§1.1.4#1Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν ἤδη διὰ τίνων καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς γίνεται πᾶς συλλογισμός· ὕστερον δὲ λεκτέον περὶἀποδείξεως.
These things having been defined, let us now state by what means, when, and how every syllogism comes about; and later we must speak about demonstration.
πρότερον δὲ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ λεκτέον ἢ περὶ ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον εἶναι τὸν συλλογισμόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός τις, ὁ συλλογισμός δὲ οὐ πᾶς ἀπόδειξις.
But we must speak about syllogism before demonstration, because syllogism is more universal; for demonstration is a kind of syllogism, but not every syllogism is a demonstration.
Ὅταν οὖν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥστε τὸν ἔσχατον ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸν μέσον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄκρων εἶναι συλλογισμὸν τέλειον.
Whenever, then, three terms are so related to one another that the last is in the middle as a whole, and the middle is or is not in the first as a whole, there must be a perfect syllogism of the extremes.
καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ τῇ θέσει γίνεται μέσον· ἄκρα δὲ τὸ αὐτό τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὂν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἄλλο ἐστίν.
And I call "middle" that which is both itself in another and another is in it, which also by position becomes middle; and "extremes" both that which is itself in another and that in which another is.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Β καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α κατὰ παντός τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖσθαι· πρότερον γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς τὸ κατὰ παντὸς λέγομεν.
For if A is predicated of every B, and B of every Γ, A must be predicated of every Γ; for it has been stated before how we mean "predicated of every".
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α κατὰ μηδενὸς τοῦ Β, τὸ δὲ Β κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.
Similarly also if A is predicated of no B, and B of every Γ, that A will belong to no Γ.
εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παντὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, τὸ δὲ μέσον μηδενὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός τῶν ἄκρων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ παντὶ καὶ μηδενὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρῶτον τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε οὔτε τὸ κατὰ μέρος οὔτε τὸ καθόλου γίνεται ἀναγκαῖον· μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου διὰ τούτων οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός.
But if the first follows every middle, and the middle belongs to no last, there will not be a syllogism of the extremes; for nothing necessary follows from their being so; for it is possible for the first to belong to every or to no last, so that neither a particular nor a universal conclusion becomes necessary; and since nothing is necessary through these, there will not be a syllogism.
ὅροι τοῦ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν ζῶον—ἄνθρωποςἵππος, τοῦ μηδενὶ ζῷον—ἄνθρωπος—λίθος.
Terms of belonging to every: animal—man—horse; of belonging to none: animal—man—stone.
οὐδʼ ὅταν μήτε τὸ πρῶτον τῷ μέσῳ μήτε τὸ μέσον τῷ ἐσχάτῳ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχῃ.
Nor when neither the first belongs to any middle, nor the middle to any last.
οὐδʼ οὕτως ἔσται συλλογισμός.
Neither in this way will there be a syllogism.
ὅροι τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἐπιστήμηγραμμή-ἰατρική, τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐπιστήμη—γραμμή—μονάς.
Terms of belonging: science—line—medicine; of not belonging: science—line—unit.
καθόλου μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν ὅρων, δῆλον ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι πότε ἔσται καὶ πότε οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, καὶ ὅτι ὄντος τε συλλογισμοῦ τοὺς ὅρους ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν ὡς εἴπομεν, ἄν θʼ οὕτως ἔχωσιν, ὅτι ἔσται συλλογισμός.
It is clear, then, when the terms are universal, when there will and when there will not be a syllogism in this figure, and that if there is a syllogism the terms must be related as we said, and that if they are so related, there will be a syllogism.
Εἰ δʼ ὁ μὲν καθόλου τῶν ὅρων ὁ δʼ ἐν μέρει πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον, ὅταν μὲν τὸ καθόλου τεθῇ πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον ἄκρον ἢ κατηγορικὸν ἢ στερητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐν μέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον κατηγορικόν, ἀνάγκη συλλογισμὸν εἶναι τέλειον, ὅταν δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχωσιν οἱ ὅροι, ἀδύνατον.
But if one of the terms is universal and the other is particular in relation to the other, whenever the universal is placed in relation to the major extreme, whether affirmative or privative, and the particular is placed in relation to the minor as affirmative, there must be a perfect syllogism; but whenever the universal is placed in relation to the minor, or if the terms are related in any other way, it is impossible.
λέγω δὲ μεῖζον μὲν ἄκρον ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ μέσον ὄν.
And I call "major extreme" that in which the middle is, and "minor" that which is under the middle.
ὑπαρχέτω γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α παντὶ τῷ Β, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕστι παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λεχθέν, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν.
For let A belong to every B, and B to some Γ. Then if "to be predicated of every" is as was said at the beginning, A must belong to some Γ.
καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α μηδενὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ὥρισται γὰρ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μηδενὸς πῶς λέγομεν· ὥστε ἔσται συλλογισμὸς τέλειος.
And if A belongs to no B and B to some Γ, A must not belong to some Γ; for it has also been defined how we mean "predicated of none"; so that there will be a perfect syllogism.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ ἀδιόριστον εἴη τὸ Β Γ, κατηγορικὸν ὄν· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἀδιορίστου τε καὶ ἐν μέρει λτηφθέντος.
Similarly also if BΓ should be indefinite, being affirmative; for the same syllogism will hold for an indefinite and for a particular premise.