§7.55.1διεξιὼν δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων οὐ προσποιητῶν καὶ πεπλασμένων, ἀλλʼ ἀληθινῶν, ἀνὴρ ἡλικίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀξιώσει προὔχων, ὡς ἔμαθε κινούμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις τὸ συνέδριον, ἐκ τοῦ τεθαρρηκότος ἤδη τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξύφαινε τῶν λόγων· εἰ δέ τινες ὑμῶν, ὦ βουλευταί, λέγων, ταράττονται δοκοῦντες ἔθος εἰσάγειν πονηρὸν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐὰν τῷ δήμῳ συγχωρήσητε ψῆφον ἐπιφέρειν κατὰ τῶν πατρικίων, καὶ ἐπʼ οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ νομίζουσι τὴν τῶν δημάρχων ἐξουσίαν πολλὴν ἰσχὺν λαβοῦσαν γενήσεσθαι, μαθέτωσαν ἁμαρτάνοντες τῆς δόξης καὶ τἀναντία ἢ §7.55.2προσῆκεν ὑπειληφότες.
Relating these things with many tears, not feigned and artificial, but genuine, a man preeminent in age and the reputation for virtue, when he perceived that the senate was moved by what was being said, from a position of confidence now wove the rest of his speech: "But if any of you, senators," he said, "are troubled in the belief that you are introducing a bad custom into the city if you permit the people to cast their vote against the patricians, and think that the power of the tribunes, having acquired great strength, will lead to nothing good, let them know that they are mistaken in their opinion and have conceived the very opposite of what is fitting.
εἰ γάρ τι καὶ ἄλλο σωτηρίας αἴτιον ἔσται τῇ πόλει τῇδε καὶ τοῦ μηδέποτε τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μηδὲ τὴν ἰσχὺν ἀφαιρεθῆναι, ὁμονοοῦσαν δʼ ἀεὶ καὶ μιᾷ γνώμῃ περὶ πάντων χρωμένην διατελεῖν, ὁ δῆμος αἰτιώτατος ἔσται συμπαραληφθεὶς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τὸ μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν διοικοῦσαν τὰ κοινὰ πολιτείαν ἄκρατον μήτε μοναρχίαν μήτʼ ὀλιγαρχίαν μήτε δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μικτὴν ἐξ ἁπασῶν τούτων κατάστασιν, τοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα ἡμᾶς ὠφελήσει.
For if indeed anything else shall be the cause of safety for this city, and of its never being deprived of its freedom or its power, but continuing always in concord and employing one mind concerning all things, the people will be most of all the cause, having been admitted to a share in affairs; and the fact that the form of government administering public affairs is not one unmixed form, neither a monarchy, nor an oligarchy, nor a democracy, but a constitution mixed from all of these, this will benefit us above all things.
§7.55.3ῥᾷστα γὰρ εἰς ὕβρεις ἀποσκήπτει καὶ παρανομίας τούτων ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτευμάτων αὐτὸ καθʼ ἑαυτὸ γινόμενον, ὅταν δʼ ἀνακερασθῇ πάντα μετρίως, τὸ παρακινοῦν μέρος αἰεὶ καὶ ἐκβαῖνον ἐκ τοῦ συνήθους κόσμου ὑπὸ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος καὶ μένοντος ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ἤθεσι κατείργεται.
For each of these forms of government, when existing by itself, very easily degenerates into insolence and lawlessness; but when all are moderately blended, the part that is disorderly and departs from the accustomed order is always restrained by that which is prudent and remains in its own habits.
μοναρχία μὲν ὠμὴ καὶ αὐθάδης γενηθεῖσα καὶ τυραννικὰ διώκειν ἀρξαμένη ζηλώματα ὑπʼ ἀνδρῶν ὀλίγων καὶ ἀγαθῶν καταλύεται.
Monarchy, when it has become cruel and arrogant and has begun to pursue tyrannical aims, is overthrown by a few good men.
§7.55.4ὀλιγαρχία δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀνδρῶν συνεστηκυῖα, ᾗ χρῆσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς νυνί, ὅταν πλούτῳ καὶ ἑταιρίαις ἐπαρθεῖσα δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς μηθένα ποιῆται λόγον, ὑπὸ δήμου φρονίμου καταλύεται.
An oligarchy, composed of the best men—such as you yourselves now employ—when, puffed up by wealth and factions, it pays no regard to justice and the rest of virtue, is overthrown by a prudent people.
δῆμος δὲ σωφρονῶν καὶ κατὰ νόμους πολιτευόμενος ὅταν ἀκοσμεῖν ἄρξηται καὶ παρανομεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατίστου ἀνδρὸς βίᾳ καταληφθεὶς δικαιοῦται.
And a people that is prudent and governs according to the laws, when it begins to be disorderly and to transgress the laws, is chastened, being subdued by force by the most excellent man.
§7.55.5ὑμῖν δʼ, ὦ βουλή, μονάρχου μὲν ἐξουσίας, ἵνα μὴ τυραννὶς γένηται, τὰ δυνατὰ εὕρηται βοηθήματα.
But for you, senate, against the power of a monarch, so that it may not become a tyranny, the possible safeguards have been found.
δύο τε γὰρ ἀνθʼ ἑνὸς ἀποδείξαντες τῆς πόλεως κυρίους καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἀόριστον χρόνον ἐπιτρέψαντες ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλʼ ἐνιαύσιον οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀποδείκνυτε φύλακας αὐτῶν τριακοσίους ἄνδρας ἐκ τῶν πατρικίων τοὺς κρατίστους τε καὶ πρεσβυτάτους, ἐξ ὧν ἥδε ἡ βουλὴ συνέστηκεν· ὑμῶν δʼ αὐτῶν, ἵνα μένητε ἐν τῷ προσήκοντι κόσμῳ, φυλακὴν οὐδεμίαν ἄχρι τοῦδε φαίνεσθε πεποιημένοι.
For having appointed two masters of the city instead of one, and having entrusted the office to them not for an indefinite time, but for a year, you nevertheless appoint as guardians over them three hundred men from the patricians, the most excellent and the eldest, of whom this senate is composed; but for yourselves, so that you may remain in the fitting order, you appear up to this time to have made no guard at all.
§7.55.6καὶ περὶ μὲν ὑμῶν οὔπω ἔδεισα, μὴ διαφθαρῆτε τὰς διανοίας ὑπό τε μεγέθους καὶ πλήθους ἀγαθῶν, οἳ τυραννίδος τε πολυχρονίου ἠλευθερώκατε τὴν πόλιν ἔναγχος καὶ οὔπω σχολὴν ἐσχήκατε ὑβρίζειν καὶ τρυφᾶν διά τοὺς συνεχεῖς καὶ μακροὺς πολέμους· περὶ δὲ τῶν μεθʼ ὑμᾶς ἐσομένων ἐνθυμούμενος ὅσας ὁ μακρὸς αἰὼν φέρει μεταβολὰς δέδοικα, μή τι παρακινήσαντες οἱ δυνατοὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου λάθωσιν εἰς μοναρχίαν τὸ πολίτευμα περιστήσαντες τυραννικήν.
And concerning you indeed, I do not yet fear lest you be corrupted in your minds by the greatness and abundance of good things, you who have lately freed the city from a long-lasting tyranny and have not yet had leisure to be insolent and luxurious on account of the continuous and long wars; but when I consider, concerning those who will be after you, how many changes the long age brings, I fear lest the powerful men from the senate, having made some encroachment, may secretly turn the government into a tyrannical monarchy."