§7.4πότερον δʼ ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς.
Whether there is anyone who is incontinent unqualifiedly, or whether all are so in a partial way, and if there is, what sort of things he is concerned with, must be discussed next.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τʼ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν.
That continent and resilient people, and incontinent and soft people, are concerned with pleasures and pains is clear.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δʼ αἱρετὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτὰ ἔχοντα δʼ ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά (λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην), τὰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθʼ αὑτά (λέγω δʼ οἷον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων)· τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δʼ οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθʼ ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν.
Since of things that produce pleasure some are necessary, and others are desirable in themselves but admit of excess; necessary being the bodily things (I mean such things as those concerned with food and the use of aphrodisiacs, and such bodily things as we placed under the headings of licentiousness and temperance), and the others being not necessary, but desirable in themselves (I mean, for example, victory, honor, wealth, and such things among goods and pleasant things); those, then, who exceed in these things contrary to the right rule within themselves we do not call incontinent unqualifiedly, but we add 'incontinent of wealth', 'of gain', 'of honor', or 'of anger', but not unqualifiedly, as being different and called so by virtue of resemblance, like 'Man' who won the Olympic games; for in his case the common definition differed only slightly from his proper name, but still it was different.
σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἁπλῶς οὖσα ἢ κατά τι μέρος, τούτων δʼ οὐδείς.
The sign of this: for incontinence is blamed not only as a mistake but also as a kind of vice, either unqualifiedly or in some part; but none of these is so blamed.
τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολάς—καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν—ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς μόνον.
But of those concerned with bodily enjoyments, with which we associate the temperate and the licentious person, he who pursues the excesses of pleasant things—and avoids painful things like hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and all things to do with touch and taste—not by choice, but contrary to his choice and thinking, is called incontinent, not with an addition, as being concerned with 'this', like anger, but simply only.
σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δʼ οὐδεμίαν.
And the sign is: they are called soft in relation to these, but in relation to none of those.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ εἰς ταὐτὸ τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἳ δʼ εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλʼ οἳ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἳ δʼ οὐ προαιροῦνται.
And for this reason we place the incontinent and the licentious in the same category, and the continent and the temperate, but none of those others, because they are in a way concerned with the same pleasures and pains; they indeed are concerned with the same things, but not in the same way, for the one choose them, while the others do not choose them.
διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά;
Therefore we should call licentious rather him who pursues excesses and avoids moderate pains without desiring or desiring only weakly, than him who does so because of strong desire; for what would the former do if a youthful desire were added, and strong pain regarding the lack of necessary things?
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ μέν εἰσι τῶν τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά), τὰ δʼ ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες· ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν)· μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτʼ ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι διʼ αὑτό, φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί.
Since of desires and pleasures some belong to the class of things beautiful and noble (for some pleasant things are naturally desirable), while others are contrary to these, and others are intermediate, as we distinguished earlier—such as wealth, gain, victory, and honor; in relation to all these and such intermediate things, people are not blamed for experiencing them, desiring them, and loving them, but for doing so in a certain way and in excess; (wherefore, all who contrary to rule are either mastered by or pursue something naturally noble and good—such as those who are more devoted than they should be to honor, or to children and parents; for these too are among goods, and those who are devoted to them are praised; but yet there is an excess even in these, if one, like Niobe, were to fight even against the gods, or like Satyrus nicknamed 'the father-lover' in relation to his father, for he seemed to be excessively foolish) — vice, then, there is none in these cases for the reason given, because each of them is by nature desirable in itself, but the excesses of them are bad and to be avoided.
ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδʼ ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν·
Likewise neither is there incontinence; for incontinence is not only to be avoided but is also among the blameworthy things.
διʼ ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν κακόν.
But because of the resemblance of the state, people add 'incontinence' and speak of it in relation to each thing, just as they speak of a 'bad doctor' or a 'bad actor', whom they would not call bad unqualifiedly.
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδʼ ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κἀκεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμοῦ καθʼ ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.
As, then, in those cases, because each of them is not a vice but only similar by analogy, so clearly we must suppose that in the other case also, only that which is concerned with the same things as temperance and licentiousness is incontinence and continence, and we speak of anger by resemblance; wherefore we also say 'incontinent of anger' with an addition, just as we say 'of honor' and 'of gain'.