§3.7σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαὶ τὰ δʼ ἐλλείψεις τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικαί.
And almost each of the other praiseworthy and blameworthy things concerning character are on the one hand excesses, on the other hand deficiencies, and on the other hand passionate intermediate states.
οἷον ὁ φθονερὸς καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος.
For example, the envious and the spiteful.
καθʼ ἃς γὰρ ἕξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατʼ ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσιν ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλʼ ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις.
For according to the states they are spoken of: envy is to feel pain at those faring well according to worth, but the passion of the spiteful person is nameless with respect to the same thing, though the one possessing it is obvious, [which is] to rejoice at misfortunes contrary to worth.
μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὃ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δʼ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διὸ καὶ θεὸν οἴονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν.
And intermediate between these is the indignant person, and what the ancients called indignation (nemesis), namely, to feel pain at misfortunes and good fortunes contrary to worth, and to rejoice at those according to worth; wherefore also they think that nemesis is a god.
αἰδὼς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων.
And shame is an intermediate state between shamelessness and being dumbfounded (overawed); for the one who cares for no reputation is shameless, but the one who cares for all alike is dumbfounded, and the one who cares for that of those who appear decent is shamefaced.
φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολακείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἁπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν μήτʼ ἀκολουθῶν μήτʼ ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος.
And friendship is an intermediate state between hostility and flattery; for the one who easily associates in all things according to desires is a flatterer, but the one who opposes all is hateful, and the one who neither follows nor opposes every pleasure, but [acts] toward what appears best, is a friend.
σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς αὐθάδης, ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός.
And dignity is an intermediate state between self-will and obsequiousness; for the one who lives with no regard for another and is contemptuous is self-willed, but the one who regulates everything toward another or is even inferior to everyone is obsequious, and the one who does so in some cases but not in others, and is thus disposed toward those who are worthy, is dignified.
ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὃν καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον, μέσος τοῦ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος.
And the truthful and simple person, whom they call straightforward, is intermediate between the ironical and the boastful.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω καθʼ αὑτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων, ὁ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δʼ ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθὴς καὶ καθʼ Ὅμηρον πεπνυμένος· καὶ ὅλως ὃ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὃ δὲ φιλοψευδής.
For the one who lies against himself toward the worse, not being ignorant, is ironical, while the one who does so toward the better is boastful, and the one who is as he is, is truthful and, according to Homer, sensible; and in general, the former is a lover of truth, the latter a lover of falsehood.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπελία μεσότης, καὶ ὁ εὐτράπελος μέσος τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου.
And wit also is an intermediate state, and the witty man is intermediate between the boorish or stubborn and the buffoon.
ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ τροφὴν ὁ σικχὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὃ μὲν μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὃ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄγροικος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ βωμολόχον· ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς προσίεται, ὃ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως.
For just as concerning food the squeamish differs from the omnivorous in that the former admits nothing or few things and with difficulty, while the latter admits everything easily, so also the boor is disposed toward the vulgar buffoon; for the former admits no jest but with difficulty, while the latter admits everything easily and with pleasure.
δεῖ δʼ οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· οὗτος δʼ εὐτράπελος.
But one ought to do neither, but some things and not others, and according to reason; and this person is witty.
ἡ δʼ ἀπόδειξις ἡ αὐτή· ἥ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ μὴ ἣν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἕξις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετή, τὰ δʼ ἄκρα ψεκτά.
And the proof is the same; for indeed such wit, and not that which we speak of metaphorically, is a most excellent state, and the intermediate state is praiseworthy, and the extremes are blameworthy.
οὔσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστι τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ᾖ τοιονδί, ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σκῶμμα ἐστίν, ἣ δʼ ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀμφότεραι μέντοι μεσότητες.
And since wit is twofold (for one consists in rejoicing at the jest, even if it is against oneself, provided it is of such a kind, of which one kind is indeed mockery, and the other consists in being able to produce such things), they are indeed different from each other, but both are intermediate states.
καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφʼ ὅσοις ἡσθήσεται ὁ εὖ κρίνων, κἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ᾖ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ.
For indeed the one able to produce such things as the one who judges well will be pleased with, even if the jest is against himself, will be intermediate between the vulgar and the cold.
ὁ δʼ ὅρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ μὴ λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκωπτομένῳ ὄντι ὁποιῳοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι ὄντι ἀρέσκειν· οὗτος γὰρ κρίνει εὖ.
And this definition is better than for the thing said to be not painful to the one mocked, whoever he may be; for one ought rather to please the one who is in the intermediate state, for he judges well.
πᾶσαι δʼ αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μέν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δʼ ἀρεταί, οὐδʼ αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ.
But all these intermediate states, though praiseworthy, are not virtues, nor are the opposite extremes vices; for they are without choice.
ταῦτα δὲ πάντʼ ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν καθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τι ἐστίν.
And all these are in the divisions of passions; for each of them is a certain passion.
διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως.
But because they are natural, they contribute to the natural virtues; for, as will be said later, each virtue exists somehow both by nature and in another way with wisdom.
ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδὼς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην· ὁ δʼ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ὃ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὃ δʼ ἄφρων.
Envy, then, contributes to injustice (for the actions arising from it are toward another) and indignation to justice, shame to temperance (wherefore also they define temperance in this genus); and as for the truthful and the false, the former is sensible, the latter foolish.
ἔστι δʼ ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετʼ οὐδετέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις μετʼ ἀλλήλων καί εἰσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασύδειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ὦσιν, οἱ μέσοι γίγνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστί πως τὰ ἄκρα.
And the intermediate is more opposite to the extremes than they are to one another, because the intermediate does not occur with either of them, but the extremes often occur with one another, and sometimes the same persons are rash-cowardly, and in some things prodigal and in others illiberal, and in general badly uneven. For when they are well uneven, they become the intermediate; for in the intermediate, the extremes are present in a way.
αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλʼ ὁτὲ μὲν καθʼ ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δὲ κατʼ ἔλλειψιν.
But the oppositions do not seem to belong to both extremes toward the intermediate in the same way, but sometimes according to excess and sometimes according to deficiency.
αἴτια δὲ τά τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα δύο, ὀλιγότης τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθήτων, καὶ ὅτι ἐφʼ ὃ ἁμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἧττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.
And the causes are the two first mentioned—namely, scarcity, as of those who are insensible to pleasant things, and that toward which we err more seems to be more opposite; and the third is that what is more similar appears less opposite, as rashness is disposed toward courage and prodigality toward liberality.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἴρηται σχεδόν· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λεκτέον.
Concerning the other praiseworthy virtues, then, they have been nearly spoken of; but concerning justice we must now speak.