§3.5#1περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον.
Concerning magnanimity, we must define its characteristic from what is attributed to magnanimous men.
ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι του λανθάνει πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταὐτὸ συμβέβηκεν.
For just as with other things which, because of proximity and similarity, escape notice up to a point but differ as they proceed further, the same has happened concerning magnanimity.
διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ αὐθάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοροι μέχρι τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασύς, ἀλλʼ ὃ μὲν ὧδε ὃ δʼ ὧδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει πλεῖστον.
Therefore, sometimes opposites lay claim to the same thing, as for example the profligate to the liberal, the self-willed to the dignified, and the rash to the brave; for they are concerned with the same things and are bordering up to a certain point, just as the brave man is enduring of dangers and so is the rash man, but the one is so in this way and the other in that way; and these differ most of all.
λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως.
And we speak of the magnanimous man according to the designation of the name, as if in a certain greatness of soul and power.
ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ ὅμοιος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται.
So that he seems to be similar both to the dignified and to the magnificent man, since he also appears to follow all the virtues.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρῖναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν.
For indeed to judge rightly the great and small among goods is praiseworthy.
δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτʼ εἶναι μεγάλα, ἃ διώκει ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἕξιν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτʼ εἶναι ἡδέα.
And those things seem to be great which the man who has the best state concerning such pleasant things pursues.
ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη· κρίνει δʼ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὥστε ἕπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ αὐτὴν ἕπεσθαι πάσαις.
And magnanimity is the best state; and the virtue concerning each thing judges the greater and the lesser rightly, which are the very things the prudent man and virtue would command, so that all the virtues follow it, or it follows all of them.
ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι.
Moreover, to be contemptuous seems to belong to the magnanimous man.
ἑκάστη δʼ ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικοὺς ποιεῖ τῶν παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν), καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθέριος χρημάτων.
But each virtue makes men contemptuous of things that are great contrary to reason, as for example courage of dangers (for it thinks that only of shameful things is anything great, and not every multitude is fearful), and temperance of great and many pleasures, and liberality of wealth.
μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἑτέρῳ τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος, τί δοκεῖ ἑνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἐπαινέσαντα.
And this seems to belong to the magnanimous man because of his being earnest about few things, and those great, and not because it seems so to someone else; and a magnanimous man would care more about what seems to one excellent man than to many ordinary people, just as Antiphon said to Agathon when he had been condemned, when Agathon praised his defense.
καὶ τὸ ὀλίγωρον τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστʼ εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον.
And slighting seems to be most especially a characteristic affection of the magnanimous man.
πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς.
Again, concerning honor, life, and wealth, about which men seem to be earnest, he cares nothing for the others except for honor.
καὶ λυπηθήσοιτʼ ἂν ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχόμενος ὑπὸ ἀναξίου.
And he would be pained if he were dishonored and ruled by an unworthy person.
καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.
And he rejoices most of all when he obtains it.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι.
Thus indeed he might seem to be in an opposite state; for to be both especially concerned with honor and contemptuous of the opinion of the multitude seems not to agree.
δεῖ δὴ τοῦτο διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν.
We must therefore define this before speaking.
ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς.
For honor is both small and great in two ways.
ἢ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων λόγου, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ τίνι ἡ τιμὴ διαφέρει.
For it differs either by being by many ordinary people or by those worthy of consideration, and again, by what the honor is for.
μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμίαν εἶναι·
For great honor is so not only by the multitude of those who honor, nor only by their quality, but also by being itself honorable.
τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους·
And in truth, both offices and the other goods are honorable and worthy of earnestness, as many of them as are truly great, so that no virtue is without greatness.
διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους ποιεῖν ἑκάστη, περὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν.
Therefore, each virtue seems to make men magnanimous, concerning whatever each of them is about, just as we said.