Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §4.8-4.9

Wit in Social Play and the Nature of Shame

Passage 49 of 123 · Greek

Summary

The author defines the ready-witted mean in social play, contrasting it with buffoonery and boorishness, and argues that shame and self-control are not strictly virtues but rather a passion and a mixed state.

§4.8οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὥς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν.
Since there is also relaxation in life, and in this a pastime accompanied by play, there seems to be here too a certain harmonious social intercourse, both in what kind of things one ought to say and how, and likewise in listening.
διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.
And it will also make a difference to speak among such people or to listen to such people.
δῆλον δʼ ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου.
And it is clear that in these matters too there is an excess and a deficiency of the mean.
οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτʼ αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
Now, those who exceed in the ridiculous seem to be buffoons and vulgar, striving for the ridiculous at all costs, and aiming more at raising a laugh than at saying what is seemly and not paining the person being mocked; while those who would not say anything ridiculous themselves and are displeased with those who do seem to be boorish and stiff.
οἱ δʼ ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι· τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη.
But those who play in a well-tuned manner are called ready-witted, as if they were of a versatile turn; for such movements are thought to belong to character, and just as bodies are judged by their movements, so also are characters.
ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον.
But since the ridiculous is common, and most people enjoy play and mocking more than they ought, even buffoons are called ready-witted as if they were refined; but that they differ, and not a little, is clear from what has been said.
τῇ μέσῃ δʼ ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δʼ ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου.
To the mean state also belongs dexterity; and it belongs to the dexterous person to say and listen to such things as are fitting for a decent and gentlemanly person; for there are some things fitting for such a person to say in the way of play, and to listen to, and the play of the gentlemanly person differs from that of the slavish person, and that of the educated from that of the uneducated.
ἴδοι δʼ ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δʼ οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην.
One may see this also from the old and the new comedies; for to the former, obscenity was ridiculous, but to the latter, innuendo rather; and these differ not a little in respect of decency.
πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν;
Should we, then, define the person who mocks well by his saying what is not unfitting for a gentlemanly person, or by his not paining the listener, or even by his pleasing him?
ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον;
Or is such a thing at least indefinite?
ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ.
For different things are hateful and pleasant to different people.
τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ.
And he will also listen to such things; for what a person tolerates listening to, he is also thought to do.
οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δʼ ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν.
He will not indeed do everything; for mockery is a sort of abuse, and since legislators forbid some kinds of abuse, they perhaps ought to have forbidden some kinds of mockery as well.
ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ.
So the refined and gentlemanly person will be thus disposed, being as it were a law to himself.
τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτʼ ἐπιδέξιος εἴτʼ εὐτράπελος λέγεται.
Such, then, is the person in the mean, whether he is called dexterous or ready-witted.
ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δʼ οὐδʼ ἂν ἀκούσαι.
But the buffoon is defeated by the ridiculous, and sparing neither himself nor others if he can raise a laugh, and saying such things as the refined person would never say, and some indeed he would not even listen to.
ὁ δʼ ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει.
On the other hand, the boorish person is useless for such social intercourse; for contributing nothing, he is displeased with everything.
δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον.
Yet relaxation and play seem to be necessary in life.
τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν.
There are, then, three mean states in life as has been said, and they are all concerned with some association in words and actions.
διαφέρουσι δʼ ὅτι ἣ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ.
But they differ in that one is concerned with truth, and the others with what is pleasant.
τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἣ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἣ δʼ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.
And of those concerned with pleasure, one is in play, and the other in the social intercourses of the rest of life.
§4.9περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει.
Regarding shame, it is not fitting to speak of it as a sort of virtue; for it resembles a passion rather than a state of character.
ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν.
At any rate, it is defined as a sort of fear of dishonor, and it produces its effect in a manner similar to the fear of terrible things; for those who feel ashamed blush, while those who fear death grow pale.
σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι.
Both, indeed, appear to be in some way bodily, which seems to belong to a passion rather than a state of character.
οὐ πάσῃ δʼ ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ.
And this passion does not suit every age, but the young.
οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δʼ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφʼ οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη.
For we think that those of this age ought to be bashful because, living by passion, they make many mistakes, but are kept in check by shame; and we praise those among the young who are bashful, but no one would praise an older person for being shamefaced; for we think he ought not to do anything for which shame is felt.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δʼ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατʼ ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστʼ οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)·
For indeed shame does not belong to a decent person, if indeed it occurs in connection with bad actions (for such things ought not to be done; and if some things are disgraceful in truth and others according to reputation, it makes no difference; for neither ought to be done, so that one ought not to feel shame).
φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν.
And it belongs to a bad person to be of such a character as to do any of the disgraceful things.
τὸ δʼ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστʼ εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δʼ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα.
But to be so disposed that if one should do any of such things one would feel ashamed, and on this account to think oneself decent, is absurd; for shame is felt for voluntary actions, and the decent person will never voluntarily do bad things.
εἴη δʼ ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτʼ ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.
Shame indeed might be decent hypothetically; for if one were to do them, one would feel ashamed; but this does not apply to the virtues.
εἰ δʼ ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές.
And if shamelessness is bad, and not to be ashamed to do disgraceful things, that does not make it any more decent for one who does such things to feel ashamed.
οὐκ ἔστι δʼ οὐδʼ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον.
Nor indeed is self-control a virtue, but a sort of mixed state; but this will be shown later.
νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.
Now let us speak about justice.

Notes

  1. 1128a1τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν — The pronouns τοιούτοις (dative) and τοιούτων (genitive) can be interpreted as either neuter ('in such matters / of such things') or masculine ('among such people / from such people'). Given that Aristotle immediately proceeds to discuss the character of speakers and listeners (e.g., the difference between the educated and uneducated), it is more contextually appropriate to take them as masculine: 'speaking among such people, or listening to such people.'
  2. 1128a12ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου — This is a genitive absolute construction expressing cause or circumstance ('since the ridiculous is common/prevalent'). It corresponds with the subsequent clause 'most people enjoy play more than they ought,' serving to establish the background reason why buffoons are often misidentified as ready-witted.
  3. 1128a29ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ — The participle ἀκούων is a supplementary participle with the verb ὑπομένει ('tolerates listening to / hears patiently'). The subject of the main verb δοκεῖ is the implied antecedent of the relative pronoun ἃ. The entire sentence forms a general statement: 'for what a person tolerates listening to, he is also thought to do.'
  4. 1128b30εἴη δʼ ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές — The construction uses the optative εἴη with ἄν to express a potential or cautious assertion ('might be'). The predicate adjective ἐπιεικές is neuter singular, despite the subject ἡ αἰδὼς being feminine, because it is treated as a conceptual noun ('a decent thing'). The prepositional phrase ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ('on a hypothesis / conditionally') anticipates the conditional explanation that follows.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §4.8-4.9. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:4.8-4.9

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