§1.1#1πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.
All men by nature desire to know.
σημεῖον δʼ ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται διʼ αὑτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων.
An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for even apart from their utility they are loved for themselves, and most of all the sense of sight, above the others.
οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἱρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων.
For not only that we may act, but even when we are not about to act, we prefer seeing, one might say, to all the other senses.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς.
The reason is that this of all the senses makes us know best and reveals many differences.
φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δʼ ἐγγίγνεται.
By nature, then, animals are born with sensation, but from this, in some of them memory is not produced, while in others it is.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστί, φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ μανθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῴων ἔστι), μανθάνει δʼ ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν.
And for this reason, the former are more intelligent and more capable of learning than those unable to remember, being intelligent without learning such as are unable to hear sounds (like the bee, and if there is any other such class of animals), while those learn which, in addition to memory, possess this sense also.
τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς.
Now, the other animals live by appearances and memories, and share but little in experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings.
γίγνεται δʼ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν.
And experience comes to men from memory; for many memories of the same thing produce the capacity for a single experience.
καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δʼ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ δʼ ἀπειρία τύχην.
And experience seems to be almost similar to science and art, but science and art come to men through experience; for experience has created art, as Polus says, but inexperience chance.
γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις.
And art arises when from many notions of experience a single universal judgment is formed concerning similar things.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλίᾳ κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· τὸ δʼ ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατʼ εἶδος ἓν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης.
For to have a judgment that this was beneficial to Callias when he was suffering from this disease, and to Socrates, and similarly to many individuals, belongs to experience; but that it was beneficial to all such persons, demarcated according to one class, when suffering from this disease, as for instance to phlegmatic or bilious people when burning with fever, belongs to art.
—πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἱ ἔμπειροι τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων (αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι·
With a view to action, then, experience seems to differ not at all from art; on the contrary, we even see men of experience succeeding more than those who, without experience, possess the theory. (The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, while art is knowledge of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual; for the physician does not cure "man", except incidentally, but Callias or Socrates or some other of those so designated, who happens to be a man.
ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ δʼ ἐν τούτῳ καθʼ ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον)·
If, therefore, anyone possesses the theory without experience, and knows the universal but is ignorant of the individual contained within it, he will frequently fail in his treatment; for it is the individual that is to be cured).