§1.2.4#2Πάλιν τῆς μὲν ὅλης ἀληθοῦς οὔσης, τῆς δʼ ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς.
Again, when one is wholly true, and the other partially false.
ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ τινί, καὶ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β, οἷον δίπουν μὲν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, καλὸν δʼ οὐ παντί, καὶ τὸ καλὸν τινὶ δίποδι ὑπάρχει.
For it is possible for B to belong to every C, and [A] to some, while A belongs to some B, for instance, two-footed belongs to every man, but beautiful not to every, and beautiful belongs to some two-footed.
ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ καὶ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, ἡ μὲν Β Γ ὅλη ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Α Γ ἐπί τι ψευδής, τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.
If, therefore, both A and B should be assumed to belong to the whole of C, the premise BC indeed is wholly true, but AC is partially false, and the conclusion is true.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς μὲν Α Γ ἀληθοῦς τῆς δὲ Β Γ ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς λαμβανομένης· μετατεθέντων γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ἔσται ἡ ἀπόδειξις.
And similarly also when AC is assumed as true, and BC as partially false; for the proof will be by transposing the same terms.
καὶ τῆς μὲν στερητικῆς τῆς δὲ καταφατικῆς οὔσης.
And also when one is negative and the other affirmative.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ μὲν Β ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ τινί, καὶ ὅταν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α, ἐὰν οὖν ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Β ὅλῳ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ μηδενί, ἡ μὲν στερητικὴ ἐπί τι ψευδής, ἡ δʼ ἑτέρα ὅλη ἀληθὴς καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα.
For since it is possible for B to belong to the whole of C, and [A] to some, and when they are so, for A not to belong to every B; if, therefore, B should be assumed to belong to the whole of C, and [A] to none, the negative premise indeed is partially false, and the other wholly true, and so is the conclusion.
πάλιν ἐπεὶ δέδεικται ὅτι τοῦ μὲν Α μηδενὶ ὑπάρχοντος τῷ Γ, τοῦ δὲ Β τινί, ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β μὴ ὑπάρχειν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τῆς μὲν Γ ὅλης ἀληθοῦς οὔσης, τῆς δὲ Β Γ ἐπί τι ψευδοῦς, ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἶναι ἀληθές.
Again, since it has been shown that when A belongs to no C, and B to some, it is possible for A not to belong to some B, it is clear that also when AC is wholly true, and BC is partially false, it is possible for the conclusion to be true.
ἐὰν γὰρ ληφθῇ τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Γ, τὸ δὲ Β παντί, ἡ μὲν Α Γ ὅλη ἀληθής, ἡ δὲ Β Γ ἐπί τι ψευδής.
For if A should be assumed to belong to no C, and B to every, AC is wholly true, and BC is partially false.
Φτανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει συλλογισμῶν ὅτι πάντως ἔσται διὰ ψευδῶν ἀληθές.
And it is also clear in the case of particular syllogisms that a true [conclusion] will in any case be [drawn] through false [premises].
οἱ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὅροι ληπτέοι[ καὶ ὅταν καθόλου ὦσιν αἱ προτάσεις, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατηγορικοῖς κατηγορικοί, οἱ δʼ ἐν τοῖς στερητικοῖς στερητικοί.
For the same terms must be assumed as when the premises are universal, the affirmative terms in affirmative syllogisms, and the negative in negative ones.
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μηδενὶ ὑπάρχοντος παντὶ λαβεῖν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τινὶ ὑπάρχοντος καθόλου λαβεῖν ὑπάρχειν, πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερητικῶν.
For, for the purpose of setting out the terms, it makes no difference whether, when [a term] belongs to none, we assume that it belongs to all, or, when it belongs to some, we assume it universally; and similarly also in the case of negative premises.
Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἂν μὲν ᾖ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος, ἀνάγκη, ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ψευδῆ εἶναι ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια, ὅταν δʼ ἀληθές, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀληθὲς εἶναι οὔτε τὶ οὔτε πάντα, ἀλλʼ ἕστι μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀληθοῦς τῶν ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ τὸ συμπέρασμα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
It is clear, then, that if the conclusion is false, it is necessary that those from which the argument [proceeds] should be false, either all or some; but when it is true, it is not necessary that either some or all should be true, but it is possible, even when none of the premises in the syllogism is true, for the conclusion to be similarly true; not indeed of necessity.
αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι ὅταν δύο ἔχῃ οὕτω πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστε θατέρου ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι θάτερον, τούτου μὴ ὄντος μὲν οὐδὲ θάτερον ἔσται, ὄντος δʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι θάτερον·
The reason is that when two things are so related to each other that when the one is, the other is of necessity, if this latter is not, neither will the former be, but if it is, it is not necessary for the former to be.
τοῦ δʼ αὐτοῦ ὄντος καὶ μὴ ὄντος ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι τὸ αὐτό·
And it is impossible that the same thing should be of necessity when the same thing both is and is not.
λέγω δʼ οἷον τοῦ Α ὄντος λευκοῦ τὸ εἶναι μέγα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ τοῦ τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
I mean, for instance, that when A is white, B is of necessity great, and when A is not white, B is of necessity great.
ὅταν γὰρ τουδὶ ὄντος λευκοῦ, τοῦ Α, τοδὶ ἀνάγκη μέγα εἶναι, τὸ Β, μεγάλου δὲ τοῦ Β ὄντος τὸ Γ μὴ λευκόν, ἀνάγκη, εἰ τὸ Α λευκόν, τὸ Γ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν.
For when this (A) being white, this (B) must be great, and B being great, C is not white of necessity, it is necessary, if A is white, that C is not white.
καὶ ὅταν δύο ὄντων θατέρου ὄντος ἀνάγκη θάτερον εἶναι, τούτου μὴ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὸ πρῶτον μὴ εἶναι.
And when, there being two things, if the one is, the other must be, if this latter is not, the first must not be of necessity.
τοῦ δὴ Β μὴ ὄντος μεγάλου τὸ Α οὐχ οἷόν τε λευκὸν εἶναι.
So when B is not great, A cannot be white.
τοῦ δὲ μὴ ὄντος λευκοῦ εἰ ἀνάγκη τὸ Β μέγα εἶναι, συμβαίνει ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦ Β μεγάλου μὴ ὄντος αὐτὸ τὸ Β εἶναι μέγα· τοῦτο δʼ ἀδύνατον.
But if, when A is not white, B must be great, it follows of necessity that when B is not great, B itself is great; but this is impossible.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β μὴ ἔστι μέγα, τὸ οὐκ ἔσται λευκὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
For if B is not great, A will of necessity not be white.
εἰ οὖν μὴ ὄντος τούτου λευκοῦ τὸ Β ἔσται μέγα, συμβαίνει, εἰ τὸ Β μὴ ἔστι μέγα, εἶναι μέγα, ὡς διὰ τριῶν.
If, therefore, when this (A) is not white, B is to be great, it follows that if B is not great, it is great, as if [proved] through three [propositions].