§11Τὸ δὲ ἓν κατὰ πολλῶν ἢ πολλὰ καθ᾿ ἑνὸς καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, ἐὰν μὴ ἕν τι ᾖ τὸ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν δηλούμενον, οὐκ ἔστι κατάφασις μία οὐδὲ ἀπόφασις.
But to affirm or deny one thing of many, or many of one, is not one affirmation or negation, unless that which is signified by the many is some one thing.
Λέγω δὲ ἓν οὐκ ἐὰν ὄνομα ἓν ᾖ κείμενον, μὴ ᾖ δὲ ἕν τι ἐξ ἐκείνων, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν καὶ ἥμερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν τι γίνεται ἐκ τούτων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ βαδίζειν οὐχ ἕν.
And I do not mean 'one' if one name is established but some one thing does not result from them; for example, man is perhaps both an animal and two-footed and tame, but some one thing also results from these, whereas from white and man and walking, some one thing does not.
Ὥστε οὔτ᾿ ἐὰν ἕν τι κατὰ τούτων καταφήσῃ τις μία κατάφασις, ἀλλὰ φωνὴ μὲν μία καταφάσεις δὲ πολλαί, οὔτε ἐὰν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς ταῦτα, ἀλλ᾿ ὁμοίως πολλαί.
Consequently, neither if someone affirms some one thing of these is it one affirmation—rather, the voice is one but the affirmations are many—nor if he affirms these of one thing, but similarly they are many.
Εἰ οὖν ἡ ἐρώτησις ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἀποκρίσεώς ἐστιν αἴτησις, ἢ τῆς προτάσεως ἢ θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, ἡ δὲ πρότασις ἀντιφάσεως μιᾶς μόριον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀπόκρισις μία πρὸς ταῦτα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρώτησις μία, οὐδ᾿ ἐὰν ᾖ ἀληθής.
If, then, the dialectical question is a request for an answer—either for the premise or for one part of the contradiction—and the premise is a part of one contradiction, there would not be one answer to these; for neither is the question one, even if it is true.
Εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν.
But these matters have been discussed in the Topics.
Ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἐρώτησίς ἐστι διαλεκτική· δεῖ γὰρ δεδόσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως ἑλέσθαι ὁπότερον βούλεται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως μόριον ἀποφήνασθαι.
At the same time, it is clear that the question 'what is it' is not a dialectical question either; for it must be given from the question to choose whichever part of the contradiction one wishes to assert.
Ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα προσδιορίσαι πότερον τόδε ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ οὐ τοῦτο.
Rather, the questioner must specify further whether man is this or not this.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν κατηγορεῖται συντιθέμενα, ὡς ἓν τὸ πᾶν κατηγόρημα τῶν χωρὶς κατηγορουμένων, τὰ δ᾿ οὔ, τίς ἡ διαφορά;
But since some things are predicated in combination, as one whole predicate of the things predicated separately, while others are not, what is the difference?
κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν καὶ χωρὶς ζῷον καὶ χωρὶς δίπουν, καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ἕν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκόν, καὶ ταῦθ᾿ ὡς ἕν.
For of man it is true to say separately both 'animal' and 'two-footed', and these as one, and also 'man' and 'white', and these as one.
Ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί, εἰ σκυτεὺς καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ σκυτεὺς ἀγαθός.
But not, if he is a 'shoemaker' and 'good', is he also a 'good shoemaker'.
Εἰ γάρ, ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἀληθές, εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω, πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ἔσται.
For if, because each is true, the combined both must also be true, many absurdities will follow.
Κατὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ λευκόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἅπαν.
For of man both 'man' is true and 'white', so that the whole is too.
Πάλιν εἰ τὸ λευκὸν αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἅπαν, ὥστε ἔσται ἄνθρωπος λευκὸς λευκός, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον.
Again, if the 'white' itself is, the whole is too, so that there will be a 'white white man', and this to infinity.
Καὶ πάλιν μουσικὸς λευκὸς βαδίζων· καὶ ταῦτα πολλάκις πεπλεγμένα εἰς ἄπειρον.
And again 'musical white walking', and these combined many times to infinity.
Ἔτι εἰ ὁ Σωκράτης Σωκράτης καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ Σωκράτης Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος.
