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Aristotle · Nicomachean Ethics §4.3#1

Definition of Magnanimity and Its Relation to Honor

Passage 43 of 123 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle defines "magnanimity" (greatness of soul) as the state of character of one who, being worthy of great things, deems himself worthy of them. He shows that it presupposes all virtues and is primarily characterized by a proper, moderate attitude toward honors and external fortune.

§4.3#1ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δʼ ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν·
Magnanimity, as its very name suggests, seems to be concerned with great things. Let us first grasp what kind of things it is concerned with.
διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν.
It makes no difference whether we examine the state of character or the person who acts in accordance with that state.
δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν·
Now, a magnanimous person seems to be one who deems himself worthy of great things and is indeed worthy of them.
ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατʼ ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατʼ ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδʼ ἀνόητος.
For he who does this without being worthy is foolish, but no one who acts in accordance with virtue is foolish or senseless.
μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος.
Such, then, is the magnanimous person.
ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δʼ οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δʼ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δʼ οὔ.
For he who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but not magnanimous; for magnanimity consists in greatness, just as beauty implies a large body—small people may be neat and well-proportioned, but not beautiful.
ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος.
But he who deems himself worthy of great things when he is unworthy of them is vain; yet not everyone who deems himself worthy of more than he deserves is vain.
ὁ δʼ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ.
But he who deems himself worthy of less than he deserves is pusillanimous, whether his deserts be great or moderate, or even if, being worthy of small things, he claims still less for himself.
καὶ μάλιστʼ ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος;
And the one who is worthy of great things would seem to be [pusillanimous] most of all; for what would he have done, if he were not worthy of so many things?
ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατʼ ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ· οἳ δʼ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν.
Thus, the magnanimous person is extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but intermediate in acting as he ought; for he estimates himself at his true worth, while the others exceed or fall short.
εἰ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴη.
If, then, he deems himself worthy of great things, and especially of the greatest, being indeed worthy of them, he will be concerned preeminently with some one object.
ἡ δʼ ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτʼ ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστʼ ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον·
Now, "worthiness" is spoken of in relation to external goods; and we should assume that to be the greatest which we assign to the gods, and which those of high standing most of all desire, and which is the prize for the finest deeds.
τοιοῦτον δʼ ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν·
Such a thing is honor; for this is indeed the greatest of external goods.
περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ.
Therefore, the magnanimous person is concerned as he ought to be with honors and dishonors.
καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, κατʼ ἀξίαν δέ.
And even without argument, it is evident that magnanimous people are concerned with honor; for it is honor that they especially claim for themselves, but in accordance with their worth.
ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα.
But the pusillanimous person falls short both in relation to his own worth and in relation to the claim of the magnanimous person.
ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον.
The vain person, on the other hand, exceeds in relation to himself, but certainly does not exceed the magnanimous person.
ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
And the magnanimous person, if indeed he is worthy of the greatest things, must be the best of men; for the better person always worthy of a greater thing, and the best of the greatest.
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.
Therefore, the truly magnanimous person must be good.
καὶ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα.
And greatness in each virtue would seem to belong to the magnanimous person.
οὐδαμῶς τʼ ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδʼ ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γʼ οὐδὲν μέγα;
It would by no means befit a magnanimous person to flee, swinging his arms, nor to do injustice; for to what end would he do shameful deeds, to whom nothing is great?
καθʼ ἕκαστα δʼ ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτʼ ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν.
If we examine the character in detail, the magnanimous person would appear completely ridiculous if he were not good.
οὐκ εἴη δʼ ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
Nor would he be worthy of honor if he were bad; for honor is the prize of virtue, and it is paid to the good.
ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων.
Magnanimity, then, seems to be a sort of ornament of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it does not arise without them.
διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
For this reason, it is difficult to be truly magnanimous; for it is not possible without nobility and goodness.
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι· καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν·
The magnanimous person, then, is concerned preeminently with honors and dishonors; and he will be moderately pleased with great honors and those bestowed by excellent men, on the ground that he is obtaining what is his own or even less; for there can be no honor worthy of perfect virtue, though he will accept it because they have nothing greater to bestow on him.
τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος·
But honor from casual people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise; for he is not worthy of these.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν.
He will feel similarly about dishonor too; for it cannot justly attach to him.
μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτʼ εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτʼ ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος.
The magnanimous person, then, as has been said, is concerned preeminently with honors; nevertheless, he will also bear himself moderately towards wealth and power and all good and bad fortune, however they may turn out, and will neither be overjoyed by good fortune nor over-distressed by ill fortune.
οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν.
For he does not even regard honor itself as if it were the greatest of things.
αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι διʼ αὐτῶν βούλονται·
For power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honor; at all events, those who possess them wish to be honored because of them.
ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα.
But to him for whom even honor is a small thing, other things also must be small.
διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
This is why they are thought to be supercilious.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν.
It seems, too, that good fortune contributes to magnanimity.
οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δʼ ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον.
For the well-born, the powerful, and the wealthy are deemed worthy of honor; for they are in a position of superiority, and everything that is superior in goodness is more highly honored.
διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν·
Therefore, such circumstances also make people more magnanimous, since they are honored by some.
κατʼ ἀλήθειαν δʼ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ δʼ ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς.
In truth, however, only the good person is to be honored; but he who has both is deemed even more worthy of honor.
οἱ δʼ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα.
But those who possess such goods without virtue neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things nor are they rightly called magnanimous; for without perfect virtue these things are impossible.

Notes

  1. 1123b1διαφέρει δʼ οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν — The infinitive `σκοπεῖν` (to examine) functions as the subject of the impersonal verb `διαφέρει` (it makes a difference), with the adverbial accusative `οὐδέν` indicating "not at all" or "no difference." The coordinate objects of the infinitive are `τὴν ἕξιν` (the state of character) and `τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν` (the person in accordance with that state). This asserts the methodological equivalence between defining a virtue in the abstract and describing the agent who possesses it.
  2. 1123b12καὶ μάλιστʼ ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· — The subject `ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος` (the one worthy of great things) carries over the context from the preceding sentence (1123b9-11) regarding the pusillanimous person (`μικρόψυχος`), who estimates himself at less than his true worth. Thus, it elliptically refers to "the one who, though worthy of great things, estimates himself at less." Supplying this ellipsis clarifies the argument: a person with genuinely high worth who underestimates himself appears the most pusillanimous of all.
  3. 1123b13τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· — The datives `τῷ μεγέθει` (in respect of greatness) and `τῷ ὡς δεῖ` (in respect of acting as one ought) are datives of respect (or relationship). They point to the structural paradox of the magnanimous person: while standing at the "extreme" (peak) regarding the greatness of his claims, he occupies the "mean" (intermediate position) regarding the appropriateness and correctness of those claims relative to his actual worth.
  4. 1123b31φεύγειν παρασείσαντι — The participle `παρασείσας` (from `παρασείω`, to shake or swing beside) is an idiomatic expression meaning "to flee in a panic" or "to run away swinging one's arms." The dative form of the participle `παρασείσαντι` agrees with `μεγαλοψύχῳ` (the magnanimous person), which serves as the dative agent of the infinitive `φεύγειν` governed by the impersonal construction `ἂν ἁρμόζοι` (it would befit).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics §4.3#1. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:4.3%231

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