§1Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἐνυπνίου ζητητέον, καὶ πρῶτον τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φαίνεται, καὶ πότερον τοῦ νοητικοῦ τὸ πάθος ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γνωρίζομέν τι.
After this, we must investigate the dream, and first, to which of the parts of the soul it appears, and whether this affection belongs to the cognitive or to the sensitive faculty; for by these alone of the things in us do we cognize anything.
Εἰ δὲ χρῆσις ὄψεως ὅρασις καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὅλως αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κοινὰ δ’ ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οἷον σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κίνησις καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἴδια δ’ οἷον χρῶμα ψόφος χυμός, ἀδυνατεῖ δὲ πάντα μύοντα καὶ καθεύδοντα ὁρᾶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις.
If, then, the exercise of sight is seeing, and of hearing is listening, and of sensation generally is sensing, and if the common objects of sensation are such as shape, magnitude, movement, and other such things, while the proper objects are such as color, sound, and flavor, and if it is impossible for anything that has its eyes closed and is asleep to see, and likewise for the other senses, it is clear that we sense nothing in sleep.
Οὐκ ἄρα γε τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ ἐνύπνιον αἰσθανόμεθα.
Therefore, we do not sense the dream by sensation.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῇ δόξῃ.
Yet, neither do we do so by belief.
Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ προσιόν φαμεν ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἵππον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ λευκὸν ἢ καλόν· ὧν ἡ δόξα ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ἂν φήσειεν, οὔτ’ ἀληθῶς οὔτε ψευδῶς.
For we do not only say that what approaches is a man or a horse, but also that it is white or beautiful; about which things belief without sensation could assert nothing, either truly or falsely.
Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὕπνοις συμβαίνει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι λευκὸς ὁ προσιὼν δοκοῦμεν ὁρᾶν.
But in sleep, it happens that the soul does this; for we seem to see likewise both that what approaches is a man and that it is white.
Ἔτι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐννοοῦμεν ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι αἰσθανόμενοί τι· περὶ οὗ γὰρ αἰσθανόμεθα, πολλάκις καὶ διανοούμεθά τι.
Furthermore, besides the dream itself, we think of something else, just as when awake we sense something; for about what we sense, we often also think something.
Οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐνίοτε ἄλλα ἐννοοῦμεν.
So too in sleep, besides the images, we sometimes think of other things.
Φανείη δ’ ἄν τῳ τοῦτο, εἴ τις προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ πειρῷτο μνημονεύειν ἀναστάς.
This would be clear to anyone if they were to pay attention and try to remember upon waking.
Ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα οἷον οἱ δοκοῦντες κατὰ τὸ μνημονικὸν παράγγελμα τίθεσθαι τὰ προβαλλόμενα· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολλάκις ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων εἰς τὸν τόπον φάντασμα.
Already some have even seen dreams of such a kind as those who believe they are placing the presented items according to the mnemonic instruction; for it often happens to them that another image, besides the dream, is placed before their eyes in that location.
Ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε ἐνύπνιον πᾶν τὸ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα, καὶ ὅτι ὃ ἐννοοῦμεν τῇ δόξῃ δοξάζομεν.
Thus, it is clear that not every image in sleep is a dream, and that what we think of, we judge by belief.
Δῆλον δὲ περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων τό γε τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ ᾧ καὶ ἐγρηγορότες ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἀπατώμεθα, ὅτι τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ ποιεῖ τὸ πάθος.
At least this much is clear about all these things: that by the very same faculty by which we are deceived in illness while awake, this very affection also occurs in sleep.
Καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι δὲ καὶ εἰδόσιν ὅμως ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ.
Even to those who are healthy and know, the sun still appears to be a foot wide.
Ἀλλ’ εἴτε δὴ ταὐτὸν εἴθ’ ἕτερον τὸ φανταστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι· τὸ γὰρ παρορᾶν καὶ παρακούειν ὁρῶντος ἀληθές τι καὶ ἀκούοντος, οὐ μέντοι τοῦτο ὃ οἴεται.
But whether the imaginative faculty of the soul and the sensitive faculty are the same or different, nonetheless it does not occur without seeing and sensing something; for misseeing and mishearing belong to one who is actually seeing and hearing something real, though not indeed what they think.
Ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ ὑπόκειται μηδὲν ὁρᾶν μηδ’ ἀκούειν μηδ’ ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι.
But in sleep, it is assumed that one sees nothing, hears nothing, and senses nothing at all.
Ἆρ’ οὖν τὸ μὲν μηδὲν ὁρᾶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν πάσχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀληθές, ἀλλ’ ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὴν ὄψιν πάσχειν τι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορότος προσβάλλει μέν πως τῇ αἰσθήσει, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορότος· καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν ἡ δόξα λέγει ὅτι ψεῦδος τὸ ὁρώμενον, ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορόσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ κατέχεται καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ φαντάσματι.
Is it then that while seeing nothing is true, the sensation experiencing nothing is not true, but it is possible for both sight and the other senses to experience something, and each of these, as if of one awake, strikes the sense in some way, yet not in the same way as of one awake; and sometimes belief says that what is seen is false, just as to those awake, but sometimes it is held in check and follows the image?
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δοξάζοντος οὐδὲ τοῦ διανοουμένου τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐνυπνιάζειν φανερόν.
That this affection which we call dreaming, therefore, does not belong to the faculty of belief or of thought is clear.
Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου ἁπλῶς· ὁρᾶν γὰρ ἂν ἦν καὶ ἀκούειν ἁπλῶς.
But neither does it belong to that of sensation simply; for then it would be seeing and hearing simply.
Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ἐπισκεπτέον.
But how and in what manner it occurs must be examined.
Ὑποκείσθω δ’, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ φανερόν, ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τὸ πάθος, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ ὕπνος· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῳ μέν τινι τῶν ζῴων ὑπάρχει ὁ ὕπνος, ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ.
Let it be assumed, which is also clear, that the affection belongs to the sensitive faculty, if indeed sleep does too; for sleep does not belong to one kind of animal and dreaming to another, but to the same.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς εἴρηται, καὶ ἔστι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ δ’ εἶναι φανταστικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἕτερον, ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις, τὸ δ’ ἐνύπνιον φάντασμά τι φαίνεται εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα ἐνύπνιον λέγομεν, εἴθ’ ἁπλῶς εἴτε τρόπον τινὰ γινόμενον), φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τούτου δ’ ᾗ τὸ φανταστικόν.
And since imagination has been discussed in *On the Soul*, and the imaginative faculty is the same as the sensitive, though being imaginative is different from being sensitive, and since imagination is the movement produced by sensation in actual exercise, and the dream appears to be a certain image (for we call the image in sleep a dream, whether simply or as occurring in a certain way), it is clear that dreaming belongs to the sensitive faculty, and to this insofar as it is imaginative.