§2.1.16#2ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Γ Β ἐνδέχεται ἀληθῆ εἶναι τῆς ἑτέρας οὔσης ψευδοῦς, οἷον εἰ τὸ Β καὶ ἐν τῷ Γ καὶ ἐν τῷ Α ἐστίν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ θάτερον ὑπὸ θάτερον εἶναι, ὥστʼ ἂν λάβῃ τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, ψευδὴς ἔσται ἡ πρότασις.
But it is also possible for the C-B premise to be true while the other is false, as when B is both in C and in A; for it is necessary for one to be under the other, so that if one should assume that A belongs to no C, the premise will be false.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας ψευδοῦς οὔσης καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἔσταιψευδὴς ὁ συλλογισμός.
It is clear, then, that both when only one of them is false and when both are, the syllogism will be false.
Ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ σχήματι ὅλας μὲν εἶναι τὰς προτάσειςs ἀμφοτέρας ψευδεῖς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ὅταν γὰρ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχῃ, οὐδὲν ἔσται λαβεῖν ὃ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρῳ παντὶ θατέρῳ δʼ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρξει· δεῖ δʼ οὕτω λαμβάνειν τὰς προτάσεις ὥστε τῷ μὲν ὑπάρχειν τῷ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται συλλογισμός.
But in the middle figure, it is not possible for both premises to be false as wholes; for when A belongs to all B, it will not be possible to take anything which belongs to all of one but to none of the other; but one must take the premises in such a way that it belongs to one but does not belong to the other, if indeed there is to be a syllogism.
εἰ οὖν οὕτω λαμβανόμεναι ψευδεῖς, δῆλον ὡς ἐναντίως ἀνάπαλιν ἕξουσι· τοῦτο δʼ ἀδύνατον.
If, therefore, they are false when taken in this way, it is clear that they will be contrariwise the other way around; but this is impossible.
ἐπί τι δʼ ἑκατέραν οὐδὲν κωλύει ψευδῆ εἶναι, οἷον εἰ τὸ Γ καὶ τῷ Α καὶ τῷ Β τινὶ ὑπάρχοι· ἂν γὰρ τῷ μὲν Α παντὶ ληφθῇ ὑπάρχον, τῷ δὲ Β μηδενί, ψευδεῖς μὲν ἀμφότεραι αἱ προτάσεις, οὐ μέντοι ὅλαι ἀλλʼ ἐπί τι.
But nothing prevents each of them from being false in part, as when C belongs to all A and to some B; for if C is assumed to belong to all A, but to no B, both premises are indeed false, not, however, as wholes but in part.
καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὲ τεθέντος τοῦ στερητικοῦ ὡσαύτως.
And similarly if the privative premise is placed the other way around.
τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν εἶναι ψευδῇ καὶ ὁποτερανοῦν ἐνδέχεται.
And it is possible for one of them to be false, and whichever of the two it may be.
ὃ γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ Α παντί, καὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει· ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τῷ μὲν Α ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Γ, τῳ δὲ Β ὅλῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Γ Α ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἡ δὲ Γ Β ψευδής.
For what belongs to all A also belongs to B; if, therefore, C is assumed to belong to the whole of A, but to belong to none of the whole of B, the C-A premise will be true, and the C-B false.
πάλιν ὃ τῷ Β μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τῷ Α παντὶ ὑπάρξει· εἰ γὰρ τῷ Α, καὶ τῷ Β· ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑπῆρχεν.
Again, what belongs to no B will not belong to all A either; for if to A, also to B; but it did not belong.
ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Γ τῷ μὲν Α ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τῷ δὲ Β μηδενί, ἡ μὲν Γ Β πρότασις ἀληθής, ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα ψευδής.
If, therefore, C is assumed to belong to the whole of A, but to no B, the C-B premise is true, and the other is false.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μετατεθέντος τοῦ στερητικοῦ.
And similarly if the privative premise is transposed.
ὃ γὰρ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ Α, οὐδὲ τῷ Β οὐδενὶ ὑπάρξει· ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ Γ τῷ μὲν Α ὅλῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τῷ δὲ Β ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Γ πρότασις ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἡ ἑτέρα δὲ ψευδής.
For what belongs to no A will belong to no B either; if, therefore, C is assumed to belong to no A as a whole, but to belong to B as a whole, the C-A premise will be true, and the other false.
καὶ πάλιν, ὃ παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, μηδενὶ λαβεῖν τῷ Α ὑπάρχον ψεῦδος.
And again, to assume that what belongs to all B belongs to no A is false.
ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ τῷ Β παντί, καὶ τῷ Α τινὶ ὑπάρχειν· ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τῷ μὲν Β παντὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Γ, τῷ δὲ Α μηδενί, ἡ μὲν Γ Β ἀληθὴς ἔσται, ἡ δὲ Γ ψευδής.
For it is necessary, if it belongs to all B, that it belongs also to some A; if, therefore, C is assumed to belong to all B, but to no A, the C-B premise will be true, and the C-A false.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ ἀμφοτέρων οὐσῶν ψευδῶν καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας μόνον ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἀπατητικὸς ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις.
It is clear, then, that both when both premises are false and when only one of them is, there will be a deceptive syllogism in the case of atomic things.