§2.99.
9.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐστὶν ἔνια γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτά, καὶ ἡ γένεσις τυγχάνει οὖσα ἐν τῷ περὶ τὸ μέσον τόπῳ, λεκτέον περὶ πάσης γενέσεως ὁμοίως πόσαι τε καὶ τίνες αὐτῆς αἱ ἀρχαί· ῥᾷον γὰρ οὕτω τὰ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον θεωρήσομεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν καθόλου λάβωμεν πρῶτον.
Since some things are generated and destructible, and generation happens to be in the region about the center, we must speak of all generation alike, both how many and what its principles are; for in this way we shall more easily contemplate particulars, when we first grasp those things that are universal.
Εἰσὶν οὖν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἴσαι καὶ τῷ γένει αἱ αὐταὶ αἵπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τε καὶ πρώτοις· ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ὕλη, ἡ δ᾿ ὡς μορφή.
Now, they are equal in number and the same in kind as those in the eternal and primary things; for one is as matter, and the other as form.
δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν τρίτην ἔτι προσυπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἱκαναὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαι αἱ δύο, καθάπερ οὐδ᾿ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις.
But the third must still be present in addition; for the two are not sufficient for generating, just as they are not in the primary things.
ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλη τοῖς γενητοῖς ἐστὶν αἴτιον τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.
As matter, then, the cause for the things that are generated is the being able to be and not to be.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν, οἷον τὰ ἀΐδια, τὰ δ᾿ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἔστιν.
For some things are of necessity, such as the eternal ones, and others of necessity are not.
τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλως ἔχειν.
And of these, some cannot not-be, and others cannot be, because it is impossible for them to be otherwise than as necessary.
ἔνια δὲ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι δυνατά, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν· ποτὲ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο, ποτὲ δ᾿ οὔκ ἐστιν.
But some things are able both to be and not to be, which is the generated and destructible; for at one time this is, and at another it is not.
ὥστ᾿ ἀνάγκη γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν περὶ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.
So it is necessary that generation and destruction are about that which is able to be and not to be.
διὸ καὶ ὡς μὲν ὅλη τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν αἴτιον τοῖς γενητοῖς, ὡς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας.
Therefore, as matter, this is the cause for generated things, and as that for the sake of which, the shape and the form; and this is the definition (logos) of the substance of each.
Δεῖ δὲ προσεῖναι καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἢν ἅπαντες μὲν ὀνειρώττουσι, λέγει δ᾿ οὐδείς, ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν ἱκανὴν ᾠήθησαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἴδη τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολήν, ὥστ᾿ εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἴδη οἴεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἴτια εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.
But the third must also be added, which indeed all dream of, but no one speaks of; rather, some thought that the nature of forms is a sufficient cause for generation, as Socrates in the Phaedo; for he too, having censured the others as having said nothing, hypothesizes that some of the things that are are forms, and others are participants in the forms, and that each thing is said to be according to the form, and to be generated according to participation, and to be destroyed according to loss; so that if these things are true, he thinks that the forms are of necessity the causes of both generation and destruction.
οἱ δ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην· ἀπὸ ταύτης γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν.
But others thought matter itself is; for from this is motion.
οὐδέτεροι δὲ λέγουσι καλῶς.
But neither speaks well.
εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἴτια τὰ εἴδη, διὰ τί οὐκ ἀεὶ γεννᾷ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν ποτὲ δ᾿ οὔ, ὄντων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν;
For if the forms are causes, why do they not always generate continuously, but sometimes they do and sometimes they do not, since both the forms and the participants always exist?
ἔτι δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων θεωροῦμεν ἄλλο τὸ σἴτιον ὄν· ὑγίειαν γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἐπιστήμην ὁ ἐπιστήμων, οὔσης καὶ ὑγιείας αὐτῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ δύναμιν πραττομένων.
And further, in some cases we see that another thing is the cause; for the doctor produces health, and the man of knowledge produces knowledge, although health itself and knowledge exist, and the participants do; and likewise also in other things done according to a capacity.
εἰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην τις φήσειε γεννᾶν διὰ τὴν κίνησιν, φυσικώτερον μὲν ἂν λέγοι τῶν οὕτω λεγόντων· τὸ γὰρ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ τὸ μετασχηματίζον αἰτιώτερόν τε τοῦ γεννᾶν, καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν εἰώθαμεν τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὃ ἂν ᾗ κινητικόν.
But if someone should say that matter generates because of motion, he would speak more physically than those who speak in that way; for that which alters and that which reshapes is more causal of generating, and in all things we are accustomed to call this the agent, alike in things by nature and in things by art, whatever is motive.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ὕλης τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἑτέρας δυνάμεως (δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει γινομένων· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ ὕδωρ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον κλίνην, ἀλλ᾿ ἡ τέχνη).
Nevertheless, these too do not speak correctly; for to matter belongs to be passive and to be moved, but to move and to act belongs to another capacity (and this is clear both in things that come to be by art and in those by nature; for water itself does not make an animal out of itself, nor does wood make a bed, but art does).
ὥστε καὶ οὗτοι διὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς, καὶ ὅτι παραλείπουσι τὴν κυριωτέραν αἰτίαν· ἐξαιροῦσι γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὴν μορφήν.
So these too for this reason do not speak correctly, and because they leave out the more principal cause; for they eliminate the essence (what it was to be) and the form.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδιδόασι τοῖς σώμασι, δι᾿ ἃς γεννῶσι, λίαν ὀργανικῶς, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτίαν.
And further, they attribute the capacities, by which they generate, to bodies in too instrumental a way, taking away the cause according to the form.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφυκεν, ὥς φασι, τὸ μὲν θερμὸν διακρίνειν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνιστάναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκ τούτων λέγουσι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα τἆλλα γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον.
For since it is their nature, as they say, for the hot to separate and the cold to combine, and of the other things each either to act or to be passive, they say that from these and through these all other things are generated and destroyed; but it appears that even fire itself is moved and is passive.
ἔτι δὲ παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις τῷ πρίονι καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀργάνων ἀπονέμοι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πρίοντος διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ξέοντος λεαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.
And further, they do similarly as if someone were to attribute to the saw and to each of the instruments the cause of things that come to be; for it is necessary for the sawyer to divide and the scraper to smooth, and likewise in other cases.
ὥστ᾿ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ πῶς κινεῖ οὐ προσθεωροῦσιν,¹ ὅτι χεῖρον ἢ τὰ ὄργανα.
So that even if fire acts and moves in the highest degree, yet they do not further consider how it moves, namely that it is worse than the instruments.
ἡμῖν δὲ καθόλου τε πρότερον εἴρηται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ νῦν διώρισται περί τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς.
But for us, it has been said before generally concerning causes, and now it has been defined concerning matter and form.