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Aristotle · Great Ethics §1.25.1-1.25.3

Greatness of Soul as a Mean Regarding Honor

Passage 27 of 71 · Greek

Summary

Defines greatness of soul as a virtuous mean concerned with honor, especially honor from the excellent, and establishes it as the middle state between vanity and smallness of soul by defining these two extremes.

§1.25.1ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης μέν ἐστιν χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας, ἔστι δὲ περὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν, καὶ περὶ τιμὴν οὐ τὴν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἀλλὰ τὴν παρὰ τῶν σπουδαίων, καὶ μᾶλλον δὲ δὴ περὶ ταύτην.
Greatness of soul is a mean between vanity and smallness of soul, and it is concerned with honor and dishonor, and not with honor from the many, but with that from the excellent, and indeed rather with this.
οἱ γὰρ σπουδαῖοι εἰδότες καὶ κρίνοντες ὀρθῶς τιμήσουσιν· βουλήσεται οὖν μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν συνειδότων αὑτῷ ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστι τιμῆς τιμᾶσθαι.
For the excellent, knowing and judging rightly, will bestow honor; therefore he will wish rather to be honored by those who share the knowledge that he is worthy of honor.
οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ πᾶσαν τιμὴν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν βελτίστην, καὶ τὸ τίμιον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀρχῆς τάξιν ἔχον.
For indeed it will not be concerned with every honor, but with the best, and that which is a prized good and has the rank of rule.
§1.25.2οἱ μὲν οὖν εὐκαταφρόνητοι ὄντες καὶ φαῦλοι, μεγάλων δʼ αὑτοὺς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τιμᾶσθαι οἰόμενοι δεῖν, χαῦνοι· ὅσοι δὲ ἐλαττόνων αὑτοὺς ἀξιοῦσιν ἢ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς, μικρόψυχοι.
Those, then, who are contemptible and base, yet deem themselves worthy of great things and, in addition to these, think they ought to be honored, are vain; but as many as deem themselves worthy of less than belongs to them, are small of soul.
§1.25.3ὁ ἄρα μέσος τούτων ἐστὶν ὃς μήτε ἐλάττονος τιμῆς αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἢ προσήκει, μήτε μείζονος ἢ ἄξος ἐστίν, μήτε πάσης· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ μεγαλάψυχφοςι ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἐστὶ χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας.
The mean between these, then, is he who neither deems himself worthy of less honor than belongs to him, nor of greater than he is worthy of, nor of every honor; and this is the man of great soul so that it is clear that greatness of soul is a mean between vanity and smallness of soul.

Notes

  1. 1.25.1ὑπὸ τῶν συνειδότων αὑτῷ ὅτι ἄξιός ἐστι — The participle συνειδότων (from σύνοιδα, 'to share knowledge with') is used with the dative of the reflexive pronoun αὑτῷ to refer to the excellent people who share the knowledge of—or are fully aware of—the fact that the magnanimous man (the subject) is worthy of honor. αὑτῷ is the dative complement of συνειδότων, and the ὅτι clause explains the content of this knowledge.
  2. 1.25.1τὸ τίμιον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀρχῆς τάξιν ἔχον — This neuter phrase is in apposition to τὴν βελτίστην [τιμήν] (the best honor) in the preceding clause, defining the nature of this honor as 'a prized good that has the rank of rule'. The genitive ἀρχῆς modifies τάξιν.
  3. 1.25.2προσῆκον αὐτοῖς — The participle προσῆκον (from the impersonal προσήκει) is used as an accusative absolute (or neuter nominative) in a nominal sense, meaning 'what is fitting for them'. Together with the conjunction ἤ after the comparative ἐλαττόνων, it means 'less than what is fitting for them'.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Great Ethics §1.25.1-1.25.3. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg022.humanitext-grc1:1.25.1-1.25.3

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