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Aristotle · On the Heavens §1.12#3

Corruptibility of Generated Things from Limits of Capacity

Passage 21 of 62 · Greek

Summary

The author demonstrates that it is impossible for a generated thing to be incorruptible, or for an ungenerated thing to be corruptible, based on the co-existence of capacities and temporal limitations. Furthermore, he argues against the possibility of a once non-existent thing becoming eternal later, relying on the principle that there is no capacity for what has already happened in the past.

§1.12#3ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ὅτι τὸ Η τῷ Ε. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτως ἔχει τὸ ἀγένητον, ἐφʼ ᾧ Ε, πρὸς τὸ γενητόν, ἐφʼ ᾧ Ζ, καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ Η, πρὸς τὸ φθαρτόν, ἐφʼ ᾧ Θ. τὸ δὴ φάναι μηδὲν κωλύειν γινόμενόν τι ἄφθαρτον εἶναι καὶ ἀγένητον ὂν φθαρῆναι, ἅπαξ ὑπαρχούσης τῷ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως τῷ δὲ τῆς φθορὰς, ἀναιρεῖν ἐστὶ τῶν δεδομένων τι.
And the same argument also shows that H follows E. But indeed, the ungenerated, represented by E, stands in this relation to the generated, represented by Z, and the incorruptible, represented by H, to the corruptible, represented by Theta. Therefore, to say that nothing prevents a thing that has been generated from being incorruptible, and a thing that is ungenerated from being destroyed—on the ground that to the former generation belongs once for all, and to the latter destruction—is to destroy one of our data.
ἢ γὰρ ἄπειρον ἢ ποσόν τινα ὡρισμένον χρόνον δύναται ἅπαντα ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἄπειρον διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὥρισταί πως ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος, οὗ οὐκ ἔστι πλείων.
For everything has the capacity of acting or being acted upon, or of being or not being, either for an infinite time or for a defined quantity of time; and for an infinite time for this reason, that infinite time is defined in a way as that than which there is no more.
τὸ δὲ πῇ ἄπειρον οὔτ᾿ ἄπειρον οὔθ᾿ ὡρισμένονἔτι τί μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ σημείῳ ἀεὶ ὂν πρότερον ἐφθάρη ἢ μὴ ὂν ἄπειρον ἐγένετο;
But that which is infinite only in a certain respect is neither infinite nor defined. Furthermore, why should a thing which always existed before have been destroyed at this particular point rather than another, or that which did not exist for an infinite time have been generated?
εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν μᾶλλον, ἄπειρα δὲ τὰ σημεῖα, δῆλον ὅτι ἄπειρον χρόνον ἦν τι γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτόν.
For if there is no reason why rather at one than another, and the points of time are infinite, it is clear that for an infinite time something was generated and corruptible.
δύναται ἄρα μὴ εἶναι ἄπειρον χρόνον· ἅμα γὰρ ἕξει δύναμιν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ εἶναι, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, εἰ φθαρτόν, τὸ δʼ ὕστερον, εἰ γενητόν.
Therefore, it has the capacity of not being for an infinite time; for at the same time it will have the capacity of being and of not being—the former in the prior time, if it is corruptible, the latter in the posterior time, if it is generated.
ὥστʼ ἐὰν ὑπάρχειν θῶμεν ἃ δύνανται, τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἅμα ὑπάρξει.
So that if we assume those things to exist which they have the capacity to be, the contraries will exist at the same time.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦθʼ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπαντι σημείῳ ὑπάρξει, ὥστʼ ἄπειρον χρόνον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἕξει δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ δέδεικται ὅτι, ἀδύνατον τοῦτο.
And furthermore, this will likewise hold at every point of time, so that it will have the capacity of being and of not being for an infinite time; but it has been shown that this is impossible.
ἔτι εἰ πρότερον ἡ δύναμις ὑπάρχει τῆς ἐνεργείας, ἅπανθ᾿ ὑπάρξει τὸν χρόνον, καὶ ὃν ἀγένητον ἦν καὶ μὴ ὂν, τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον γίγνεσθαι δυνάμενον.
Furthermore, if the capacity exists prior to the actuality, it will possess this capacity for all time, even during the infinite time when it was ungenerated and non-existent, being capable of being generated.
ἅμα δὴ οὐκ ἦν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι δύναμιν εἶχε, καὶ τοῦ τότε εἶναι καὶ ὕστερον ἄπειρον ἄρα χρόνον.
At the same time, then, it did not exist and yet had the capacity of being, and of being both then and later; therefore, for an infinite time.
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ὅτι ἀδύνατον φθαρτὸν ὂν μὴ φθαρῆναί ποτε.
And it is also clear in another way that it is impossible for that which is corruptible never to be destroyed.
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔσται ἅμα καὶ φθαρτὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἐντελεχείᾳ, ὥστε ἅμα ἔσται δυνατὸν ἀεἱ τε εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀεί.
For it will always be at once corruptible and incorruptible in actuality, so that it will at the same time be capable both of always being and of not always being.
φθείρεται ἄρα ποτὲ τὸ φθαρτόν, καὶ εἰ γενητόν, γέγονεν· δυνατὸν γὰρ γεγονέναι, καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ ἄρα εἶναι.
Therefore, that which is corruptible is destroyed at some time, and if it is generated, it has been generated; for it was capable of having been generated, and therefore of not always being.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὧδε θεωρῆσαι ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἢ γενόμενόν ποτε ἄφθαρτόν τι διατελεῖν, ἢ ἀγένητον ὂν καὶ ἀεὶ πρότερον ὂν φθαρῆναι.
