§2.11.
1.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν μίξεως καὶ ἁφῆς καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἴρηται πῶς ὑπάρχει τοῖς μεταβάλλουσι κατὰ φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ἁπλῆς, πῶς καὶ τίνος¹ ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τίν᾿ αἰτίαν.
Now, concerning mixture and contact, and acting and being acted upon, it has been said how they belong to things that change according to nature, and further, concerning simple generation and destruction, how and from what they exist, and for what cause.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως εἴρηται, τί τὸ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ τίν᾿ ἔχει διαφορὰν αὐτῶν.
Similarly, it has also been said concerning alteration, what it is to be altered and what difference there is between them.
λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων.
It remains to consider the so-called elements of bodies.
Γένεσις μὲν γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ πάσαις ταῖς φύσει συνεστώσαις οὐσίαις οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων· τούτων δὲ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην οἱ μέν φασιν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἀέρα τιθέντες ἢ πῦρ ἤ τι μεταξὺ τούτων, σῶμά τε ὂν καὶ χωριστόν, οἱ δὲ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἑνός, οἱ μὲν πῦρ καὶ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ἀέρα τρίτον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τούτων τέταρτον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· ἐξ ὧν συγκρινομένων καὶ διακρινομένων ἢ ἀλλοιουμένων συμβαίνειν τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὸν τοῖς πράγμασιν.
For generation and destruction, for all substances constituted by nature, do not occur without sensible bodies; and of these, some say that the underlying matter is one, assuming it to be air or fire or something intermediate between them, being a body and separable, while others say they are more than one in number, some [positing] fire and earth, others these and air as a third, and others water also as a fourth of these, just as Empedocles does; from the combining and separating or altering of these, it happens that generation and destruction occur in things.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ἔστω συνομολογούμενον, ἐξ ὧν μεταβαλλόντων ἢ κατὰ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν ἢ κατ᾿ ἄλλην μεταβολὴν συμβαίνει γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθοράν.
That it is well, then, to call the primary things principles and elements, let it be agreed, from the changing of which, either by combination and separation or by some other change, it happens that generation and destruction occur.
ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν ποιοῦντες μίαν ὕλην παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, ταύτην δὲ σωματικὴν καὶ χωριστήν, ἁμαρτάνουσιν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο αἰσθητῆς¹· ἢ γὰρ κοῦφον ἢ βαρὺ ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦτο, ὃ λέγουσί τινες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν.
But those who make the matter one besides those mentioned, and this bodily and separable, are wrong; for it is impossible for this sensible body to exist without contrariety; for this infinite thing, which some say is the principle, must be either light or heavy, or cold or hot.
ὡς δ᾿ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται, οὐδένα ἔχει διορισμόν· οὐ γὰρ εἴρηκε σαφῶς τὸ πανδεχές, εἰ χωρίζεται τῶν στοιχείων.
And as it is written in the Timaeus, it has no definition; for [Plato] has not spoken clearly about the all-receptive, whether it is separated from the elements.
οὐδὲ χρῆται οὐδέν, φήσας εἶναι ὑποκείμενόν τι τοῖς καλουμένοις στοιχείοις πρότερον, οἷον χρυσὸν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς χρυσοῖς. (καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λεγόμενον, ἀλλ᾿ ὧν μὲν ἀλλοίωσις, ἔστιν οὕτως, ὧν δὲ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀδύνατον ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεσθαι ἐξ οὗ γέγονεν.
Nor does he make any use of it, although he says that there is some underlying thing prior to the so-called elements, like gold for golden works. (And yet, even this is not well said when expressed in this way, but rather where there is alteration, it is so, but where there is generation and destruction, it is impossible to address that from which it was generated by its name.
καίτοι γέ φησι μακρῷ ἀληθέστατον εἶναι χρυσὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον εἶναι. ) ἀλλὰ τῶν στοιχείων ὄντων στερεῶν μέχρι ἐπιπέδων ποιεῖται τὴν ἀνάλυσιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὴν τιθήνην καὶ τὴν ὕλην τὴν πρώτην τὰ ἐπίπεδα εἶναι.
And yet, indeed, he says that it is by far the truest to say that each is gold.) But while the elements are solids, he makes the analysis down to surfaces; but it is impossible for the nurse and primary matter to be surfaces.
ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμὲν μὲν εἶναί τινα ὕλην τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἀεὶ μετ᾿ ἐναντιώσεως, ἐξ ἧς γίνεται τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα.
But we say that there is a certain matter of sensible bodies, but that this is not separable but always with contrariety, from which the so-called elements are generated.
διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑτέροις ἀκριβέστερον.
And about these it has been defined more precisely in other works.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τὰ σώματα τὰ πρῶτα, διοριστέον καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ πρώτην οἰομένοις εἶναι τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἀχώριστον μέν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὕλη τῷ ψυχρῷ οὔτε τοῦτο τῷ θερμῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφοῖν.
Nevertheless, since the primary bodies are also in this manner from matter, we must define concerning these too, thinking that the principle and primary thing is the matter which is inseparable, indeed, but underlying the contraries; for neither is the hot the matter for the cold nor the cold for the hot, but rather the underlying thing of both.
ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἀρχή, δεύτερον δ᾿ αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, λέγω δ᾿ οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, τρίτον δ᾿ ἤδη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὐχ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ ἕτεροι λέγουσιν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀλλοίωσις), αἱ δ᾿ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ μεταβάλλουσιν.
So that, first, the potentially sensible body is a principle, second, the contrarieties (I mean, for example, heat and cold), and third, now fire and water and such things; for these change into one another, and not as Empedocles and others say (for otherwise there would not even be alteration), while the contrarieties do not change.
ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ὣς σώματος ποίας καὶ πόσας λεκτέον ἀρχάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι ὑποθέμενοι χρῶνται, καὶ οὐδὲν λέγουσι διὰ τί αὗται ἢ τοσαῦται.
Nevertheless, even so, we must say what kind and how many are the principles of a body; for the others use them having assumed them, and say nothing as to why these or so many.