§1.4ὑποπτεύσειε δʼ ἄν τις Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος ἔρωτα ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχήν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης·
One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to seek such a thing, and if anyone else posited love or desire among existing things as a principle, such as Parmenides as well.
καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν
"
πρώτιστον μέν (φησιν) ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων
"
, Ἡσίοδος δὲ
"
πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετʼ, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
γαῖʼ εὐρύστερνος
ἠδʼ ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν,
"
ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τινʼ αἰτίαν ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνάξει τὰ πράγματα.
For he too, in constructing the generation of the universe, says: "First of all the gods she devised Love", and Hesiod says: "First of all indeed Chaos came to be, but then broad-bosomed Earth and Love, who is preeminent among all the immortals", on the ground that there must exist among existing things some cause which will move and bring things together.
τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον·
Now as to how one should distribute these thinkers regarding who was first, let it be permitted to judge later.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τἀναντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐνόντα ἐφαίνετο ἐν τῇ φύσει, καὶ οὐ μόνον τάξις καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀταξία καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, καὶ πλείω τὰ κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τῶν καλῶν, οὕτως ἄλλος τις φιλίαν εἰσήνεγκε καὶ νεῖκος, ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρων αἴτιον τούτων.
But since the contraries to the good also appeared to be present in nature, and not only order and the beautiful but also disorder and the ugly, and the bad things were more numerous than the good and the trivial than the beautiful, so another thinker introduced friendship and strife, each being the cause of each of these.
εἰ γάρ τις ἀκολουθοίη καὶ λαμβάνοι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἃ ψελλίζεται λέγων Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, εὑρήσει τὴν μὲν φιλίαν αἰτίαν οὖσαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ δὲ νεῖκος τῶν κακῶν· ὥστʼ εἴ τις φαίη τρόπον τινὰ καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρῶτον λέγειν τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὰς Ἐμπεδοκλέα, τάχʼ ἂν λέγοι καλῶς, εἴπερ τὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων αἴτιον αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν ἐστι. —οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου δυοῖν αἰτίαιν ὧν ἡμεῖς διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως ἡμμένοι φαίνονται, τῆς τε ὕλης καὶ τοῦ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, ἀμυδρῶς μέντοι καὶ οὐθὲν σαφῶς ἀλλʼ οἷον ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οἱ ἀγύμναστοι ποιοῦσιν·
For if one should follow and take according to the thought and not according to what Empedocles lisps when speaking, one will find that friendship is the cause of good things and strife of bad things; so that if one were to say that Empedocles in a way both speaks of and is the first to speak of the bad and the good as principles, one would perhaps speak well, if indeed the cause of all good things is the good itself. — These thinkers, then, as we say, and up to this point, appear to have touched upon two causes of those which we distinguished in our works on nature: both matter and that from which is motion; however, obscurely and in no way clearly, but just as untrained men do in battles.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι περιφερόμενοι τύπτουσι πολλάκις καλὰς πληγάς, ἀλλʼ οὔτε ἐκεῖνοι ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης οὔτε οὗτοι ἐοίκασιν εἰδέναι ὅ τι λέγουσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐθὲν χρώμενοι φαίνονται τούτοις ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ μικρόν.
For they too, wheeling around, often strike fine blows, but neither do they do so from knowledge, nor do these thinkers seem to know what they are saying; for they appear to make almost no use of them except to a small extent.
Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν, καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐπὶ πλέον μὲν τούτου χρῆται τοῖς αἰτίοις, οὐ μὴν οὔθʼ ἱκανῶς, οὔτʼ ἐν τούτοις εὑρίσκει τὸ ὁμολογούμενον.
For Anaxagoras uses intellect as a device for world-making, and whenever he is at a loss as to what cause makes it exist of necessity, then he drags it in, but in other cases he blames everything else rather than intellect for what comes to be. And Empedocles uses his causes to a greater extent than him, yet neither sufficiently, nor does he find in them what is consistent.
