§1.1.29Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχουσι καὶ οἱ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἄγοντες συλογισμοὶ τοῖς δεικτικοῖς· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι γίνονται διὰ τῶν ἑπομένων καὶ οἷς ἕπεται ἑκάτερον.
The syllogisms which lead to the impossible have the same character as the ostensive ones; for these also are produced through the consequents and those which each of them follows.
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπίσκεψις ἐν ἀμφοῖν· ὃ γὰρ δείκνυται δεικτικῶς, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου ἔστι συλλογίσασθαι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων, καὶ ὃ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ δεικτικῶς, οἷον ὅτι τὸ οὐδενὶ τῷ ὑπάρχει.
And the inquiry is the same in both; for what is shown ostensively can also be syllogized through the impossible by using the same terms, and what is shown through the impossible can also be shown ostensively, for example, that A belongs to no E.
κείσθω γὰρ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν· οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Α, τὸ δὲ Α τινὶ τῷ Ε, τὸ Β τινὶ τῶν Ε ὑπάρξει· ἀλλʼ οὐδενὶ ὑπῆρχεν.
For let it be assumed to belong to some; since, then, B belongs to every A, and A to some E, B will belong to some of the E; but it belonged to none.
πάλιν ὅτι τινὶ ὑπάρχει· εἰ γὰρ μηδενὶ τῷ Ε τὸ Α, τὸ δὲ Ε παντὶ τῷ Η, οὐδενὶ τῶν Η ὑπάρξει τὸ Α· ἀλλὰ παντὶ ὑπῆρχεν.
Again, that it belongs to some; for if A belongs to no E, and E to every H, A will belong to no H; but it belonged to all.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων προβλημάτων· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν ἡ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δεῖξις ἐκ τῶν ἑπομένων καὶ οἷς ἕπεται ἑκάτερον.
And similarly in the case of the other problems; for always and in all cases the proof through the impossible will be from the consequents and those which each follows.
καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον πρόβλημα ἡ αὐτὴ σκέψις δεικτικῶς τε βουλομένῳ συλλογίσασθαι καὶ εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀγαγεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ἀμφότεραι αἰ ἀποδείξεις, οἷον· εἰ δέδεικται μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν τῷ Ε τὸ Α, ὅτι συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Ε ὑπάρχειν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· ἐὰν ληφθῇ τῷ μὲν Ε μηδενὶ τῷ δὲ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Β, φανερόν ὅτι οὐδενὶ τῷ τὸ ὑπάρξει.
And in each problem the inquiry is the same for one who wishes to syllogize ostensively and to lead to the impossible; for both proofs are from the same terms, as, for example, if it has been shown that A belongs to no E because it happens that B also belongs to some E, which is impossible; if it is taken that B belongs to no E but to every A, it is clear that A will belong to no E.
πάλιν εἰ δεικτικῶς συλλελόγισται τὸ Α τῷ Ε μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ὑποθεμένοις ὑπαρχειν τινὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δειχθήσεται οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχον.
Again, if it has been syllogized ostensively that A belongs to no E, it will be shown through the impossible, to those who assume it to belong to some, that it belongs to none.
ὁμοίως δὲ κἀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ἀνάγκη κοινόν τινα λαβεῖν ὅρον ἄλλον τῶν ὑποκειμένων, πρὸς ὃν ἔσται τοῦ ψεύδους ὁ συλλογισμός, ὥστʼ ἀντιστραφείσης ταύτης τῆς προτάσεως, τῆς δʼ ἑτέρας ὁμοίως ἐχούσης, δεικτικὸς ἔσται ὁ συλλογισμὸς διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων.
And similarly also in the other cases; for in all of them it is necessary to take some other common term than those assumed, in relation to which the syllogism of the falsehood will be made, so that when this premise is converted, and the other remains as it is, there will be an ostensive syllogism through the same terms.
διαφέρει γὰρ ὁ δεικτικὸς τοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ δεικτικῷ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν ἀμφότεραι τίθενται αἱ προτάσεις, ἐν δὲ τῷ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ψευδῶς ἡ μία.
