§3.8#2ἔτι δʼ εἰ θερμαίνει καὶ καίει τὸ πῦρ διὰ τὰς γωνίας, ἅπαντα ἔσται τὰ στοιχεῖα θερμαντικά, μᾶλλον δʼ ἴσως ἕτερον ἑτέρου· πάντα γὰρ ἔχει γωνίας, οἷον τό τε ὀκτάεδρον καὶ τὸ δωδεκάεδρον.
Furthermore, if fire heats and burns because of its angles, all the elements will be capable of heating, though perhaps one more so than another; for all of them have angles, such as the octahedron and the dodecahedron.
Δημοκρίτῳ δὲ καὶ ἡ σφαῖρα ὡς γωνία τις οὖσα τέμνει ὡς εὐκίνητον.
And for Democritus, even the sphere, as being a kind of angle, cuts because of its mobility.
ὥστε διοίσει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
Consequently, they will differ only in degree.
τοῦτο δʼ ὅτι ἔστι ψεῦδος, φανερόν.
But that this is false is manifest.
ἅμα δὲ συμβήσεται καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ σώματα καίειν καὶ θερμαίνειν· ἔχει γὰρ κἀκεῖνα γωνίας, καὶ ἔνεισιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄτομοι καὶ σφαῖρα καὶ πυραμίδες, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἄτομα μεγέθη, καθάπερ φασίν.
At the same time, it will also follow that mathematical solids burn and heat; for they too have angles, and there are in them atoms, spheres, and pyramids, especially if there are indivisible magnitudes, as they say.
εἰ γὰρ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, λεκτέον τὴν διαφοράν, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἀπλῶς οὕτω λεκτέον ὡς λέγουσιν.
For if some do so and others do not, the difference must be stated, and not asserted in this simple-minded way they do.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ. καιόμενον πυροῦται, τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐστὶ σφαῖρα ἢ πυραμίς, ἀνάγκη τὸ καιόμενον γίγνεσθαι σφαίρας ἢ πυραμίδας.
Moreover, if that which is burnt is turned into fire, and fire is a sphere or a pyramid, that which is burnt must necessarily become spheres or pyramids.
τὸ μὲν οὖν τέμνειν καὶ τὸ διαιρεῖν οὕτως ἔστω κατὰ λόγον συμβαῖνον τῷ σχήματι· τὸ δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὴν πυραμίδα ποιεῖν πυραμίδας ἢ τὴν σφαῖραν σφαίρας παντελῶς ἄλογον καὶ ὅμοιον ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀξιοίη τὴν μάχαιραν εἰς μαχαίρας διαιρεῖν ἢ τὸν πρίονα εἰς πρίονας.
Now, let it be granted that cutting and dividing happen in this way reasonably according to the shape; but that a pyramid must necessarily make pyramids, or a sphere spheres, is utterly unreasonable, and is just as if someone were to expect a knife to divide things into knives, or a saw into saws.
ἔτι δὲ γελοῖον πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν μόνον ἀποδοῦναι τὸ σχῆμα τῷ πυρί· δοκεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον συγκρίνειν καὶ συνορίζειν ἢ διακρίνειν.
Furthermore, it is ridiculous to assign the shape to fire only for the purpose of dividing; for it seems rather to combine and bring to a limit than to separate.
διακρίνει μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὁμόφυλα, συγκρίνει δὲ τὰ ὁμόφυλα· καὶ ἡ μὲν σύγκρισις καθʼ αὑτό ἐστι (τὸ γὰρ συνορίζειν καὶ ἑνοῦν τοῦ πυρός), ἡ δὲ διάκρισις κατὰ συμβεβηκός (συγκρῖνον γὰρ τὸ ὁμόφυλον ἐξαιρεῖ τὸ ἀλλότριον).
For it separates things that are not of the same kind, but combines those of the same kind; and combining is its essential function (for bringing to a limit and uniting belong to fire), while separating is accidental (for by combining what is of the same kind, it expels what is foreign).
ὥστʼ ἢ πρὸς ἄμφω ἐχρῆν ἀποδοῦναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὸ συγκρίνειν.
So they ought either to have assigned it for both, or rather for combining.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἐπεὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐναντία τῇ δυνάμει, ἀδύνατον ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ψυχρῷ σχῆμά τι· δεῖ γὰρ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἀποδιδόμενον, οὐθὲν δʼ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ σχήματι.
In addition to these, since hot and cold are contrary in their power, it is impossible to assign any shape to the cold; for that which is assigned ought to be contrary, but no shape is contrary to a shape.
διὸ καὶ πάντες ἀπολελοίπασι τοὕτο· καίτοι προσῆκεν ἢ πάντα ἀφορίσαι σχήμασιν ἢ μηδέν.
This is why all of them have left this aside; and yet they ought either to have defined all things by shapes or none.
ἔνιοι δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ πειραθέντες εἰπεῖν ἐναντία λέγουσιν αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς.
But some, in attempting to speak of its power, contradict themselves.
φασὶ γὰρ εἶναι ψυχρὸν τὸ μεγαλομερὲς διὰ τὸ συνθλίβειν καὶ μὴ διιέναι διὰ τῶν πόρων.
For they say that what consists of large parts is cold because it squeezes and does not pass through the pores.
δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ἄν εἴη τὸ διιόν. τοιοῦτον δʼ ἀεὶ τὸ λεπτομερές.
Clearly, then, the hot would be that which does pass through; and such is always that which consists of fine parts.
ὥστε συμβαίνει μικρότητι καὶ μεγέθει διαφέρειν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῖς σχήμασιν.
Consequently, it turns out that the hot and the cold differ in smallness and largeness, and not in their shapes.
ἔτι δʼ εἰ ἄνισοι αἱ πυραμίδες, αἱ μεγάλαι ἂν εἶεν οὐ πῦρ οὐδʼ αἴτιον τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ καίειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου.
Moreover, if the pyramids are unequal, the large ones would not be fire, nor would the shape be the cause of burning, but of its contrary.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ τοῖς σχήμασι διαφέρει τὰ στοιχεῖα, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
That the elements do not differ in their shapes, then, is manifest from what has been said.
ἐπεὶ δὲ κυριώταται διαφοραὶ σωμάτων αἵ τε κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις (ἑκάστου γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν τῶν φύσει καὶ ἔργα καὶ πάθη καὶ δυνάμεις), πρῶτον ἂν εἴη περὶ τούτων λεκτέον, ὅπως θεωρήσαντες ταῦτα λάβωμεν τὰς ἑκάστου πρὸς ἕκαστον διαφοράς.
But since the most fundamental differences of bodies are those in respect of properties, actions, and powers (for we say that every natural thing has actions, properties, and powers), we should first speak about these, so that by investigating them we may grasp the differences of each in relation to each.