πολλαχοῦ γοῦν αὐτῷ ἡ μὲν φιλία διακρίνει τὸ δὲ νεῖκος συγκρίνει.
Indeed, in many places for him friendship divides and strife combines.
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα διίστηται τὸ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, τότε τὸ πῦρ εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων ἕκαστον· ὅταν δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῆς φιλίας συνίωσιν εἰς τὸ ἕν, ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ἑκάστου τὰ μόρια διακρίνεσθαι πάλιν. —Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοὺς πρότερον πρῶτος τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν διελεῖν εἰσήνεγκεν, οὐ μίαν ποιήσας τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλʼ ἑτέρας τε καὶ ἐναντίας, ἔτι δὲ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα τέτταρα πρῶτος εἶπεν (οὐ μὴν χρῆταί γε τέτταρσιν ἀλλʼ ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι μόνοις, πυρὶ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὸ τοῖς δʼ ἀντικειμένοις ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, γῇ τε καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι· λάβοι δʼ ἄν τις αὐτὸ θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν)· —οὗτος μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, οὕτω τε καὶ τοσαύτας εἴρηκε τὰς ἀρχάς·
For whenever the universe is separated into the elements by strife, then fire is combined into one, and each of the other elements; but when they come together again into the one by friendship, it is necessary that the parts be divided again out of each. — Empedocles, then, in contrast with his predecessors, was the first to introduce the division of this cause, making the principle of motion not one but different and contrary; and further, he was the first to state that the elements spoken of in the form of matter are four (yet he does not use them as four, but as if they were only two, fire by itself, and its opposites as a single nature: earth, air, and water; one might grasp this by observing it from his verses). — This thinker, then, as we say, spoke in this way and of so many principles.
Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναί φασι, λέγοντες τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πλῆρες καὶ στερεὸν τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ κενὸν τὸ μὴ ὄν (διὸ καὶ οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναί φασιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ σῶμα), αἴτια δὲ τῶν ὄντων ταῦτα ὡς ὕλην.
But Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are elements, calling the one being and the other non-being, and of these the full and solid is being, and the empty non-being (wherefore they say that being is not at all more than non-being, because body is not more than empty space either), and these are the causes of existing things as matter.
καὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἓν ποιοῦντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν τἆλλα τοῖς πάθεσιν αὐτῆς γεννῶσι, τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἀρχὰς τιθέμενοι τῶν παθημάτων, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ οὗτοι τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων εἶναί φασιν.
And just as those who make the underlying substance one generate the other things by its affections, positing the rare and the dense as the principles of the affections, in the same way these thinkers too say that the differences are the causes of the other things.
ταύτας μέντοι τρεῖς εἶναι λέγουσι, σχῆμά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν· διαφέρειν γάρ φασι τὸ ὂν ῥυσμῷ καὶ διαθιγῇ καὶ τροπῇ μόνον· τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν ῥυσμὸς σχῆμά ἐστιν ἡ δὲ διαθιγὴ τάξις ἡ δὲ τροπὴ θέσις· διαφέρει γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α τοῦ Ν σχήματι τὸ δὲ ΑΝ τοῦ ΝΑ τάξει τὸ δὲ Ζ τοῦ Η θέσει.
These, however, they say are three: shape, arrangement, and position; for they say that being differs only by "rhysmos" and "diathige" and "trope"; and of these "rhysmos" is shape, "diathige" is arrangement, and "trope" is position; for A differs from N in shape, and AN from NA in arrangement, and Z from H in position.
περὶ δὲ κινήσεως, ὅθεν ἢ πῶς ὑπάρξει τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ οὗτοι παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥᾳθύμως ἀφεῖσαν.
But concerning motion, whence or how it will belong to existing things, they too, similarly to the others, lazily passed over it.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν δύο αἰτιῶν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ἐζητῆσθαι παρὰ τῶν πρότερον.
Concerning the two causes, then, as we say, they seem to have been investigated to this extent by our predecessors.