And we may also view the matter in this way, that it is impossible either for something that has been generated to continue for ever incorruptible, or for something that is ungenerated and has always existed before to be destroyed.
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὔτ᾿ ἄφθαρτον οὔτʼ ἀγένητον οἷόν τʼ εἶναι.
For nothing can be either incorruptible or ungenerated by chance.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτόματόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὂν ἢ γινόμενον·
For that which is by chance or luck is contrary to that which either is or is generated always or for the most part.
τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον χρόνον ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἀπό τινος χρόνου ἢ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ὑπάρχει ὄν.
But that which exists for an infinite time, whether absolutely or from some point of time, exists either always or for the most part.
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φύσει τὰ τοιαῦτα τὲ μὲν εἶναι ὁτὲ δὲ μή.
Therefore, it is necessary by nature that such things exist at one time and not at another.
τῶν δὲ τοιούτων ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, καὶ ἡ ὕλη αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μή.
And in such things there is the same capacity for contradictory states, and matter is the cause of their being and not being.
ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἐνεργείᾳ ἀντικείμενα.
So that it would be necessary for opposite states to exist in actuality at the same time.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν γʼ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι ἐστὶ πέρυσιν, οὐδὲ πέρυσιν ὅτι νῦν ἐστίν.
But indeed, it is not true to say now that a thing exists last year, nor last year that it exists now.
ἀδύνατον ἄρα μὴ ὄν ποτε ὕστερον ἀΐδιον εἶναι· ἕξει γὰρ ὕστερον καὶ τὴν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι δύναμιν.
Therefore, it is impossible for something which once was not to be eternal afterwards; for it will afterwards have the capacity of not being as well.
πλὴν οὐ τοῦ τότε μὴ εἶναι ὅτε ἔστιν (ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πέρυσιν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι χρόνῳ.
However, this capacity is not for its not being at the time when it exists (for then it exists in actuality), but for its not being last year and in past time.
ἔστα δὴ οὗ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχον ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔσται ἄρα ἀληθὲς. εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι πέρυσιν.
Now, that of which it has the capacity will exist in actuality; therefore, it will be true to say now that it does not exist last year.
ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον· οὐδεμία γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ἀλλά τοῦ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι.
But this is impossible; for no capacity is of having happened, but only of being or of what will be.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πρότερον ὂν ἀΐδιον ὕστερον μή ἐστιν· ἕξει γὰρ δύναμιν οὗ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκ ἔστιν.
And similarly also if that which previously existed eternally is not so afterwards; for it will have a capacity for that which is not in actuality.
ὥστʼ ἂν θῶμεν τὸ δυνατόν, ἀληθὲς ἔσται εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἔστι πέρυσιν καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι χρόνῳ.
So that if we assume the possibility to be realized, it will be true to say now that this thing exists last year, and generally in past time.
καὶ φυσικῶς δὲ καὶ μὴ καθόλου σκοποῦσιν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀΐδιον ὂν πρότερον φθαρῆναι ὕστερον, ἢ πρότερον μὴ ὂν ὕστερον ἀΐδιον εἶναι.
And to those who view the matter physically and not universally, it is likewise impossible either for that which was previously eternal to be destroyed afterwards, or for that which previously was not to be eternal afterwards.
τὰ γὰρ φθαρτὰ καὶ γενητὰ καὶ ἀλλοιωτὰ πάντα· ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐξ ὧν σννίσταται τὰ φύσει ὄντα, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων φθείρεται.
For all corruptible and generated things are also alterable; and they are altered by contraries and by those very elements of which naturally existing things consist, and they are destroyed by these same things.

Notes

  1. 283aὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος — Understand by supplying the omitted verb ἐστί, meaning 'the same argument holds also for the fact that...'. The καὶ ὅτι clause introduces the corresponding conclusion that H follows E.
  2. 283aτὸ δὲ πῇ ἄπειρον — The adverb πῇ means 'in a certain respect' or 'partially'. Here it refers to what is infinite only in one direction (either past or future), defined as an intermediate state that is neither absolutely infinite nor finite.
  3. 283aτὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον γίγνεσθαι δυνάμενον — The accusative participle δυνάμενον agrees with the unexpressed subject of the infinitive, or functions as an accusative absolute indicating capability. It expresses the pre-existence of the capacity (δύναμις) for an infinite time prior to actual generation.
  4. 35οὐδεμία γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ γεγονέναι ἐστίν — The genitive infinitive τοῦ γεγονέναι modifies δύναμις. It expresses Aristotle's key temporal-modal principle that there is no capacity for what has already happened in the past (indicated by the perfect tense).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, On the Heavens §1.12#3. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg005.humanitext-grc1:1.12%233

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