§7.6ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν.
Next, let us observe that incontinence in anger is less disgraceful than incontinence in the desires.
ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν·
For anger seems to hear reason to some extent, but to mishear it, just like hasty servants who run out before hearing all that is said and then mistake the order, or like dogs who bark if there is merely a noise, before looking to see if it is a friend.
οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δʼ ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν.
In this way anger, because of the warmth and swiftness of its nature, having heard indeed, but not having heard an order, rushes to vengeance.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δʼ ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς·
For when reason or imagination shows that an insult or slight has been offered, anger, as if concluding by syllogism that one must fight against such a person, immediately grows angry.
ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν.
But desire, if only reason or perception says that a thing is pleasant, rushes to its enjoyment.
ὥσθʼ ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία οὔ.
So that while anger follows reason in a way, desire does not.
αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὃ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.
It is, therefore, more disgraceful; for the person incontinent in anger is defeated by reason in a way, but the other is defeated by desire and not by reason.
ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφʼ ὅσον κοιναί·
Further, it is more pardonable to follow natural appetites, since indeed we more pardon those desires that are common to all, and to the extent that they are common.
ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι
"καὶ γὰρ οὗτος"
ἔφη
"τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν,"
καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας
"καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ"
ἔφη,
"ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν· "
καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα.
But anger and bad temper are more natural than desires for excess and for what is not necessary; like the man who defended himself for beating his father by saying, 'Yes, for he beat his father, and that one beat his father before him,' and pointing to his child, said, 'and this one will beat me when he becomes a man; for it runs in our family.' And the father who was being dragged by his son bid him stop at the door, because he himself had dragged his father as far as that.
ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι.
Further, those who are more crafty are more unjust.
ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδʼ ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός·
Now, the quick-tempered man is not crafty, nor is anger; rather, it is open.
ἡ δʼ ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν· "
δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς· "
καὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἱμάντα Ὅμηρος· "
πάρφασις, ἥ τʼ ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος. "
ὥστʼ εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως.
But desire is, as they say of Aphrodite: 'weaver of wiles is the Cyprus-born'; and Homer says of her embroidered girdle: 'persuasion, which steals away the mind of even the very wise.' So that if this incontinence is more unjust and more disgraceful than that regarding anger, it is both unqualified incontinence and a kind of vice.
ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δʼ ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δʼ ὑβρίζων μεθʼ ἡδονῆς.
Further, no one acts with insolence while feeling pain, but everyone who acts from anger acts feeling pain, whereas the person who acts with insolence does so with pleasure.
εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις.
If, then, those things are more unjust with which it is most just to be angry, then incontinence through desire is also more unjust; for there is no insolence in anger.
ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον·
That, then, incontinence concerning desire is more disgraceful than that concerning anger, and that continence and incontinence are concerned with bodily desires and pleasures, is clear.
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον.
But we must grasp the differences among these themselves.
ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατʼ ἀρχάς, αἳ μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἳ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἳ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα.
For as was said at the beginning, some are human and natural both in kind and in degree, while others are brutish, and others are due to deformities and diseases.
τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν·
Of these, temperance and licentiousness are only concerned with the first kind.
διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτʼ ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλʼ ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τινι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σιναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλʼ ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Therefore, we do not call beasts either temperate or licentious, except metaphorically and if some one class of animals differs entirely from another in insolence, destructiveness, or voracity; for they have no choice or calculation, but are outside their nature, like madmen among humans.
ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔχει.
Brutishness is a less evil than vice, though more frightening; for the better part has not been destroyed, as in human beings, but is simply absent.
ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή.
It is like comparing an inanimate thing with an animate one to see which is worse; for the badness of that which has no principle is always less harmful, and intellect is a principle.
παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον·
It is, therefore, similar to comparing injustice with an unjust human being.
μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.
For in one way each is worse; since a bad human being can do ten thousand times more harm than a beast.