Further, if Socrates is 'Socrates' and 'man', then he is 'Socrates Socrates man'.
Καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπος καὶ δίπους, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος δίπους.
And if 'man' and 'two-footed', then 'man man two-footed'.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἴ τις ἁπλῶς φήσει τὰς συμπλοκὰς γίνεσθαι, πολλὰ συμβαίνει λέγειν ἄτοπα, δῆλον· ὅπως δὲ θετέον, λέγομεν νῦν.
That, therefore, many absurdities result if one says that combinations occur simply, is clear; but how we must lay it down, we are now telling.
Τῶν δὴ κατηγορουμένων, καὶ ἐφ᾿ οἷς κατηγορεῖσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅσα μὲν λέγεται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ θάτερον κατὰ θατέρου, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔσται ἕν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἐστι καὶ μουσικός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ἓν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μουσικόν·
Of things predicated, and of those of which they happen to be predicated, those that are said accidentally—either of the same thing, or one of the other—these will not be one.
συμβεβηκότα γὰρ ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ.
For example, man is white and musical, but white and musical are not one; for both are accidental to the same thing.
Οὐδ᾿ εἰ τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ὅμως οὐκ ἔσται τὸ μουσικὸν λευκὸν ἕν τι· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τὸ μουσικὸν λευκόν, ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἕν τι.
Nor, even if it is true to say that the white is musical, will musical white be some one thing nevertheless; for the musical is white accidentally, so that white musical will not be some one thing.
Διὸ οὐδ᾿ ὁ σκυτεὺς ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός, ἀλλὰ ζῷον δίπουν· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
Hence neither is the shoemaker simply good, but [man is] a two-footed animal; for these are not accidental.
Ἔτι οὐδ᾿ ὅσα ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ.
Further, neither are those that are inherent in the other.
Διὸ οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν πολλάκις οὔτε ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν ἢ δίπουν· ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν.
Hence neither is 'white' repeated many times, nor is 'man' 'man animal' or 'man biped'; for animal and biped are inherent in man.
Ἀληθὲς δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ ἁπλῶς, οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸν τινὰ λευκὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον λευκόν·
But it is true to say of the particular also simply, as for example, to say the particular man is 'man', or the particular white man is 'white man'.
οὐκ ἀεὶ δέ, ἀλλ᾿ ὅταν μὲν ἐν τῷ προσκειμένῳ τῶν ἀντικειμένων τι ἐνυπάρχῃ ᾧ ἕπεται ἀντίφασις, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος, οἷον τὸν τεθνεῶτα ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνυπάρχῃ, ἀληθές.
Yet not always; but when in the adjunct some one of the opposites is inherent from which a contradiction follows, it is not true but false—as for example, to say a dead man is 'man'—but when it is not inherent, it is true.
Ἢ ὅταν μὲν ἐνυπάρχῃ, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀληθές, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνυπάρχῃ, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἀληθές, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός ἐστί τι, οἷον ποιητής.
Or rather, when it is inherent, it is always not true, but when it is not inherent, it is not always true; as for example, 'Homer is something', as for example, 'a poet'.
Ἀρ᾿ οὖν καὶ ἔστιν, ἢ οὔ;
Is he therefore also 'existent', or not?
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ κατηγορεῖται τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸ ἔστιν· ὅτι γὰρ ποιητής ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ καθ᾿ αὑτό, κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ Ὁμήρου τὸ ἔστιν.
For the 'is' (or 'exists') is predicated of Homer accidentally; for it is because he is a poet, and not in itself, that the 'is' is predicated of Homer.
Ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις κατηγορίαις μήτε ἐναντιότης ἔνεστιν, ἐὰν λόγοι ἀντ᾿ ὀνομάτων λέγωνται, καὶ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὰ κατηγορῆται καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ τὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀληθὲς ἔσται εἰπεῖν.
So in all those predications in which no contrariety is contained if definitions are spoken instead of nouns, and they are predicated in themselves and not accidentally, in these cases to say of the particular also simply will be true.
Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ὅτι δοξαστόν, οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὄν τι· δόξα γὰρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν.
But of non-being, because it is an object of opinion, it is not true to say that it is a 'being'; for the opinion of it is not that it is, but that it is not.