§1.9#19 Ὅτι δʼ οὐ μόνον εἷς ἐστὶν οὐρανός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι πλείους, ἔτι δʼ ὡς ἀΐδιος ἄφθαρτος ὢν καὶ ἀγένητος, λέγωμεν, πρῶτον διαπορήσαντες περὶ αὐτοῦ.
9 Let us explain that not only is the heaven one, but it is also impossible for there to be more, and furthermore that it is eternal, being ungenerated and indestructible, having first discussed the difficulties concerning it.
δόξειε γὰρ ἂν ὡδὶ σκοπουμένοις ἀδύνατον ἕνα καὶ μόνον εἶναι αὐτόν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ καὶ τοῖς φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης συνεστῶσι καὶ γεγενημένοις ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ μεμιγμένη μετὰ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον τῆς σφαίρας ἕτερον τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ χρυσῇ καὶ ἡ χαλκῆ σφαῖρα, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ κύκλου ἑτέρα ἡ μορφὴ καὶ ὁ χαλκοῦς καὶ ὁ ξύλινος κύκλος·
For it would seem to those who look at it in this way that it is impossible for it to be one and only; for in all things, both those constituted by nature and those produced by art, the form in itself is different from the form mixed with matter; for instance, the shape of the sphere is different from the golden or bronze sphere, and again the form of the circle is different from the bronze or wooden circle.
τὸ γάρ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντες σφαίρᾳ ἢ κύκλῳ οὐκ ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ χρυσὸν ἢ χαλκόν, ὡς οὐκ ὄντα ταῦτα τῆς οὐσίας· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν χαλκῆν ἢ χρυσῆν, ἐροῦμεν, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ δυνώμεθα νοῆσαι μηδὲ λαβεῖν ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ καθʼ ἕκαστον.
For when we state the essence of a sphere or a circle, we shall not mention gold or bronze in our definition, as these do not belong to its substance; but if we state that of the bronze or golden sphere, we shall mention them, even if we cannot conceive or grasp anything else besides the individual.
ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐθὲν κωλύει τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, οἷον εἰ μόνος εἷς ληφθείη κύκλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἄλλο ἔσται τὸ κύκλῳ εἶναι καὶ τῷδε τῷ κύκλῳ, καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶδος, τὸ δʼ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον.
For sometimes nothing prevents this from happening, as for instance if only one single circle were taken; for nonetheless, being a circle and being this particular circle will be different, and the former is the form, while the latter is the form in matter and one of the individuals.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ οὐρανὸς αἰσθητός, τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἂν εἴη· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἅπαν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ὑπῆρχεν.
Since, then, the heaven is sensible, it must be one of the individuals; for every sensible thing exists in matter.
εἰ δὲ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον, ἕτερον ἂν εἴη τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ εἶναι καὶ οὐρανῷ ἀπλῶς.
And if it is one of the individuals, being this particular heaven will be different from being heaven simply.
ἕτερον ἄρα ὅδε ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ οὐρανὸς ἁπλῶς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος καὶ μορφὴ τὸ δʼ ὡς τῇ ὕλῃ μεμιγμένον.
Therefore, this particular heaven and heaven simply are different, and the one is as form and shape, while the other is as mixed with matter.
ὧν δʼ ἐστὶ μορφή τις καὶ εἶδος, ἤτοι ἔστιν ἢ ἐνδέχεται πλείω γενέσθαι τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα.
But of those things of which there is some shape and form, the individuals either are or are capable of becoming many.
εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν εἴδη, καθάπερ φασί τινες, ἀνάγκη τοῦτοσυμβαίνειν, εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστὸν μηθὲν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐθὲν ἦττον· ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ οὕτως ὁρὼμεν, ὅσων ἡ οὐσία ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστίν, πλείω καὶ ἄπειρα ὄντα τὰ ὁμοιοειδῆ.
For whether there are Ideas, as some say, this must happen, or whether none of such things is separable, it is nonetheless so; for in all things whose substance is in matter, we see that those of the same form are many or infinite in number.
