§2.1.14Τῶν δὲ σχημάτων ἐπιστημονικὸν μάλιστα τὸ πρῶτόν ἐστιν.
Of the figures, the first is the most scientific.
αἵ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ γεωμετρία καὶ ὀπτική, καί σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ὅσαι τοῦ διότι ποιοῦνται τὴν σκέψιν·
For the mathematical sciences, such as arithmetic, geometry, and optics, carry out their demonstrations through this, and so to speak, almost all sciences that make inquiry into the reason why.
ἢ γὰρ ὅλως ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος ὁ τοῦ διότι συλλογισμός.
For either entirely, or for the most part and in most cases, the syllogism of the reason why is through this figure.
ὥστε κἂν διὰ τοῦτʼ εἴη μάλιστα ἐπιστημονικόν· κυριώτατον γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὸ διότι θεωρεῖν.
So on this account as well it would be the most scientific; for to contemplate the reason why is the most principal part of knowing.
εἶτα τὴν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμην διὰ μόνου τούτου θηρεῦσαι δυνατόν.
Furthermore, it is possible to hunt the science of what a thing is through this alone.
ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ μέσῳ σχήματι οὐ γίνεται κατηγορικὸς συλλογισμός, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη καταφάσεως· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ γίνεται μὲν ἀλλʼ οὐ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι τῶν καθόλου ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ πῇ ἐστι ζῷον δίπουν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
For in the middle figure a copulative syllogism does not come about, whereas the science of what a thing is belongs to affirmation; and in the last figure it does come about, but not universally, whereas what a thing is belongs to universals; for man is not a two-footed animal in some respect.
ἔτι τοῦτο μὲν ἐκείνων οὐδὲν προσδεῖται, ἐκεῖνα δὲ διὰ τούτου καταπυκνοῦται καὶ αὔξεται, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὰ ἄμεσα ἔλθῃ.
Moreover, this figure has no need of those, but those are condensed and increased through this, until they come to the immediate premises.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι κυριώτατον τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τὸ πρῶτον· σχῆμα.
It is clear, therefore, that the first figure is the most principal for knowing.
§2.1.15Ὥσπερ δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνεδέχετο ἀτόμως, οὕτω καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐγχωρεῖ.
Just as it was possible for A to belong to B atomically, so also it is possible for it not to belong.
λέγω δὲ τὸ ἀτόμως ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῶν μέσον· οὕτω γὰρ οὐκέτι ἔσται κατʼ ἄλλο τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
And by belonging or not belonging atomically, I mean that there is no middle term between them; for in this way, belonging or not belonging will no longer be according to something else.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἢ τὸ ἢ τὸ Β ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ ᾖ, ἢ καὶ ἄμφω, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Β πρώτως μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
Whenever, then, either A or B is in some whole, or both are, it is not possible for A not to belong to B primarily.
ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Γ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ Β μὴ ἔστιν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ (ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ μέν Α εἶναι ἕν τινι ὅλῳ, τὸ δὲ Β μὴ εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ), συλλογισμὸς ἔσται τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α τῷ Β· εἰ γὰρ τῷ μὲν Α παντὶ τὸ Γ, τῷ δὲ Β μηδενί, οὐδενὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ Β ἐν ὅλῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Δ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Δ παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῷ Δ, ὥστε τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρξει διὰ συλλογισμοῦ.
For let A be in the whole of C. Thus, if B is not in the whole of C (for it is possible for A to be in some whole, and B not to be in this), there will be a syllogism that A does not belong to B; for if C belongs to all A, and to no B, A belongs to no B. And similarly also if B is in some whole, as in D; for D belongs to all B, and A to no D, so that A will belong to no B through a syllogism.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον δειχθήσεται καὶ εἰ ἄμφω ἐν ὅλῳ τινί ἐστιν.
And in the same way it will be shown also if both are in some whole.
ὅτι δʼ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Β μὴ εἶναι ἐν ᾧ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ τὸ Α, ἢ πάλιν τὸ Α ἐν ᾧ τὸ Β, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν συστοιχιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἐπαλλάττουσιν ἀλλήλαις.
But that it is possible for B not to be in the whole in which A is, or again A in which B is, is clear from the coordinate series which do not overlap one another.
εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν τῶν ἐν τῇ Γ Δ συστοιχίᾳ κατὰ μηδενὸς κατηγορεῖται τῶν ἐν τῇ Β Ζ, δʼ Α ἐν ὅλῳ ἐστὶ τῷ Θ συστοίχῳ ὄντι, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τῷ Θ· ἐπαλλάξουσι γὰρ αἱ συστοιχίαι.
For if none of the things in the coordinate series C-D is predicated of any of those in B-Z, and A is in the whole of Θ which is coordinate, it is clear that B will not be in Θ; for the series would overlap.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ τινί ἐστιν.
And similarly also if B is in some whole.
ἐὰν δὲ μηδέτερον ᾖ ἐν ὅλῳ μηδενί, μὴ ὑπάρχῃ δὲ τὸ Α τῷ Β, ἀνάγκη ἀτόμως μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
But if neither is in any whole, and A does not belong to B, it is necessary for it not to belong atomically.
εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τι μέσον, ἀνάγκη θάτερον αὐτῶν ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ εἶναι.
For if there is to be some middle term, it is necessary for one of them to be in some whole.
ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι ἢ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἔσται ὁ συλλογισμός.
For the syllogism will be either in the first figure or in the middle.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, τὸ Β ἔσται ἐν ὅλῳ τινί (καταφατικὴν γὰρ δεῖ τὴν πρός τοῦτο γενέσθαι πρότασιν), εἰ δʼ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν (πρὸς ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ ληφθέντος τοῦ στερητικοῦ γίνεται συλλογισμός· ἀμφοτέρων δʼ ἀποφατικῶν οὐσῶν οὐκ ἔσται).
If, then, in the first, B will be in some whole (for the premise in relation to this must be affirmative); but if in the middle, whichever of them it happens to be (for a syllogism comes about when the privative premise is taken in relation to either, but when both are negative, there will be no syllogism).
Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐνδέχεταί τε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀτόμως, καὶ πότʼ ἐνδέχεται καὶ πῶς, εἰρήκαμεν.
It is clear, then, that it is possible for one thing not to belong to another atomically, and we have said when it is possible and how.