§7.523κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δʼ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς, ἑλκτικῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν. πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;
"It seems that what we are seeking is by nature among those things that lead to intellection, but no one uses it rightly, though it is altogether drawing toward reality." "How do you mean?" he said.
ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τό γʼ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι.
"I will try," I said, "to make clear what seems to me.
ἃ γὰρ διαιροῦμαι παρʼ ἐμαυτῷ ἀγωγά τε εἶναι οἷ λέγομεν καὶ μή, συνθεατὴς γενόμενος σύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον μαντεύομαι. δείκνυʼ, ἔφη.
For about the things which I distinguish in my own mind as being leading where we say and not, become a fellow-observer and agree or disagree, so that we may see this too more clearly, if it is as I divine." "Show," he said.
δείκνυμι δή, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾷς, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης. τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα. οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω. ποῖα μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις; τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δʼ ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτʼ ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν.
"I show then," I said, "if you see, that some things in our sensations do not summon the intellection to inspection, as being sufficiently judged by the sensation, while others altogether command it to inspect, as sensation produces nothing sound." "You clearly mean," he said, "things appearing from afar and those drawn in perspective." "Not at all," I said, "you have not hit what I mean." "What kind indeed," he said, "do you mean?" "Those that do not summon," I said, "are as many as do not change into a contrary sensation at the same time; but those that do change I set down as summoning, whenever the sensation indicates this no more than its contrary, whether striking from near or from afar.
ὧδε δὲ ἃ λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσῃ.
You will know what I mean more clearly in this way.
οὗτοί φαμεν τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὅ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος. πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
These, we say, would be three fingers: the smallest, the second, and the middle." "Quite so," he said.
ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὁρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ.
"Think of them, then, as being seen from near when I speak.
ἀλλά μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει. τὸ ποῖον; δάκτυλος μέν που αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἐάντε ἐν μέσῳ ὁρᾶται ἐάντʼ ἐπʼ ἐσχάτῳ, ἐάντε λευκὸς ἐάντε μέλας, ἐάντε παχὺς ἐάντε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον.
But consider this for me about them." "What sort of thing?" "Each of them appears equally a finger, and in this respect at least it makes no difference, whether it is seen in the middle or at the end, whether white or black, whether thick or thin, and everything of that sort.
ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶ δάκτυλος· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνεν τὸ δάκτυλον τοὐναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.
For in all these, the soul of the many is not compelled to ask the intellection what a finger is; for nowhere did the sight indicate to it at the same time that the finger is the contrary of a finger." "No indeed," he said.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδʼ ἐγερτικὸν εἴη. εἰκότως. τί δὲ δή;
"Therefore," I said, "reasonably such a thing would not be summoning or awakening to intellection." "Reasonably." "But what about their greatness and smallness?
τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἡ ὄψις ἆρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπʼ ἐσχάτῳ;
Does the sight see them sufficiently, and does it make no difference to it whether one of them lies in the middle or at the end?
καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἡ ἁφή;
And likewise, touch with thickness and thinness, or softness and hardness?
καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; §7.524ἢ ὧδε ποιεῖ ἑκάστη αὐτῶν· πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἴσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταὐτὸν σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη; οὕτως, ἔφη.
And do not the other sensations indicate such things deficiently?" "Or does each of them do this: first, the sensation assigned to the hard is compelled to be assigned also to the soft, and reports to the soul that it perceives the same thing as both hard and soft?" "Yes," he said.
οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἔν γε τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ κοῦφον καὶ βαρύ, εἰ τό τε βαρὺ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ κοῦφον βαρὺ σημαίνει; καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὗταί γε ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως δεόμεναι. εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμόν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν εἴτε ἓν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων. πῶς δʼ οὔ; οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἓν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται; ναί. εἰ ἄρα ἓν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλʼ ἕν. ὀρθῶς.
"Therefore," I said, "it is necessary in such cases for the soul in turn to be at a loss as to what this sensation means by the hard, if it says the same thing is also soft, and that of the light and the heavy, what the light and heavy are, if it indicates the heavy as light and the light as heavy." "Indeed," he said, "these interpretations are strange to the soul and need inspection." "Reasonably then," I said, "in such cases the soul first tries, summoning calculation and intellection, to inspect whether each of the things reported is one or two." "How could it not?" "Therefore, if it appears to be two, each appears as other and one?" "Yes." "If then each is one, and both are two, it will cognize the two as separated; for it would not cognize them as two if they were unseparated, but as one." "Right." "But the sight also saw great and small, we say, yet not separated but as something confounded.
μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἦ γάρ; ναί. διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοὐναντίον ἢ ʼκείνη. ἀληθῆ. οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν τί οὖν ποτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ σμικρόν; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δʼ ὁρατὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν. ὀρθότατʼ, ἔφη.
Is it not so?" "Yes." "And for the sake of the clearness of this, the intellection in turn was compelled to see great and small, not confounded but distinguished, the contrary of that other." "True." "Is it not from somewhere here that it first occurs to us to ask: what then is the great in turn, and the small?" "Altogether so." "And thus indeed we called the one intelligible, and the other visible." "Most rightly," he said.
ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν, ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δʼ οὔ, ἃ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ὁριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. μανθάνω τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω. τί οὖν;
"This, then, is what I was trying to say just now, that some things are summoning of thought, and some are not, defining as summoning those which fall into sensation at the same time as their contraries, and as many as do not, as not awakening intellection." "I understand then now," he said, "and it seems so to me." "What then?
ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἓν ποτέρων δοκεῖ εἶναι; οὐ συννοῶ, ἔφη.
To which of the two do number and the one seem to belong?" "I do not comprehend," he said.
ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, ἀναλογίζου.
"But calculate from what has been said," I said.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ὁρᾶται ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ὁλκὸν εἴη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν·
"For if the one itself is sufficiently seen by itself or grasped by some other sensation, it would not be a drawer toward reality, just as we said about the finger."