§1.5#15 Περὶ δὲ αὐξήσεως λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, τί τε διαφέρει γενέσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, καὶ πῶς αὐξάνεται τῶν αὐξανομένων ἕκαστον καὶ φθίνει ὁτιοῦν τῶν φθινόντων.
5. Remaining is to speak about growth, both how it differs from generation and alteration, and how each of those that grow grows, and any of those that decay decays.
σκεπτέον δὴ πρῶτον πότερον μόνως ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορά, οἶον ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐκ τοῦδε εἰς τόδε μεταβολή, οἶον ἐκ δυνάμει οὐσίας εἰς ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐσίαν, γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ περὶ μέγεθος αὔξησις, ἡ δὲ περὶ πάθος ἀλλοίωσις· ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντων εἰς ἐντελέχειαν μεταβολὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστίν, ἢ καὶ ὁ τρόπος διαφέρει τῆς μεταβολῆς·
We must first consider, then, whether their difference from one another lies only in that 'about which' they are—for example, that change from this to this (such as from potential substance to actual substance) is generation, while growth is about magnitude, and alteration is about property; and both of these mentioned are a change from potential beings to actuality—or whether the manner of change also differs.
φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἀλλοιούμενον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μεταβάλλον κατὰ τόπον, οὐδὲ τὸ γινόμενον, τὸ δ᾿ αὐξανόμενον καὶ τὸ φθῖνον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ φερομένου.
For that which is altered does not seem of necessity to change in respect of place, nor does that which comes to be, but that which grows and that which decays do, and indeed in a different manner from that which is carried along (in locomotion).
τὸ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενον ὅλον ἀλλάττει τόπον, τὸ δ᾿ αὐξανόμενον ὥσπερ τὸ ἐλαυνόμενον· τούτου γὰρ μένοντος τὰ μόρια μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον, οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ τῆς σφαίρας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ τόπῳ μεταβάλλει τοῦ ὅλου μένοντος, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αὐξανομένου ἀεὶ ἐπὶ πλείω τόπον, ἐπ᾿ ἐλάττω δὲ τὰ τοῦ φθίνοντος.
For that which is carried along changes its place as a whole, whereas that which grows [changes place] like metal being beaten out; for while this persists, its parts change in respect of place, yet not like the parts of a sphere; for the latter change within an equal place while the whole persists, whereas the parts of that which grows always change into a larger place, and those of that which decays into a smaller place.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ μεταβολὴ διαφέρει οὐ μόνον περὶ ὅ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς τοῦ τε γινομένου καὶ ἀλλοιουμένου καὶ αὐξανομένου, δῆλον.
That the change of that which comes to be, that which is altered, and that which grows differs, therefore, not only in 'about what' but also in 'how', is clear.
περὶ δὲ ὅ ἐστιν ἡ μεταβολὴ ἡ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ ἡ τῆς φθίσεως (περὶ μέγεθος δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ φθίνει), ποτέρως ὑποληπτέον, πότερον ἐκ δυνάμει μὲν μεγέθους καὶ σώματος, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ᾿ ἀσωμάτου καὶ ἀμεγέθους γίνεσθαι σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, καὶ τούτου διχῶς ἐνδεχομένου λέγειν, ποτέρως ἡ αὔξησις γίνεται;
But concerning 'about what' the change of growth and decay is (and growing and decaying seem to be about magnitude), in which of two ways must we conceive it? Is it that body and magnitude come to be from what is potentially magnitude and body, but actually incorporeal and without magnitude? And since this can be said in two ways, in which of them does growth occur?
πότερον ἐκ κεχωρισμένης αὐτῆς καθ᾿ αὐτὴν τῆς ὕλης, ἢ ἐνυπαρχούσης ἐν ἄλλῳ σώματι;
Is it from matter separated by itself, or from matter existing inside another body?
ἢ ἀδύνατον ἀμφοτέρως;
Or is it impossible in both ways?
χωριστὴ μὲν γὰρ οὖσα ἢ οὐδένα καθέξει τόπον, [ἢ] οἷον στιγμή τις, ἢ κενὸν ἔσται ἢ σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν.
For if it is separated, it will either occupy no place, [or] be like some point, or it will be empty space (a void), or an imperceptible body.
τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔν τινι εἶναι· ἀεὶ γάρ που ἔσται τὸ γινόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε κἀκεῖνο, ἢ καθ᾿ αὐτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
But of these, the former is not possible, and the latter must exist in something; for that which comes to be from it will always be somewhere, so that it [the matter] too must be somewhere, either in itself or accidentally.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γ᾿ ἔν τινι ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὲν κεχωρισμένον οὕτως ὥστε μὴ ἐκείνου καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός τι εἶναι, συμβήσεται πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα.
