§4Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις.
A sentence is a significant spoken sound by convention, of which some part is significant in separation, as an utterance, but not as an affirmation or negation.
Λέγω δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μέν τι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ᾿ ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ.
I mean, for example, "man" signifies something, but not that it is or is not; but it will be an affirmation or negation if something is added.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου συλλαβὴ μία.
But not even a single syllable of "man" is so.
Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μῦς τὸ ῦς σημαντικόν, ἀλλὰ φωνή ἐστι νῦν μόνον.
For in "mouse", "ys" is not significant, but is now a mere sound.
Ἐν δὲ τοῖς διπλοῖς σημαίνει μέν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ καθ᾿ αὑτό, ὡς προείρηται.
In double words, the part does signify, but not by itself, as was said before.
Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, οὐχ ὡς ὄργανον δέ, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς προείρηται, κατὰ συνθήκην.
Every sentence is significant, not as an instrument, but, as has been said, by convention.
Ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει.
But not every sentence is assertoric, but only that in which truth or falsity resides.
Οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής.
But truth and falsity do not reside in all; for example, a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false.
Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.
Therefore, let the other sentences be dismissed, for their inquiry is more appropriate to rhetoric or poetics; but the assertoric sentence belongs to the present study.
§5Ἔστι δὲ εἷς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ᾿ ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἷς.
The first single assertoric sentence is the affirmation, and next the negation; all others are one by means of a conjunction.
Ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως ῥήματος·
It is necessary that every assertoric sentence be made of a verb or an inflection of a verb.
καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἤ τι τοιοῦτον προστεθῇ, οὔπω λόγος ἀποφαντικός.
For even the definition of "man", unless "is" or "was" or "will be" or something of the sort is added, is not yet an assertoric sentence.
Διότι δὴ ἕν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ᾿ οὐ πολλὰ τὸ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν·
Why indeed is "two-footed terrestrial animal" one thing and not many?
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ σύνεγγυς εἰρῆσθαι εἷς ἔσται.
For it will not be one just because it is spoken in close succession.
Ἔστι δὲ ἄλλης πραγματείας τοῦτο εἰπεῖν.
But to discuss this belongs to another inquiry.
Ἔστι δὲ εἷς λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς ἢ ὁ ἓν δηλῶν ἢ ὁ συνδέσμῳ εἷς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν ἢ οἱ ἀσύνδετοι.
One assertoric sentence is either that which reveals one thing or that which is one by conjunction, and many are those which reveal many things and not one, or those which are unconnected.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα φάσις ἔστω μόνον, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὕτω δηλοῦντά τι τῇ φωνῇ ὥστε ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐρωτῶντός τινος, ἢ μή, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸν προαιρούμενον.
Therefore, let a noun or a verb be only an utterance, since one cannot speak by revealing something with the voice in such a way as to make an assertion, whether someone asks a question or not, but rather one is choosing to speak by oneself.
Τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν ἁπλῆ ἐστὶν ἀπόφανσις, οἷον τὶ κατά τινος ἢ τὶ ἀπό τινος, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τούτων συγκειμένη οἷον λόγος τις ἤδη σύνθετος.
Of these, the simple assertion is, for example, something of something, or something from something; and that which is composed of these is already a certain composite sentence.
Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀπόφανσις φωνὴ σημαντικὴ περὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τι ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὡς οἱ χρόνοι διῄρηνται.
A simple assertion is a significant spoken sound about whether something belongs to or does not belong to something, according to the divisions of time.
§6Κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος κατά τινος.
An affirmation is an assertion of something of something.
Ἀπόφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος.
A negation is an assertion of something from something.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ὡς ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον ὡς μὴ ὑπάρχον, καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἐκτὸς δὲ τοῦ νῦν χρόνους ὡσαύτως, ἅπαν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ ὃ κατέφησέ τις ἀποφῆσαι καὶ ὃ ἀπέφησέ τις καταφῆσαι.
Since it is possible to assert that what belongs does not belong, and what does not belong belongs, and what belongs belongs, and what does not belong does not belong, and similarly regarding times outside the present, it would be possible both to deny what someone has affirmed and to affirm what someone has denied.
Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πάσῃ καταφάσει ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις ἀντικειμένη καὶ πάσῃ ἀποφάσει κατάφασις.
So it is clear that to every affirmation there is an opposed negation, and to every negation an affirmation.
Καὶ ἔστω ἀντίφασις τοῦτο, κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι.
And let this be a contradiction: the opposed affirmation and negation.
Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, μὴ ὁμωνύμως δέ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων προσδιοριζόμεθα πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις.
I say "opposed" of the same thing concerning the same thing, and not homonymously, and with all other such qualifications as we add to counter sophistical difficulties.