§2.2.8Πάλιν δὲ σκεπτέον τί τούτων λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τί οὐ καλῶς, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὁρισμός, καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἆρά πως ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις καὶ ὁρισμὸς ἢ οὐδαμῶς.
We must consider again which of these things are well said and which are not well said, and what definition is, and whether there is in some way a demonstration and a definition of 'what it is', or not at all.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ταὐτὸν τὸ εὐδέναι τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ σἴτίον τοῦ εἰ ἔστι (λόγος δὲ τούτου, ὅτι ἔστι τι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλο, κἄν ᾖ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀποδεικτὸν ἢ ἀναπόδεικτον)—εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἄλλο καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἀποδεῖξαι, ἀνάγκη μέσον εἶναι τὸ σἴτιον καὶ ἐν τῷ σχήματι τῷ πρώτῳ δείκνυσθαι·
But since, as we said, to know 'what it is' is the same as to know the cause of 'whether it exists' (and the reason for this is that there is some cause, and this is either the same as the thing itself or something else, and if it is something else, it is either demonstrable or indemonstrable)—if, then, it is something else and it is possible to demonstrate it, the cause must be the middle term and be demonstrated in the first figure; for that which is demonstrated is both universal and affirmative.
καθόλου τε γὰρ καὶ κατηγορικὸν τὸ δεικνύμενον. εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος ἄν εἴη ὁ νῦν ἐξητασμένος, τὸ διʼ ἄλου του τί ἐστι δείκνυσθαι, τῶν τε γὰρ τί ἐστιν ἀνάγκη τὸ μέσον εἶναι τί ἐστι, καὶ τῶν ἰδων ἴδιον.
Thus, one way would be the one just now examined, namely, that 'what it is' is shown through something else; for the middle term of 'what it is' must be 'what it is', and that of unique properties must be a unique property.
ὥστε τὸ μὲν δείξει, τὸ δʼ οὐ δείξει τῶν τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ αὐτῷ πράγματι.
Consequently, of the same thing, one will show, and the other will not show, 'what it was to be'.
Oὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ τρόπος ὅτι οὐκ ἄν εἴη ἀπόδειξις, εἴρηται πρότερον· ἀλλʼ ἔστι λογικὸς συλλογισμός τοῦ τί ἐστιν.
That this way, therefore, cannot be a demonstration, has been said before; but it is a logical syllogism of 'what it is'.
ὃν δὲ τρόπον ἐνδέχεται, λέγωμεν, εἰπόντες πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
Let us state, then, in what way it is possible, speaking again from the beginning.
ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ διότι ἴητοῦμεν ἔχοντες τὸ ὅτι, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἅμα δέῆλα γίνεται, ἀλλʼ οὔτι τπρότερόν γε τὸ διότι δυνατόν γνωρίσαι τοῦ ὅτι, δῆλον ὅτι ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ὅτι ἔστιν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἰδέναι τί ἐστιν, ἀγνοοῦντας εἰ ἔστιν.
For just as we seek the 'why' when we have the 'that' (though sometimes they also become clear at the same time, but it is certainly not possible to know the 'why' prior to the 'that'), it is clear that likewise 'what it was to be' is not without the 'that it exists'; for it is impossible to know what a thing is, being ignorant of whether it exists.
γὸ δʼ εἰ ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἔχομεν, ὁτὲ δʼ ἔχοντές τι αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον βροντήν, ὅτι ψόφος τις νεφῶν, καὶ ἔκλειφιν, ὅτι στέρησίς τις φωτός, καὶ ἄνθρωπον, ὅτι ζῷόν τι, καὶ φυχήν, ὅτι αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν.
But as to 'whether it exists', sometimes we grasp it accidentally, and sometimes by having something of the thing itself—as for thunder, that it is a certain sound in the clouds, and for eclipse, that it is a certain deprivation of light, and for man, that he is a certain animal, and for soul, that it is that which moves itself.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἔστιν, ἀναγκαῖον μηδαμῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ τί ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅτι ἔστιν ἴσμεν· τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τί ἐστι μὴ ἔχοντας ὅτι ἔστι, μηδὲν ζητεῖν ἐστιν.
Therefore, as many things as we know to exist accidentally, we must have no relation at all to 'what it is' (for we do not even know that they exist; and to seek what a thing is when we do not have that it exists is to seek nothing).
καθʼ ὅσων δʼ ἔχομέν τι, ῥᾷον.
But concerning those things of which we have something, it is easier.
ὥστε ὡς ἔχομεν ὅτι ἔστιν, οὕτως ἔχομεν καὶ τπρὸς τὸ τί ἐστιν.
So, to the extent that we have that they exist, in that way we also stand in relation to 'what they are'.