For the ostensive differs from the reduction to the impossible in that in the ostensive both premises are laid down according to truth, whereas in the reduction to the impossible one is laid down falsely.
Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔσται μᾶλλον φανερὰ διὰ τῶν ἑπομένων, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου λέγωμεν· νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν ἔστω δῆλον, ὅτι εἰς ταὐτὰ βλεπτέον δεικτικῶς τε βουλομένῳ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἄγειν.
These things, then, will be more manifest through what follows, when we speak of the impossible; but for now let this much be clear to us, that we must look to the same things whether we wish to syllogize ostensively or to lead to the impossible.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις συλλογισμοῖς τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, οἷον ὅσοι κατὰ μετάληψιν ἢ κατὰ ποιότητα, ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀλλʼ ἐν τοῖς μεταλαμβανομένοις, ἔσται ἡ σκέψις, ὁ δὲ τρόπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐπιβλέψεως.
But in the other syllogisms from hypothesis, such as those by substitution or by quality, the inquiry will be in the assumed subjects, not in the original ones but in those substituted, though the method of inspection is the same.
ἐπισκέφασθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ διελεῖν ποσαχῶς οἱ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.
But we must investigate and divide in how many ways those from hypothesis are produced.
Δείκνυται μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον τῶν προβλημάτων οὕτως, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον ἔνια συλλογίσασθαι τούτων, οἷον τὰ καθόλου διὰ τῆς κατὰ μέρος ἐπιβλέψεως ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.
Each of the problems, then, is shown in this way, but it is also possible to syllogize some of them in another way, such as universal ones from hypothesis through the inspection of the particular ones.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ Γ καὶ τὸ ταὐτὰ εἴη, μόνοις δὲ ληφθείη τοῖς Η τὸ Ε ὑπάρχειν, παντὶ ἂν τῷ Ε τὸ ὑπάρχοι·
For if Γ and H should be the same, and E should be taken to belong only to the H, A would belong to every E.
καὶ πάλιν εἰ τὸ Δ καὶ Η ταὐτά, μόνων δὲ τῶν τὸ Ε κατηγοροῖτο, ὅτι οὐδενὶ τῷ Ε τὸ Α ὑπάρξει.
And again, if Δ and H are the same, and E should be predicated only of H, A will belong to no E.
φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι καὶ οὕτως ἐπιβλεπτέον.
It is clear, then, that we must also inspect in this way.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ σκέψις, καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὅρων ἔσται τῇ τάξει τοῦ τʼ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ὁ συλλογισμός.
And in the same way also in the case of the necessary and the contingent; for the inquiry is the same, and the syllogism will be through the same terms in the order of being contingent and of belonging.
ληπτέον δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα δυνατὰ δʼ ὑπάρχειν· δέδεικται γάρ ὅτι καὶ διὰ τούτων γίνεται ὁ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι σλλογισμός.
But in the case of the contingent we must also take things that do not belong but are possible to belong; for it has been shown that the syllogism of contingency is produced also through these.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν.
And similarly also in the case of the other categories.
Φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἐγχωρεῖ. διὰ ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ γίνεσθαι πάντας τοὺς συλλογισμούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι διʼ ἄλλης ἀδύνατον.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, not only that it is possible for all syllogisms to be produced through this way, but also that it is impossible through any other.
ἅπας μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς δέδεικται διά τινος τῶν προειρημένων σχημάτων γινόμενος, ταῦτα δʼ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ διʼ ἄλλων συσταθῆναι πλὴν διὰ τῶν ἑπομένων καὶ οἷς ἕπεται ἕκαστον· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις καὶ ἡ τοῦ μέσου λῆψις, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ συλλογισμὸν ἐγχωρεῖ γίνεσθαι διʼ ἄλλων.
For every syllogism has been shown to be produced through some one of the aforementioned figures, and these cannot be constituted through any other things except through the consequents and those which each of them follows; for from these are the premises and the taking of the middle, so that neither is it possible for a syllogism to be produced through any other things.