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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §8.11

Justice and Friendship in Constitutions and Domestic Relations

Passage 95 of 123 · Greek

Summary

The correlation between justice and friendship in each of the correct constitutions is analyzed in comparison with domestic relations, followed by an examination of their absence in deviant constitutions, particularly tyranny, with reference to relations with slaves and inanimate objects.

§8.11καθʼ ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφʼ ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵνʼ εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας.
In each of the constitutions, friendship appears to the same extent as justice does. In a kingship, the friendship of a king toward his subjects lies in an excess of benefits; for he does good to his subjects, since, being good, he cares for them so that they may fare well, like a shepherd of his sheep; whence Homer also called Agamemnon the "shepherd of the people." Paternal friendship is also of this kind, but it differs in the magnitude of the benefits; for the father is the cause of his children's existence (which is held to be the greatest benefit), and of their nurture and education.
καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευομένων.
These things are also ascribed to ancestors; and by nature a father is ruler of his sons, ancestors of their descendants, and a king of his subjects.
ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς.
These friendships, then, lie in superiority, which is why parents also are honored.
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία.
Hence, the justice in these relations is not the same but is according to worth; for so too is friendship.
καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατʼ ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἁρμόζον ἑκάστῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
The friendship of a husband toward a wife is the same as that in an aristocracy; for it is according to virtue, and the better partner receives more of the good, and each receives what is appropriate; and so too is justice.
ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δʼ ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
The friendship of brothers is like that of companions; for they are equals and of the same age, and such persons are for the most part of like feelings and character.
ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικήν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία.
The friendship in a timocracy also resembles this; for the citizens wish to be equal and decent; so they rule in turn and on equal terms; and so too is friendship.
ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας.
In the deviations, just as justice exists only to a small extent, so too does friendship, and least of all in the worst form; for in a tyranny there is little or no friendship.
ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δʼ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον.
For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there is no friendship either, since there is no justice; as in the relation of a craftsman to his tool, of the soul to the body, and of a master to his slave; for all these are benefited by those who use them, but there is no friendship toward inanimate things, nor is there justice.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος.
Indeed, there is none toward a horse or an ox, nor toward a slave qua slave.
οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δʼ ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος.
For there is nothing in common; since a slave is a companion-tool with a soul, and a tool is a companion-slave without a soul.
ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δʼ ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δή, καθʼ ὅσον ἄνθρωπος.
Qua slave, then, there is no friendship toward him, but there is qua human being; for there is held to be some justice between any human being and anyone who is capable of sharing in law and covenant; and therefore there is friendship, in so far as he is a human being.
ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν.
Thus, in tyrannies, friendships and justice exist only to a small extent, but in democracies they exist to a greater extent; for there are many things in common among those who are equal.

Notes

  1. 1161a10ἐφʼ ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον — Meaning "to the same extent as justice." The particle καί functions here to emphasize the close correspondence with the compared element, showing that the scope of friendship (φιλία) corresponds directly to that of justice (τὸ δίκαιον).
  2. 1161a15αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας — The adjective αἴτιος ("responsible for," "cause of") governs three genitives: τοῦ εἶναι (substantivized infinitive "existence"), τροφῆς ("nurture"), and παιδείας ("education"). The participle phrase δοκοῦντος μεγίστου modifies τοῦ εἶναι appositively ("which is held to be the greatest").
  3. 1161a23τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν — An elliptical construction with the omission of the copula ἐστίν or a verb of distribution. It expresses the principle of proportional or distributive justice in an aristocracy: "to the better partner (τῷ ἀμείνονι, dative), more of the good (πλέον ἀγαθόν, nominative) is assigned."
  4. 1161b5παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης — παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ is the dative depending on δοκεῖ εἶναί τι δίκαιον ("there is held to be some justice for every human being"). πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον ("towards anyone who is capable") indicates the object of this relation, with the infinitive κοινωνῆσαι ("to share in") modifying δυνάμενον and governing the genitives νόμου καὶ συνθήκης ("law and covenant").

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §8.11. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:8.11

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