ὧν οὖν ἔχομέν τι τοῦ τί ἐστιν, ἔστω πρῶτον μὲν ὧδε· ἔκλειψις ἐφʼ οὗ τὸ Α, σελήνη ἐφʼ οὗ Γ. ἀντίφραξις γῆς ἐφʼ οὅ Β. τὸ μὲν οὖν πότερον ἐκλείπει ἢ οὔ, τὸ Β ζητεῖν ἔστιν, ἆρʼ ἔστιν ἢ οὔ.
Of those things, then, of which we have something of 'what it is', let it be first assumed thus: eclipse represented by A, moon by Γ, blockage by the earth by B. To seek, then, whether it eclipses or not, is to seek whether B exists or not.
τοῦτο δʼ οὐδὲν διαφέρει ζητεῖν ἢ εἰ ἔστι λόγος αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐὰν ᾖ τοῦτο, κἀκεῖνό φαμεν εἶναι.
And this is no different from seeking whether there is an account of it; and if this exists, we say that that also exists.
ἢ ποτέρας τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, πότερον τοῦ ἔχειν δύο ὀρθὰς ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν.
Or, we seek of which of the two contradictories the account is, for instance, whether it is of having two right angles or of not having them.
ὅταν δʼ εὕρωμεν, ἄμα τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ διότι ἴσμεν, ἄν διʼ ἀμέσων ᾖ· εἰ δὲ μή, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι δʼ οὔ.
And when we find it, we know at the same time the 'that' and the 'why', if it is through immediate premises; but if not, we know the 'that', but not the 'why'.
σελήνη Γ, ἔκλειψις Α, τὸ πανσελήνου σκιὰν μὴ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν μηδενὸς ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ὄντος φανεροῦ, ἐφʼ οὗ Β. εἰ τοίνυν τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει τὸ Β τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν σκιὰν μηδενὸς μεταξύ ἡμῶν ὄντος, τούτῳ δὲ τὸ Α τὸ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ὅτι μὲν ἐκλείπει δῆλον, διότι δʼ οὔπω, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕκλειφις ἴσμεν, τί δʼ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἴσμεν.
Moon Γ, eclipse A, the inability of the full moon to produce a shadow when there is nothing visible between us, represented by B. If, then, B (the inability to produce a shadow when there is nothing between us) belongs to Γ, and to this belongs A (being eclipsed), that it eclipses is manifest, but why is not yet so, and we know that there is an eclipse, but we do not know what it is.
δήλου δʼ ὄντος ὅτι τὸ Α τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τί ὑπάρχει, τὸ ζητεῖν τὸ Β τί ἐστι, πότερον ἀντίφραξις ἢ στροφὴ τῆς σελήνης ἢ ἀπόσβεσις.
But when it is manifest that A belongs to Γ, to seek why it belongs is to seek what B is, whether it is a blockage or a rotation of the moon or an extinction.
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἑτέρου ἄκρου, οἶον ἐν τούτοις τοῦ Α· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἔκλειψις ἀντίφραξις ὑπὸ γῆς.
And this is the account of the other extreme, for example, in these cases, of A; for an eclipse is a blockage by the earth.
τί ἐστι βροντή;
What is thunder?
πυρὸς ἀπόσβεσις ἐν νέφει.
Extinction of fire in a cloud.
διὰ τί βροντᾶ;
Why does it thunder?
διὰ τὸ ἀποσβέννυσθαι τὸ πῦρ ἐν τῷ νέφει.
Because the fire is extinguished in the cloud.
νέφος Γ, βροντὴ Α, ἀπόσβεσις πυρὸς τὸ Β. τῷ δὴ Γ τῷ νέφει ὑπάρχει τὸ Β (ἀποσβέννυται γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ πῦρ), τούτῳ δὲ τὸ Α, ψόφος· καὶ ἔστι γε λόγος τὸ Β τοῦ τοῦ τπρώτου ἄκρου.
Cloud Γ, thunder A, extinction of fire B. To Γ (the cloud) belongs B (for the fire is extinguished in it), and to this belongs A, the sound; and B is indeed the account of the first extreme.
ἂν δὲ πάλιν τούτου ἄλλο μέσον ᾖ, ἐκ τῶν παραλοίπων ἔσται λόγων.
If, again, there is another middle term for this, it will be from the remaining accounts.
Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν λαμβάνεται τὸ τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεται γνώ· ριμονν, εἴρηται, ὥστε συλλογισμὸς μὲν τοῦ τί ἐστιν οὐ γίνεται οὐδʼ ἀπόδειξις, δῆλον μέντοι διὰ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ διʼ ἀποδείξεως· ὥστʼ οὔτʼ ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως ἔστι γνῶναι τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὗ ἔστιν αἴτιον ἄλλο, οὔτʼ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διατπορήμασιν εἴπομεν.
How, then, 'what it is' is grasped and becomes known, has been said, so that there is no syllogism of 'what it is' nor demonstration, yet it is made manifest through syllogism and through demonstration; so that neither without demonstration is it possible to know 'what it is' of which there is another cause, nor is there a demonstration of it, just as we also said in the difficulties.