ὥστε ἤτοι εἰσὶ πλείους οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἢ ἐνδέχεται πλείους εἶναι.
So that either there are more heavens or it is possible for there to be more.
ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι πλείους εἶναι οὐρανούς· σκεπτέον δὲ πάλιν τί τούτων λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τί οὐ καλῶς.
From these arguments, then, one might suppose both that there are and that it is possible for there to be more heavens; but we must consider again what in these is said rightly and what not rightly.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν λόγον τὸν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τὸν ἐν τῇ ὕλη τῆς μορφῆς καλῶς τε λέγεται, καὶ ἔστω τοῦτʼ ἀληθές.
That the definition of the form without matter is different from that of the form in matter is said rightly, and let this be true.
ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη διὰ τοῦτο πλείους εἶναι κόσμους, οὐδʼ ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι πλείους, εἴπερ οὗτος ἐξ ἀπάσης ἐστὶ τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἔστιν.
But nonetheless there is no necessity because of this for there to be more worlds, nor is it possible for more to come into being, if indeed this world is composed of all matter, as in fact it is.
ὡδὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ἴσως τὸ λεγόμενον ἔσται δῆλον.
Perhaps what is being said will become clearer in this way.
εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γρυπότης καμπυλότης ἐν ῥινὶ ἢ σαρκί, καὶ ἔστιν ὕλη τῇ γρυπότητι ἡ σάρξ, εἰ ἐξ ἀπασῶν τῶν σαρκῶν μία γένοιτο σὰρξ καὶ ὑπάρξειεν ταύτῃ τὸ γρυπόν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἄλλ᾿ οὔτ᾿ εἴη γρυπὸν οὔτ᾿ ἐνδέχοιτο γενέσθαι.
For if snubness is a curvature in a nose or in flesh, and flesh is the matter for snubness, if from all flesh there were to come to be one single flesh and this were possessed of snubness, nothing else would either be snub or be capable of becoming so.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶν ὕλη σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ, εἰ ἐκ πάσης τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ πάντων τῶν ὀστῶν ἄνθρωπος γένοιτο ἀδυνάτων ὄντων διαλυθῆναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο εἶναι ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων·
And likewise also if flesh and bones are the matter for man, if from all flesh and all bones a man were to come to be, it being impossible for them to be dissolved, it would not be possible for there to be another man.
ὅλως γὰρ ὅσων ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἐν ὑποκειμένῃ τινὶ ὕλῃ, τούτων οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι μὴ ὑπαρχούσης ὕλης.
And likewise also for other things; for in general, of all things whose substance is in some underlying matter, none of these can come to be if the matter does not exist.
ὁ δʼ οὐρανὸς ἔστι μὲν τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης· ἀλλʼ εἰ μὴ ἐκ μορίου αὐτῆς συνέστηκεν ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀπάσης, τὸ μὲν εἶναι αὐτῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τῷδε τῷ οὐρανῷ ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτʼ ἂν εἴη ἄλλος οὔτ᾿ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο γενέσθαι πλείους διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν τὴν ὕλην περιειληφέναι τοῦτον.
But the heaven is one of the individuals and composed of matter; yet if it is constituted not from a part of it but from the whole of it, although being heaven simply and being this particular heaven are different, nevertheless there would neither be another nor would it be possible for more to come into being, because of this heaven's having encompassed all the matter.
λείπεται ἄρα τοῦτο δεῖξαι, ὅτι ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ φυσικοῦ καὶ αἰσθητοῦ συνέστηκε σώματος.
It remains, therefore, to show this, namely that it is constituted from the whole of physical and sensible body.
εἴπωμεν δὲ πρῶτον τί λέγομεν εἶναι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ποσαχῶς, ἵνα μᾶλλον ἡμῖν δῆλον γένηται τὸ ζητούμενον.
But let us state first what we say the heaven is and in how many senses, so that our object of inquiry may become clearer to us.