§1.2.11#1Τἱ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν καὶ πῶς ἐν ἐκάστῳ σχήματι καὶ τίς γίνεται συλλογισμός, φανερόν.
What conversion is, and how it is effected in each figure, and what sort of syllogism is produced, is clear.
ὁ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισμὸς δείκνυται μὲν ὅταν ἡ ἀντίφασις τεθῇ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ προσληφθῇ ἄλλη πρότασις, γίνεται δʼ ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς σχήμασιν· ὅμοιον γάρ ἐστι τῇ ἀντιστροφῇ, πλὴν διαφέρει τοσοῦτον ὅτι ἀντιστρέφεται μὲν γεγενημένου συλλογισμοῦ καὶ εἰλημμένων ἀμφοῖν τῶν προτάσεων, ἀπάγεται δʼ εἰς ἀδύνατον οὐ προομολογηθέντος τοῦ ἀντικειμένου πρότερον, ἀλλὰ φανεροῦ ὄντος ὅτι ἀληθές.
But proof by reduction to impossibility is demonstrated when the contradictory of the conclusion is assumed and another premise is added, and it occurs in all the figures; for it is similar to conversion, except that it differs in this much, that conversion is performed when a syllogism has already been produced and both premises have been taken, whereas reduction to impossibility is carried out when the contradictory is not agreed upon beforehand, but when [the other premise] is obviously true.
οἱ δʼ ὅροι ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ λῆψις ἀμφοτέρων.
But the terms are related in the same way in both, and the assumption of both is the same.
οἷον εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β παντὶ ὑπάρχει, μέσον δὲ τὸ Γ, ἐὰν ὑποτεθῇ τὸ Α ἢ μὴ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, τῷ δὲ Γ παντί, ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές, ἀνάγκη τὸ Γ τῷ Β ἢ μηδενὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν.
For example, if A belongs to all B, and C is the middle: if it is assumed that A either does not belong to all B or belongs to no B, but belongs to all C (which was true), it is necessary that C either belongs to no B or does not belong to all B.
τοῦτο δʼ ἀδύνατον, ὥστε ψεῦδος τὸ ὑποτεθέν· ἀληθὲς ἄρα τὸ ἀντικείμενον.
But this is impossible, so that the assumption is false; therefore the contradictory is true.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων· ὅσα γὰρ ἀντιστροφὴν δέχεται, καὶ τὸν διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου συλλογισμόν.
And similarly in the case of the other figures; for whatever admits of conversion, admits also of the syllogism by reduction to impossibility.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα προβλήματα πάντα δείκνυται διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς σχήμασι, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κατηγορικὸν ἐν μὲν τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τῷ τρίτῳ δείκνυται, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ οὐ δείκνυται.
All other problems, then, are demonstrated through impossibility in all the figures, but the universal affirmative is demonstrated in the middle and third figures, but not in the first.
ὑποκείσθω γὰρ τὸ τῷ Β μὴ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ προσειλήφθω ἄλὺλτη πρότασις ὁποτερωθενοῦν, εἴτε τῷ Α παντὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Γ εἴτε τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Δ· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα.
For let it be assumed that A does not belong to all B or to no B, and let another premise be added from whichever side, either that C belongs to all A, or B to all D; for thus we would have the first figure.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ὑπόκειται μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τῷ Β, οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς ὁποτερωθενοῦν τῆς προτάσεως λαμβανομένης, εἰ δὲ μηδενί, ὅταν μὲν ἡ Β Δ προσληφθῇ, συλλογισμός μὲν ἔσται τοῦ ψεύδους, οὐ δείκνυται δὲ τὸ προκείμενον.
If, then, it is assumed that A does not belong to all B, no syllogism is produced whichever way the premise is assumed; but if to no B, when BD is added, there will indeed be a syllogism of what is false, but the proposition in question is not demonstrated.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Δ, τὸ οὐδενὶ τῷ Δ. τοῦτο δʼ ἔστω ἀδύνατον·
For if A belongs to no B, and B to all D, A belongs to no D.
ψεῦδος ἄρα τὸ μηδενὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α ὑπάρχειν.
And let this be impossible; therefore it is false that A belongs to no B.
ἀλλʼ οὐκ εἰ τὸ μηδενὶ ψεῦδος, τὸ παντὶ ἀληθές.
But it does not follow that if "to no B" is false, "to all B" is true.
ἐὰν δʼ ἡ Γ προσληφθῇ, οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὐδʼ ὅταν ὑποτεθῇ μὴ παντὶ τῷ Β τὸ ὑπάρχειν.
But if AC is added, no syllogism is produced, nor even when it is assumed that A does not belong to all B.
ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τὸ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν οὐ δείκνυται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου.
So it is clear that "belonging to all" is not demonstrated in the first figure through impossibility.
Τὸ δέ γε τινὶ καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ καὶ μὴ παντὶ δείκνυται.
But "belonging to some", "belonging to none", and "not belonging to all" are demonstrated.
ὑποκείσθω γὰρ τὸ Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β εἰήφθω παντὶ ἢ τινὶ τῷ Γ. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸ Α μηδενὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν.
For let it be assumed that A belongs to no B, and let B be taken to belong to all or some C. Therefore, it is necessary that A belongs to no C or does not belong to all C.
τοῦτο δʼ ἀδύνατον—ἔστω γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι παντὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ τὸ Α— ὥστʼ εἰ τοῦτο ψεῦδος, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν.
But this is impossible (for let it be true and obvious that A belongs to all C); so that if this is false, it is necessary that A belongs to some B.
ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τῷ Α ληφθῇ ἡ ἑτέρα πρότασις, οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός.
But if the other premise is taken in relation to A, there will be no syllogism.
οὐδʼ ὅταν τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ συμπεράσματι ὑποτεθῇ, οἷον τὸ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
Nor when the contrary to the conclusion is assumed, for example "not belonging to some".
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὑποθετέον.
It is clear, therefore, that the contradictory must be assumed.