§3.1#11 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτου οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν μερῶν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ φερομένων ἄστρων, ἐκ τίνων τε συνεστᾶσι καὶ ποῖ ἄττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστί, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, διεληλύθαμεν πρότερον.
Concerning, then, the first heaven and its parts, and furthermore the stars that are carried in it, of what they are composed and what kind of nature they have, and in addition to these, that they are ungenerated and incorruptible, we have already treated before.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν φύσει λεγομένων τὰ μέν ἐστιν οὐσίαι τὰ δʼ ἔργα καὶ πάθη τούτων (λέγω δʼ οὐσίας μὲν τά τε ἀπλᾶ σώματα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τούτοις, καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τούτων, οἷον τόν τε σύνολον οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτων, πάθη δὲ καὶ ἔργα τάς τε κινήσεις τὰς τούτων ἑκάστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσων ἐστὶν αἴτια ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ τὰς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάσεις, φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν πλείστην συμβαίνει τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας περὶ σωμάτων εἶναι· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι ἢ σώματα ἢ μετὰ σωμάτων γίγνονται καὶ μεγεθῶν.
But since, of those things that are said to be by nature, some are substances, while others are the works and affections of these (and I mean by substances the simple bodies, such as fire and earth and those coordinate with them, and whatever is made of them, such as the whole heaven and its parts, and again animals and plants and their parts; and by affections and works I mean the movements of each of these, and of the other things of which these are the causes according to their own power, and furthermore alterations and transitions into one another), it is clear that the greater part of the inquiry concerning nature happens to be about bodies; for all natural substances either are bodies or come to be with bodies and magnitudes.
τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἔκ τε τοῦ διωρίσθαι τὰ ποῖά ἐστι φύσει, καὶ ἐκ τῆς καθʼ ἕκαστα θεωρίας.
And this is clear both from having defined what kind of things are by nature, and from the detailed investigation of each.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτου τῶν στοιχείων εἴρηται, καὶ ποῖόν τι τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τοῖν δυοῖν εἰπεῖν.
Now, concerning the first of the elements it has been said, both what kind of nature it has, and that it is incorruptible and ungenerated; but it remains to speak of the other two.
ἅμα δὲ συμβήσεται περὶ τούτων λέγουσι καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς διασκέψασθαι· γένεσις γὰρ ἤτοι τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ μόνον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς στοιχείοις καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων ἐστίν.
And at the same time it will happen to those who speak of these to investigate also coming-to-be and passing-away; for coming-to-be either does not exist at all, or is only in these elements and in those things that are made of them.
αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἴσως θεαωρητέον, πότερον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.
And this very thing itself must perhaps be considered first, whether it exists or does not exist.
οἱ μὲν οὖν πρότερον φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ πρὸς οὓς νῦν λέγομεν ἡμεῖς λόγους καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διηνέχθησαν.
Now those who previously philosophized about the truth and against whom we are now directing our arguments, as well as against one another, differed.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλως ἀνεῖλον γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν· οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτε γίγνεσθαί φασιν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν, οἷον οἱ περὶ Μέλισσόν τε καὶ Παρμενίδην, οὕς, εἰ καὶ τἆλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀλλʼ οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίσαι λέγειν· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄττα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς σκέψεως.
For some of them completely abolished coming-to-be and passing-away; for they say that none of the things that exist either comes to be or passes away, but only seems to us to do so, such as those around Melissus and Parmenides, whom, even if they speak well in other respects, we must not deem to speak in a way that belongs to natural science; for the existence of some things among those that exist as ungenerated and completely motionless belongs rather to another and prior inquiry than to the inquiry concerning nature.
ἐκεῖνοι δὲ διὰ. τὸ μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι, τοιαύτας δέ τινας νοῆσαι πρῶτοι φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔσται τις γνῶσις ἢ φρόνησις, οὕτω μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ ταῦτα τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν λόγους.
But those men, because they supposed that nothing else exists besides the substance of sensible things, and were the first to conceive such natures, if indeed there is to be any knowledge or wisdom, thus transferred the arguments from there to these things.
ἕτεροι δέ τινες ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτοις ἔσχον δόξαν.
But certain others, as if on purpose, held the opposite opinion to these.
εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἵ φασιν οὐθὲν ἀγένητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, γενόμενα δὲ τά μὲν ἄφθαρτα διαμένειν τὰ δὲ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ Ἡσίοδον, εἶτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες.
For there are some who say that nothing of things is ungenerated, but that all things come to be, and that having come to be, some remain incorruptible while others pass away again, especially those around Hesiod, and then also the first of the others who discoursed on nature.
οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γενέσθαι φασὶ καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν, ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὅπερ ἐοίκασι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος.
And some say that all other things come to be and flow, and that nothing exists stably, but that only some one thing remains, from which all these things are by nature transformed; which many others and Heraclitus of Ephesus seem to wish to say.
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ καὶ πᾶν σῶμα γενητὸν ποιοῦσι, συντιθέντες καὶ διαλύοντες εἰς ἐπίπεδα καὶ ἐξ ἐπιπέδων.
And there are some who make even every body generated, composing and dissolving them into planes and from planes.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγουσι καὶ πάντα τὰ σώματα συνιστᾶσιν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων ὅσα μὲν ἄλλα συμβαίνει λέγειν ὑπεναντία τοῖς μαθήμασιν, ἐπιπολῆς ἔστιν 5 ἰδεῖν (καίτοι δίκαιον ἦν ἢ μὴ κινεῖν ἢ πιστοτέροις αὐτὰ λόγοις κινεῖν τῶν ὑποθέσεων.
Concerning the others, then, let there be another discussion; but for those who speak in this manner and compose all bodies from planes, what other things happen to be said contrary to mathematics is easy to see (and yet it was just either not to disturb them, or to disturb them with arguments more credible than the hypotheses.
ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου. ἐστὶ στερεὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συγκεῖσθαι, ἐπίπεδα δʼ ἐκ γραμμῶν, ταύτας δʼ ἐκ στιγμῶν· οὕτω δʼ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος γραμμὴν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπέσκεπται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετα μήκη)· ὅσα δὲ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει λέγειν τοῖς ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀτόμους γραμμάς, ἐπὶ μικρὸν θεωρήσωμεν καὶ νῦν·
Then it is clear that it belongs to the same argument is solids composed of planes, planes of lines, and these of points; and this being so, it is not necessary that a part of a line is a line; but concerning these things it has been investigated before in the discussions on movement, that there are no indivisible lengths); but what impossible things happen to be said concerning natural bodies by those who make indivisible lines, let us consider briefly now.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπʼ ἐκείνων ἀδύνατα συμβαίνοντα καὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀκολουθήσει, τὰ δὲ τούτοις ἐπʼ ἐκείνων οὐχ ἅπαντα διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως.
For the impossible things that happen in those cases will also follow for natural things, but those of natural things will not all follow in those cases, because mathematical things are said by way of subtraction, but natural things by way of addition.