§2.4#1Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιείσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν, εἶθʼ οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν.
It is necessary for one who is going to make an investigation concerning these things to grasp what each of them is, and then in this way to inquire concerning what follows and concerning the other things.
εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικόν, πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
But if one must say what each of them is, for example what is the thinking, or the sensitive, or the nutritive power, one must state even prior to this what is thinking and what is perceiving; for according to definition, the activities and the actions are prior to the powers.
εἰ δʼ οὕτως, τούτων δʼ ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δεῖ τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἂν δέοι διορίσαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἶον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ.
And if this is so, and if even prior to these one must have contemplated their objects, one would have to define concerning those first for the same reason, for example concerning food, the sensible, and the intelligible.
ὥστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθʼ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.
Consequently, first we must speak about food and generation; for the nutritive soul belongs also to the other things, and is the first and most common power of the soul, in virtue of which living belongs to all.
ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι· φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνανται· πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατά φύσιν.
Its works are to generate and to use food; for the most natural of works for living things—as many as are complete and not defective, or do not have spontaneous generation—is to make another such as itself, an animal an animal, and a plant a plant, so that they may participate in the eternal and the divine in the way they can; for all things strive for that, and for the sake of that they do whatever they do according to nature.
τὸ δʼ οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τό μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ.
But "that for the sake of which" is twofold: that for which, and that for whom.
ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δʼ ἧττον, καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλʼ οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δʼ ἕν.
Since, then, they are unable to share in the eternal and the divine by continuity, because nothing of perishable things can remain the same and one in number, each shares in it in the way it can, this one more and that one less, and remains not itself but such as itself, not one in number, but one in species.
ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή.
And the soul is the cause and principle of the living body.
ταῦτα δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ὁμοίως δʼ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία· καὶ γὰρ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὡς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία.
But these are spoken of in many ways, and similarly the soul is a cause in the three distinguished ways; for it is the cause as that from which motion [comes], and as that for the sake of which, and as the essence of animate bodies.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐσία, δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή.
That it is so as essence is clear; for the cause of being for all things is essence, and living is being for living things, and the soul is the cause and principle of this.
ἔτι τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ ἐντελέχεια.
Furthermore, the actuality is the definition of that which exists potentially.
φανερὸν δʼ ὡς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν αὐτῆς τέλος.
And it is manifest that the soul is also a cause as that for the sake of which; for just as intellect acts for the sake of something, in the same way also nature, and this is its end.
τοιοῦτον δʼ ἐν· τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ φύσιν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καὶ καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα.
And such a thing in animals is the soul according to nature; for all natural bodies are instruments of the soul, and just as those of animals, so also those of plants, as existing for the sake of the soul.
διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τό τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ.
But "that for the sake of which" is twofold: both that for which and that for whom.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅθεν· πρῶτον ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, ψυχή· οὐ πᾶσι δʼ ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσιν ἡ δύναμις αὕτη.
But indeed, also as that from which [motion comes] first: the motion in space is [caused by] soul; but this power does not belong to all living things.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὔξησις κατὰ ψυχήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, αἰσθάνεται δʼ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ μετέχει ψυχῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ φθίσεως ἔχει· οὐδὲν γὰρ φθίνει οὐδʼ αὔξεται φυσικῶς μὴ τρεφόμενον, τρέφεται δʼ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ κοινωνεῖ ζωῆς.
And alteration and growth are also according to soul; for sensation seems to be a certain alteration, and nothing perceives which does not participate in soul, and similarly it is also concerning growth and decay; for nothing decays or grows naturally without being nourished, and nothing is nourished which does not share in life.
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δʼ οὐ καλῶς εἴρηκε, τοῦτο προστιθείς, τὴν αὔξησιν συμβαίνειν τοῖς φυτοῖς, κάτω μὲν συρριζουμένοις διὰ τὸ τὴν γῆν οὕτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνω δὲ διὰ τὸ. πῦρ ὡσαύτως.
Empedocles, however, did not speak well, adding this: that growth occurs in plants, by their rooting downwards because earth naturally moves thus, and upwards because fire [moves] likewise.
οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καλῶς λαμβάνει (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ πᾶσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τῷ παντί, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτως αἱ ῥίζαι τῶν φυτῶν, εἰ χρὴ τὰ ὄργανα λέγειν ἕτερα καὶ ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἔργοις)· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τἀναντία φερόμενα τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν;
For he does not grasp "up" and "down" well (for up and down are not the same for all things and for the universe, but as the head of animals is, so are the roots of plants, if one must say that organs are different or the same by their functions); and in addition to these, what is it that holds together fire and earth as they are carried in opposite directions?
διασπασθήσεται γάρ, εἰ μή τι ἔσται τὸ κωλύον· εἰ δʼ ἔσται, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὔξεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι.
For they will be torn apart unless there is something to prevent it; and if there is, this is the soul, and the cause of growth and nourishment.
δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἁπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τῶν σωμάτων τρεφόμενον καὶ αὐξόμενον, διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον.
But it seems to some that the nature of fire is simply the cause of nourishment and growth; for indeed it alone of bodies appears to be nourished and to grow, wherefore also in plants and in animals one might suppose this is what is active.
τὸ δὲ συναίτιον μέν πώς ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς αὔξησις εἰς ἄπειρον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ καυστόν, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων· ἔστι πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλʼ οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης.
But it is a con-cause in some way, not indeed the cause simply, but rather the soul [is]; for the growth of fire is to infinity, as long as there is fuel, but of all things constituted by nature there is a limit and a proportion of magnitude and growth; and these belong to soul, and not to fire, and to definition rather than to matter.