§1#2Ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις πῶς ποτὲ τοῦ μὲν πάθους παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται τὸ μὴ παρόν.
One might raise the question how on earth, when the affection is present but the thing is absent, that which is not present is remembered.
Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γινόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οἷον ζωγράφημά τι τὸ πάθος, οὖ φαμὲν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην εἶναι·
For it is clear that one must conceive that which is generated through sense-perception in the soul and in the part of the body which possesses it as being like a picture—the affection, the state of which we say is memory.
ἡ γὰρ γινομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυλίοις.
For the movement that occurs stamps in, as it were, an impression of the sense-image, just like those who make an impression with signet-rings.
Διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν κινήσει πολλῇ διὰ πάθος ἢ δι’ ἡλικίαν οὖσιν οὐ γίνεται μνήμη, καθάπερ ἂν εἰς ὕδωρ ῥέον ἐμπιπτούσης τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς σφραγῖδος·
Hence, also, in those who are in a state of great movement, because of passion or because of age, no memory occurs, just as if the movement and the seal were falling into running water.
τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ψήχεσθαι, καθάπερ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, καὶ διὰ σκληρότητα τοῦ δεχομένου τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἐγγίνεται ὁ τύπος.
And in others, because of wearing away, like old buildings, and because of the hardness of that which receives the affection, the impression does not arise.
Διόπερ οἵ τε σφόδρα νέοι καὶ οἱ γέροντες ἀμνήμονές εἰσιν· ῥέουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν φθίσιν.
Wherefore both the very young and the old are forgetful; for the former are in a state of flux because of growth, and the latter because of decay.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ λίαν ταχεῖς καὶ οἱ λίαν βραδεῖς οὐδέτεροι φαίνονται μνήμονες· οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ὑγρότεροι τοῦ δέοντος, οἱ δὲ σκληρότεροι· τοῖς μὲν οὖν οὐ μένει τὸ φάντασμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τῶν δ’ οὐχ ἅπτεται.
In like manner, both those who are excessively quick and those who are excessively slow appear to be neither of them mindful; for the former are moister than is necessary, and the latter harder; in the case of the former, the image does not remain in the soul, and in the case of the latter, it does not touch them.
Ἀλλ’ εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τὴν μνήμην, πότερον τοῦτο μνημονεύει τὸ πάθος, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἀφ’ οὖ ἐγένετο;
But if indeed this is what happens concerning memory, does one remember this, namely the affection, or that from which it arose?
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο, τῶν ἀπόντων οὐδὲν ἂν μνημονεύοιμεν· εἰ δ’ ἐκεῖνο, πῶς αἰσθανόμενοι τούτου μνημονεύομεν, οὗ μὴ αἰσθανόμεθα, τὸ ἀπόν;
For if the former, we would remember none of the things that are absent; but if the latter, how, while perceiving this, do we remember that which we do not perceive, namely the absent thing?
Εἴτ’ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, τούτου αὐτοῦ ἡ αἴσθησις διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμη ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τούτου;
Further, if it is like an impression or drawing in us, why on earth should the perception of this very thing be memory of something else, and not of this very thing?
Ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου.
For the person who exercises memory contemplates this affection and perceives this.
Πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ παρὸν μνημονεύει;
How then does he remember that which is not present?
Εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ παρὸν καὶ ἀκούειν.
For it would be possible both to see and to hear that which is not present.
Ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτο;
Or is there a way in which this is possible and does happen?
Οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένον καὶ ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ εἰκών, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἄμφω, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν φάντασμα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ αὐτό τι καθ’ αὑτὸ εἶναι θεώρημα καὶ ἄλλου φάντασμα.
For just as the animal painted on a panel is both an animal and an image, and this very same and single thing is both, yet the being is not the same for both, and it is possible to contemplate it both as an animal and as an image, so also must we suppose the mental image in us to be both something in itself, an object of contemplation, and a mental image of another thing.
Ἦι μὲν οὖν καθ’ αὑτό, θεώρημα ἢ φάντασμά ἐστιν, ᾖ δ’ ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμα.
Insofar, then, as it is in itself, it is an object of contemplation or a mental image, but insofar as it is of another, it is, as it were, an image and a reminder.
Ὥστε καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ, ἂν μὲν ᾗ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι, ταύτῃ αἴσθηται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ, οἷον νόημά τι ἢ φάντασμα φαίνεται ἐπελθεῖν· ἂν δ’ ᾗ ἄλλου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, καὶ μὴ ἑωρακὼς τὸν Κορίσκον ὡς Κορίσκου·
So that also when the movement of it is active, if the soul perceives it insofar as it is in itself, some thought or mental image appears to present itself; but if insofar as it is of another, it contemplates it as an image, just as in the case of the painting, and even without having seen Coriscus, as of Coriscus.
ἐνταῦθά τε ἄλλο τὸ πάθος τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης καὶ ὅταν ὡς ζῷον γεγραμμένον θεωρῇ, ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μὲν γίνεται ὥσπερ νόημα μόνον, τὸ δ’ ὡς ἐκεῖ ὅτι εἰκών, μνημόνευμα.
And there, this contemplation is a different affection from when one contemplates it as a painted animal; and in the soul, the one arises as a mere thought, while the other, just as in the former case because it is an image, arises as a reminder.
Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ’ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων κινήσεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ οὒ διστάζομεν· ὁτὲ δὲ συμβαίνει ἐννοῆσαι καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι ὅτι ἠκούσαμέν τι πρότερον ἢ εἴδομεν.
And because of this, when such movements arise in our soul from having perceived something before, we sometimes do not know whether it happens in accordance with having perceived, and we doubt whether it is memory or not; but at other times it happens that we think and recollect that we heard or saw something before.
Τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν θεωρῶν ὡς αὐτὸ μεταβάλλῃ καὶ θεωρῇ ὡς ἄλλου.
And this happens when, contemplating it as itself, one changes and contemplates it as of another.
Γίνεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον, οἷον συνέβη Ἀντιφέροντι τῷ Ὠρείτῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξισταμένοις· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ἔλεγον ὡς γενόμενα καὶ ὡς μνημονεύοντες.
The opposite also happens, as occurred to Antipheron of Oreus and others who were out of their minds; for they spoke of their mental images as if they had actually happened and as if they were remembering them.
Τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν τις τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρῇ.
And this happens when someone contemplates that which is not an image as an image.
Αἱ δὲ μελέται τὴν μνήμην σώζουσι τῷ ἐπαναμιμνήσκειν· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὸ θεωρεῖν πολλάκις ὡς εἰκόνα καὶ μὴ ὡς καθ’ αὑτό.
And practices preserve memory by repeatedly reminding; and this is nothing other than contemplating many times as an image, and not as something in itself.
Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν, εἴρηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις, καὶ τίνος μορίου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ ᾧ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα.
What memory and remembering are, then, has been stated: that it is a state of a mental image, as an image of that of which it is an image, and to which of the parts in us it belongs: namely, the primary sensory faculty, and that with which we perceive time.