§1.33.1περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη εἰπεῖν, τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποῖα.
It would remain next to speak about justice, what it is, in what circumstances, and concerning what matters.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ λάβοιμεν τί ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον, ἔστιν δὴ διττὸν τὸ δίκαιον, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι κατὰ νόμον.
First of all, then, if we take what the just is, the just is indeed twofold, of which one is in accordance with the law.
§1.33.2δίκαια γάρ φασιν εἶναι ἃ ὁ νόμος προστάττει.
For people say that those things which the law commands are just.
ὁ δὲ νόμος κελεύει τἀνδρεῖα πράττειν καὶ τὰ σώφρονα καὶ ἁπλῶς ἅπαντα ὅσα κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγεται.
And the law bids us to perform acts of courage, acts of temperance, and simply all those things which are said to be in accordance with the virtues.
διὸ καί, φασίν, δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι·
Therefore also, they say, justice seems to be a kind of complete virtue.
εἰ γὰρ δίκαια μέν ἐστιν ἃ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ νόμος τὰ κατὰ πάσας ἀρετὰς ὄντα προστάττει, ὁ ἄρα τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ἐμμένων δικαίοις τελείως σπουδαῖος ἔσται, ὥστε ὁ δίκαιος καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τελεία τις ἀρετὴ ἐστίν.
For if those things which the law bids us to do are just, and the law commands those things which are in accordance with all the virtues, then he who abides by the just things in accordance with the law will be completely virtuous; so that the just man and justice are a kind of complete virtue.
§1.33.3ἓν μὲν δή τι δίκαιον ἔν τε τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ τοῦτο τὸ δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν περὶ ταῦτα δικαιοσύνην ζητοῦμεν.
Now indeed, one kind of just is in these things and concerned with them; yet we are seeking neither this just nor the justice concerned with these things.
κατὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ δίκαια ἔστιν καθʼ ἑαυτὸν ὄντα δίκαιον εἶναι (ὁ γὰρ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ αὐτὸς καθʼ ἑαυτόν ἐστι τοιοῦτος)·
For in accordance with these just things, it is possible for a person to be just by himself (for the temperate, the courageous, and the self-controlled person is such by himself); but the just towards another is different from the aforementioned just in accordance with the law.
ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ἄλλο τοῦ εἰρημένου κατὰ νόμον δικαίου ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ἔσττιν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον δικαίοις οὖσιν καθʼ αὑτὸν εἶναι δίκαιον.
For in the case of just things towards another, it is not possible to be just by himself.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὃ ζητοῦμεν δίκαιον καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν περὶ ταῦτα.
And this is the just that we are seeking, and the justice concerned with these things.
§1.33.4τὸ τοίνυν δίκαιον ἐδτιν τὸ πρὸς ἕτερον ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν τὸ ἴσον.
The just, then, which is towards another is, to speak simply, the equal.
τὸ γὰρ ἄδικον τὸ ἄνισον ἐστίν· ὅταν γὰρ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μείζω αὑτοῖς νέμωσι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν τὰ ἐλάσσονα, ἄνισον τοῦτʼ ἐστί, καὶ οὕτως ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι οἴονται.
For the unjust is the unequal; for when people assign to themselves the greater of good things, and the lesser of evil things, this is unequal, and in this way they think they commit injustice and suffer injustice.
§1.33.5δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀδικία ἐν ἀνίσοις, ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἰσότητι συμβολαίων.
It is clear then that, since injustice is in unequal things, justice and the just are in the equality of transactions.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μεσόυης τις ἂν εἴη ὑπερσχῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως καὶ πολλοῦ καὶ ὀλίγου.
Therefore, it is clear that justice would be a kind of mean between excess and deficiency, and between much and little.
§1.33.6ὅ τε γὰρ ἄδικος τῷ ἀδικεῖν πλεῖον ἔχει, καὶ ὁ ἀδικούμενος δὲ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔλαττον· τὸ δέ γε μέσον τούτωον δίκαιον ἐστί.
For the unjust person, by committing injustice, has more, and the person who is treated unjustly, by being treated unjustly, has less; but the mean between these is the just.
τὸ δὲ μέσον ἔσον· ὥστε τὸ ἔσον ἂν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος εἴη δίκαιον, καὶ δίκαιος δὲ ὁ τὸ ἴσον βουλόμενος ἔχειν.
And the mean is the equal; so that the equal would be the just between more and less, and the just person is the one who wishes to have the equal.
§1.33.7τὸ δέ γε ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν ἐγγίνεται· τὸ ἄρα πρὸς ἕτερον ἴσον εἶναι δίκαιον ἐστί, καὶ δίκαιος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη.
But the equal occurs in at least two things; therefore, to be equal towards another is the just, and such a person would be just.
§1.33.8ἑπεὶ οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐν δικαίῳ καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ ἐν μεσότητι, 〈καὶ〉 τὸ μὲν δίκαιον [ἐν] τισὶ λέγεται δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἴσον ἔν τισιν ἴσον, τὸ δὲ μέσον τισὶ μέσον· ὥστε ἡ δικκιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαρον ἔσται καὶ πρός τινας καὶ ἐν τισίν.
Since, then, justice is in the just, in the equal, and in the mean, <and> the just is said to be just for certain persons, and the equal is equal for certain persons, and the mean is a mean for certain persons; so that justice and the just will be both towards certain persons and in certain things.
§1.33.9ον ἂν εἴη.
<it would be proportionate>.
τὸ δʼ ἀνάλογον ἔντέτταρσι γίνεται ἐλαχίστοις·
And proportion occurs in at least four terms; for as A is to B, so C is to D.
ὡς γὰρ τὸ Απρὸς τὸ Β, τὸ Γπρὸς τὸ Δ. οἷον ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν τὸν τὰ πολλὰ κεκτημένον πολλὰ εἰσφέρειν, τὸν δὲ τὰ ὀλίγα κεκτημένον ὀλίγα· πάλιν ὁμοίως τὸν μὲν πολλὰ πεπονηκότα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν, τὸν δὲ ὀλίγα πεπονηκότα ὀλίγα λαμβάνειν.
For example, it is proportionate for the one who possesses much to contribute much, and the one who possesses little to contribute little; again, similarly, for the one who has labored much to receive much, and the one who has labored little to receive little.
ὡς δὲ ἔγει ὁ πεπονηκὼς πρὸς τὸν μὴ πεπονηκότα, οὕτω τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς τὰ ὀλίγα.
And as the one who has labored is to the one who has not labored, so is much to little.
ὡς δὲ ὁ πεπονηκὼς πρὸς τὰ πολλά, οὕτως ὁ μὴ πεπονηκὼς πρὸς τὰ ὀλίγα.
And as the one who has labored is to much, so is the one who has not labored to little.