§1.1.8Ἐπεὶ δʼ ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν (πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὰ δʼ οὔτʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθʼ ὑπάρχει ὅλως, ἐνδέχεται δʼ ὑπάρχειν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἑκάστου τούτων ἕτερος ἔσται, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων, ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀναγκαίων, ὁ δʼ ἐξ ὑπαρχόντων, ὁ δʼ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένων.
Since belonging, belonging of necessity, and being possible to belong are different (for many things belong, but not of necessity; others neither belong of necessity nor belong at all, but are possible to belong), it is clear that there will also be a different syllogism for each of these, and that the terms do not behave in the same way, but one syllogism is from necessary premises, another from actual premises, and another from possible premises.
Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων· ὡσαύτως γὰρ τιθεμένων τῶν ὅρων ἔν τε τῷ ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἔσται τε καὶ οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, πλὴν διοίσει τῷ προσκεῖσθαι τοῖς ὅροις τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκτης ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
In the case of necessary premises, then, it is almost the same as in the case of actual ones; for when the terms are placed in the same way both for belonging and for belonging or not belonging of necessity, there will and will not be a syllogism, except that it will differ in that "belonging of necessity" or "not belonging of necessity" is added to the terms.
τό τε γὰρ στερητικὸν ὡσαύτως ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς ὁμοίως ἀποδώσομεν.
For the privative premise converts in the same way, and we shall define "being in a whole" and "of everything" in the same way.
ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δειχθήσεται διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν·
In other cases, then, the necessary conclusion will be shown through conversion in the same way as in the case of belonging.
ἐν δὲ τῷ μέσῳ σχήματι, ὅταν ᾖ τὸ καθόλου καταφατικὸν τὸ δʼ ἐν μέρει στερητικόν, καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν καθόλου κατηγορικόν τὸ δʼ ἐν μέρει στερητικόν, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔσται ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ἐκθεμένους ᾧ τινὶ ἑκάτερον μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατὰ τούτου ποιεῖν τὸν συλλογισμόν·
But in the middle figure, when the universal is affirmative and the particular is privative, and again in the third figure, when the universal is affirmative and the particular is privative, the proof will not be in the same way, but it is necessary, having set out that to which each does not belong, to produce the syllogism concerning this; for it will be necessary in these cases.
ἔσται γὰρ ἀναγκαῖος ἐπὶ τούτων· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοῦ ἐκτεθέντος ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖος, καὶ κατʼ ἐκείνου τινός· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτεθὲν ὅπερ ἐκεῖνό τί ἐστιν.
And if it is necessary concerning what has been set out, it is also necessary concerning some of that; for what has been set out is precisely a part of that.
γίνεται δὲ τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἑκάτερος ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ σχήματι.
Each of these syllogisms comes about in its appropriate figure.
§1.1.9Συμβαίνει δέ ποτε καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως ἀναγκαίας οὔσης ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι τὸν συλλογισμόν, πλὴν οὐχ ὁποτέρας ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον ἄκρον, οἷον εἰ τὸ. μὲν Α τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴληπται ὑπάρχον ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχον, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Γ ὑπάρχον μόνον· οὕτως γὰρ εἰλημμένων τῶν προτάσεων ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ Α τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρξει.
It happens sometimes also that when one of the premises is necessary, the syllogism becomes necessary, though not whichever of the two it happens to be, but the one in relation to the major term, for example if A is assumed to belong or not to belong to B of necessity, and B to belong to Γ only; for when the premises are assumed in this way, A will belong or not belong to Γ of necessity.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ παντὶ τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Γ τι τῶν Β ἐστί, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τῷ Γ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται θάτερον τούτων.
For since A belongs or does not belong to every B of necessity, and Γ is some of B, it is clear that one of these will also belong to Γ of necessity.
εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν Α Β μὴ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ Γ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀναγκαῖον.
But if the premise A-B is not necessary, and the premise B-Γ is necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary.
εἰ γὰρ ἔστι, συμβήσεται τὸ τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης διά τε τοῦ πρώτου καὶ διὰ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος.
For if it is, it will result through the first and the third figures that A belongs to some B of necessity.
τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸ Β ᾧ ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν.
But this is false; for B can be of such a kind that it is possible for A to belong to none of it.
ἔτι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὅρων φανερόν ὅτιοὐκ ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν εἴη κίνησις, τὸ δὲ Β ζῷον, ἐφʼ δὲ τὸ Γ ἄνθρωπος· ζῷον μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, κινεῖται δὲ τὸ ζῷον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐδʼ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
Further, it is also clear from the terms that the conclusion will not be necessary, for example if A were motion, B animal, and Γ man; for man is an animal of necessity, but animal does not move of necessity, nor does man.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ στερητικόν εἴη τὸ Α Β· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἀπόδειξις.
Similarly also if the premise A-B were privative; for the proof is the same.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν μέρει συλλογισμῶν, εἰ μὲν τὸ καθόλου ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔσται ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ δὲ τὸ κατὰ μέρος, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, οὔτε στερητικῆς οὔτε κατηγορικῆς οὔσης τῆς καθόλου προτάσεως.
In the case of particular syllogisms, if the universal premise is necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary; but if the particular is necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary, whether the universal premise is privative or affirmative.
ἔστω δὴ πρῶτον τὸ καθόλου ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπαρχέτω ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπαρχέτω μόνον· ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὸ γὰρ Γ ὑπὸ τὸ Β ἐστί, τῷ δὲ Β παντὶ ὑπῆρχεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ στερητικὸς εἴη ὁ συλλογισμός·
Let the universal premise first be necessary, and let A belong to every B of necessity, and let B belong to some Γ only; it is necessary then that A belongs to some Γ of necessity; for Γ is under B, and A belonged to every B of necessity.
ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἀπόδειξις.
Similarly also if the syllogism were privative; for the proof will be the same.
εἰ δὲ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀναγκαῖον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον συμπίπτει), καθάπερ οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς καθόλου συλλογισμοῖς.
But if the particular is necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary (for no impossibility results), just as in the universal syllogisms.
ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν στερητικῶν.
Similarly also in the case of privative ones.
ὅροι κίνησις–ζῷον–λευκόν.
Terms: motion–animal–white.