§2.11#111.
11.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς συνεχῶς κινουμένοις κατὰ γένεσιν ἢ ἀλλοίωσιν ἢ ὅλως μεταβολὴν ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἐφεξῆς ὂν καὶ γινόμενον τόδε μετὰ τόδε ὥστε μὴ διαλείπειν, σκεπτέον πότερον ἔστι τι ὃ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι.
Since we see in those things that are continuously moved according to generation or alteration or change in general, that which is in succession and coming to be, this after that, so that there is no gap, we must consider whether there is anything which will be of necessity, or nothing, but all things can not-come-to-be.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια, δῆλον, καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἕτερον διὰ τοῦτο· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰιπεῖν ὅτι ἔσται, δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναί ποτε ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἔστιν· ὃ δὲ νῦν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι μέλλει, οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ γενέσθαι· μέλλων γὰρ ἂν βαδίζειν τις οὐκ ἂν βαδίσειεν.
For that there are some [which will be of necessity] is clear, and immediately "it will be" and "it is about to be" are different because of this; for that of which it is true to say "it will be", this must at some time be true that "it is"; but that of which it is now true to say "it is about to be", nothing prevents its not coming to be; for someone who is about to walk might not walk.
ὅλως δ᾿, ἐπεὶ ἐνδέχεται ἔνια τῶν ὄντων καὶ μὴ εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ γινόμενα οὕτως ἔξει, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτ᾿ ἔσται.
And in general, since some of the things that are can also not be, it is clear that also the things coming to be will be in this state, and this will not be of necessity.
πότερον οὖν ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾿ ἔνια ἀναγκαῖον ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατα μὴ εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνατά, οὕτως καὶ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν;
Are all things then of this sort, or not, but is it necessary for some things simply to come to be, and is it just as in the case of being some things cannot not-be while others can, so also concerning generation?
οἶον τροπὰς ἄρα ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι.
For instance, is it necessary that solstices come to be, and is it not possible for them not to occur?
Εἰ δὴ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἔσται (οἷον εἰ οἰκία, θεμέλιον, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πηλόν), ἆρ᾿ οὖν καὶ εἰ θεμέλιος γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη οἰκίαν γενέσθαι;
If indeed the prior must of necessity come to be, if the posterior is to be (for instance, if a house, a foundation; and if this, clay), then if a foundation has come to be, is it necessary for a house to come to be?
ἢ οὐκέτι, εἰ μὴ κἀκεῖνο ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι ἁπλῶς;
Or is it no longer so, unless that too is necessary to come to be simply?
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη καὶ θεμελίου γενομένου γενέσθαι οἰκίαν·
And if this is so, it is necessary also when the foundation has come to be that the house comes to be.
οὕτω γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρότερον ἔχον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον, ὥστ᾿ εἰ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται, ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνο πρότερον.
For in this way the prior was related to the posterior, so that if that [posterior] is to be, that [prior] is necessary beforehand.
εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕδυρτον, καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη· καὶ εἰ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τοίνυν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ δι᾿ ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι ὑπέκειτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐσόμενον.
If therefore the posterior must of necessity come to be, the prior also must of necessity; and if the prior, then the posterior also must of necessity, yet not because of that [prior], but because it was assumed that it would be of necessity.
ἐν οἶς ἄρα τὸ ὕστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν τούτοις ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ προτέρου γενομένου ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὕστερον.
In those cases, therefore, where the posterior must of necessity be, in these there is conversion, and always when the prior has come to be, it is necessary that the posterior comes to be.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω, οὐκ ἔσται ἀνάγκη τὸ ὕστερον τόδε γενέσθαι ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ᾿ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερον ἔμπροσθεν ἀνάγκη ἔσται, δι᾿ ὃ ἐκεῖνο ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι.
If, then, it goes on to infinity downwards, it will not be necessary for this posterior simply to come to be, but conditionally; for always another prior thing will be necessary, because of which that other must of necessity come to be.
ὥστ᾿ εἰ μή ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἀπείρου, οὐδὲ πρῶτον ἔσται οὐδέν, δι᾿ ὅ ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται γενέσθαι.
So that if there is no beginning of the infinite, neither will there be any first thing because of which it will be necessary to come to be.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾿ ἐν τοῖς πέρας ἔχουσι τοῦτ᾿ ἔσται εἰπεῖν ἀληθῶς, ὅτι ἁπλῶς ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, οἶον οἰκίαν, ὅταν θεμέλιος γένηται·
But indeed neither in those things which have a limit will it be true to say this, that it is simply necessary to come to be, for instance a house when the foundation has come to be.
ὅταν γὰρ γένηται, εἰ μὴ ἀεὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι, συμβήσεται ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ ἀεὶ εἶναι.
For when it has come to be, if it is not necessary that this always comes to be, it will happen that what can not-always-be always is.
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ γενέσει ἀεὶ εἶναι, εἰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ γένεσις· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἄμα· ὃ γὰρ εἶναι ἀνάγκη οὐχ οἶόν τε μὴ εἶναι· ὥστ᾿ εἰ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀΐδιόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἀΐδιον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
But it is necessary for it always to be in coming-to-be, if its coming-to-be is of necessity; for "of necessity" and "always" go together; for what is of necessity to be cannot not-be; so that if it is of necessity, it is eternal, and if eternal, of necessity.
καὶ εἰ ἡ γένεσις τοίνυν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀΐδιος ἡ γένεσις τούτου, καὶ εἰ ἀΐδιος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
And if therefore the coming-to-be is of necessity, the coming-to-be of this is eternal, and if eternal, of necessity.