνεται, μήτε μᾶλλον ᾖ μήτε ἧττον.
And other things are like if, having the same form, and being things in which "more and less" can occur, they are neither more nor less.
τὰ δὲ ἐὰν ᾖ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος καὶ ἓν τῷ εἴδει, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, σφόδρα καὶ ἧττον, ὅμοιά φασιν εἶναι ὅτι ἓν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν.
And other things, if there is the same affection and it is one in form, for instance white, in a high degree and in a lesser degree, they say are like because their form is one.
τὰ δὲ ἐὰν πλείω ἔχῃ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἕτερα, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τὰ πρόχειρα, οἷον καττίτερος ἀργύρῳ ᾗ λευκόν, χρυσὸς δὲ πυρὶ ᾗ ξανθὸν καὶ πυρρόν.
And other things, if they have more identical than different features, either simply or those that are prominent, as tin is like silver in being white, and gold like fire in being yellow and red.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον πολλαχῶς λέγεται.
So it is clear that both the other and the unlike are spoken of in many ways.
καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ἀντικειμένως καὶ τὸ ταὐτό, διὸ ἅπαν πρὸς ἅπαν ἢ ταὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο·
And the other and the same are spoken of as opposed, so that everything is, in relation to everything else, either the same or other.
τὸ δʼ ἐὰν μὴ καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὁ λόγος εἷς, διὸ σὺ καὶ ὁ πλησίον ἕτερος·
And in another way, if both the matter and the definition are not one, on which account you and your neighbor are different.
τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς.
And thirdly, as in the case of mathematical objects.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶν πρὸς πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσα λέγεται ἓν καὶ ὄν· οὐ γὰρ ἀντίφασίς ἐστι τοῦ ταὐτοῦ, διὸ οὐ λέγεται ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων (τὸ δὲ μὴ ταὐτὸ λέγεται), ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὄντων πάντων· ἢ γὰρ ἓν ἢ οὐχ ἓν πέφυχʼ ὅσα ὂν καὶ ἕν.
Therefore, the different or the same is on this account spoken of in every case in relation to every case, as many as are called one and being; for [different] is not a contradiction of the same, which is why it is not spoken of in the case of non-beings (whereas "not the same" is spoken of), but in the case of all beings; for as many as are being and one are by nature either one or not one.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον καὶ ταὐτὸν οὕτως ἀντίκειται, διαφορὰ δὲ καὶ ἑτερότης ἄλλο.
So the different and the same are opposed in this way, but difference and otherness are distinct.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ οὗ ἕτερον οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τινὶ ἕτερον· πᾶν γὰρ ἢ ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸ ὅ τι ἂν ᾖ ὄν·
For that which is other and that than which it is other need not be other in some particular respect; for everything that is a being is either other or the same.
τὸ δὲ διάφορον τινὸς τινὶ διάφορον, ὥστε ἀνάγκη ταὐτό τι εἶναι ᾧ διαφέρουσιν.
But that which is different is different from something in some particular respect, so that there must be something the same in respect of which they differ.
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ταὐτὸ γένος ἢ εἶδος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ διαφέρον διαφέρει ἢ γένει ἢ εἴδει, γένει μὲν ὧν μὴ ἔστι κοινὴ ἡ ὕλη μηδὲ γένεσις εἰς ἄλληλα, οἷον ὅσων ἄλλο σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, εἴδει δὲ ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ γένος (λέγεται δὲ γένος ὃ ἄμφω τὸ αὐτὸ λέγονται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ διάφορα).
And this same thing is either a genus or a species; for everything that differs, differs either in genus or in species—in genus, those things of which there is no common matter and no generation into one another, as many as have a different figure of category; in species, those of which the genus is the same (and genus means that which both the different things are said to be the same in respect of substance).
τὰ δʼ ἐναντία διάφορα, καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις διαφορά τις.
And contraries are different, and contrariety is a certain difference.
ὅτι δὲ καλῶς τοῦτο ὑποτιθέμεθα, δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· πάντα γὰρ διαφέροντα φαίνεται καὶ ταῦτα, οὐ μόνον ἕτερα ὄντα ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὸ γένος ἕτερα τὰ δʼ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ τῆς κατηγορίας, ὥστʼ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει καὶ ταὐτὰ τῷ γένει.
That we assume this correctly is clear from induction; for all these [contraries] appear to be different, and not only other but some are other in genus, while others are in the same coordination of category, so that they are in the same genus and are the same in genus.
διώρισται δʼ ἐν ἄλλοις ποῖα τῷ γένει ταὐτὰ ἢ ἕτερα.
And what kinds of things are the same or other in genus has been defined elsewhere.