But indeed, if it exists in something, yet separated in such a way that it is not any of its [the containing body's] properties either in itself or accidentally, many impossible consequences will follow.
λέγω δ᾿ οἶον εἰ γίνεται ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος, οὐ τοῦ ὕδατος ἔσται μεταβάλλοντος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγγείῳ τῷ ὕδατι ἐνεῖναι τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῦ.
I mean, for example, if air comes to be from water, it will not be because the water changes, but because, as if in a vessel, its [the air's] matter was inside the water.
ἀπείρους γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει ὕλας εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐντελεχείᾳ.
For nothing prevents there being infinite matters, so that they also come to be in actuality.
ἔτι δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενος ἀὴρ ἐξ ὕδατος, οἶον ἐξιὼν ὑπομένοντος.
Moreover, neither is air seen to come to be from water in this way, as if coming out while the water persists.
Bέλτιον τοίνυν ποιεῖν πᾶσιν ἀχώριστον τὴν ὕλην ὡς οὗσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μίαν.
It is better, therefore, to make the matter inseparable in all cases, as being the same and one in number, but not one in definition.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ στιγμὰς θετέον οὐδὲ γραμμὰς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὕλην διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας.
But indeed, neither must we pose points or lines as the matter of body, for the same reasons.
ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὗ ταῦτα ἔσχατα, ἡ ὕλη, ἣν οὐδέποτ᾿ ἄνευ πάθους οἶόν τε εἶναι οὐδ᾿ ἄνευ μορφῆς.
Rather, that of which these are limits is the matter, which can never exist without property nor without form.
γίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται, καὶ ὑπό τινος δὲ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος ἢ ὁμοιοειδοῦς ἢ ὁμογενοῦς, οἶον πῦρ ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ὑπ᾿ ἀνθρώπου, ἢ ὑπ᾿ ἐντελεχείας· σκληρὸν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπὸ σκληροῦ γίνεται.
One thing comes to be simply from another, then, as has also been defined in other works, and indeed by something that is in actuality, being either of the same species or of the same genus—for example, fire by fire or man by man—or by an actuality; for a hard thing does not come to be by a hard thing.
ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐσίας ὕλη σωματικῆς, σώματος δ᾿ ἥδη τοιουδί (σῶμα γὰρ κοινὸν οὐδέν), ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μεγέθους καὶ πάθους ἐστί, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ χωριστή, τόπῳ δ᾿ οὐ χωριστή, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ πάθη χωριστά.
And since there is matter of bodily substance, and indeed of a body of such a kind (for there is no common body), this same matter is also that of magnitude and property, being separable in definition, but not separable in place, unless properties also are separable.
Φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν διηπορημένων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὔξησις μεταβολὴ ἐκ δυνάμει μεγέθους, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἔχοντος μέγεθος· χωριστὸν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ κενόν, τοῦτο δ᾿ ὅττι ἀδύνατον, εἴρηται ἐν ἑτέροις πρότερον.
It clear from the difficulties discussed, then, that growth is not a change from what is potentially magnitude, but has in actuality no magnitude; for [otherwise] the void would be separable, and that this is impossible has been said earlier in other works.
ἔτι δ᾿ ἥ γε τοιαύτη μεταβολὴ οὐκ αὐξήσεως ὄδιος ἀλλὰ γενέσεως· ἡ γὰρ αὔξησίς ἐστι τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἡ δὲ φθίσις μείωσις (διὸ δὴ ἔχειν τι δεῖ μέγεθος τὸ αὐξανόμενον), ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἐξ ἀμεγέθους ὕλης δεῖ εἶναι τὴν αὔξησιν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν μεγέθους· γένεσις γὰρ ἂν εἴη σώματος μᾶλλον, οὐκ αὔξησις.
Moreover, such a change is not proper to growth but to generation; for growth is the increase of the existing magnitude, and decay is its decrease (hence that which grows must have some magnitude), so that growth must not be from a matter without magnitude into the actuality of magnitude; for that would be a generation of body rather, not growth.
ληπτέον δὴ μᾶλλον οἷον ἁπτομένους τῆς ζητήσεως ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ποίου τινὸς ὄντος τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ φθίνειν τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦμεν.
Therefore, we must grasp [the matter] rather as if laying hold of the inquiry from the beginning, asking what sort of thing growing or decaying is, of which we seek the causes.