§10.609τί δέ;
"What then?" I said.
κακὸν ἑκάστῳ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις;
"Do you say that there is a certain bad and good for each thing?
οἷον ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ σύμπαντι τῷ σώματι νόσον, σίτῳ τε ἐρυσίβην, σηπεδόνα τε ξύλοις, χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν πᾶσι σύμφυτον ἑκάστῳ κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα; ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
For example, ophthalmia for the eyes, disease for the whole body, mildew for grain, rot for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, an inherent bad and sickness for almost every single thing?" "I do," he said.
οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῴ τι τούτων προσγένηται, πονηρόν τε ποιεῖ ᾧ προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τὸ σύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἑκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθείρειεν.
"Then when one of these comes upon something, does it make that upon which it came wretched, and in the end dissolve and destroy it completely?" "How could it not?" "Therefore, the inherent bad of each thing and its wretchedness destroys each thing, or if this does not destroy it, nothing else would ever corrupt it.
οὐ γὰρ τό γε ἀγαθὸν μή ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.
For the good would never destroy anything, nor again would that which is neither bad nor good." "How could they indeed?" he said.
ἐὰν ἄρα τι εὑρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακὸν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύον, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος οὕτως ὄλεθρος οὐκ ἦν; οὕτως, ἔφη, εἰκός.
"If, then, we find something among existing things which has indeed a bad that makes it wretched, but which this bad is nevertheless unable to dissolve and destroy, shall we not at once know that there was no destruction for that which is so constituted?" "That is likely," he said.
τί οὖν; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ·
"What then?" I said.
ψυχῇ ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κακήν; καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· ἃ νυνδὴ διῇμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία. ἦ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι;
"Is there not that which makes the soul bad?" "Very much so," he said, "all those things we were just going through: injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, and ignorance." "Does, then, any of these dissolve and destroy it?
καὶ ἐννόει μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, πονηρίας οὔσης ψυχῆς.
And let us reflect, lest we be deceived into thinking that the unjust and foolish man, when he is caught doing wrong, is then destroyed by injustice, which is the wretchedness of the soul.
ἀλλʼ ὧδε ποίει· ὥσπερ σῶμα ἡ σώματος πονηρία νόσος οὖσα τήκει καὶ διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα εἶναι, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας, τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται—οὐχ οὕτω; ναί. ἴθι δή, καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει.
Rather, do it this way: just as the body's wretchedness, which is disease, wastes and destroys the body and leads it to being no longer a body, and all the things we were just speaking of arrive at non-existence by their own badness, which corrupts them by clinging to and being in them—is it not so?" "Yes." "Come then, look at the soul in the same way.
ἆρα ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ; οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε ἄλογον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὑτοῦ μή. ἄλογον. ἐννόει γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδʼ ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἣ ἂν ᾖ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, εἴτε παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἡτισοῦν οὖσα, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι·
Does the injustice and other badness existing in it, by being in it and clinging to it, corrupt and wither it, until, leading it to death, it separates the soul from the body?" "By no means," he said, "not that at all." "But indeed, that is unreasonable," I said, "that the badness of another thing should destroy something, while its own does not." "Unreasonable." "For reflect, Glaucon," I said, "that we do not think the body ought to be destroyed even by the badness of food, whatever it may be of those things themselves, whether oldness or rottenness or whatever else; but if the badness of the food itself produces in the body a wretchedness of the body, we shall say that it has perished on account of those things by its own badness, which is disease.
§10.610ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων τῷ σώματι σώματος μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ διʼ ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπὸ δὲ σιτίων πονηρίας ἄλλων ὄντων ἄλλο ὂν τὸ σῶμα, ὑπʼ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν, οὐδέποτε ἀξιώσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι. ὀρθότατʼ αὖ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
But we shall never deem that by the badness of food, which is another thing, the body, which is a different thing, is destroyed by an external bad that has not produced the inherent bad." "Again, you speak most correctly," he said.
κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐὰν μὴ σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ, μή ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπὸ ἀλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ἰδίας πονηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ ἕτερον. ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.
"According to the same argument, then," I said, "unless the badness of the body produces in the soul a badness of the soul, let us never deem that the soul is destroyed by an external bad without its own wretchedness, one thing by the bad of another." "That makes sense," he said.
ἢ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν, ἢ ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἀνέλεγκτα, μή ποτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ μηδʼ αὖ ὑπʼ ἄλλης νόσου μηδʼ αὖ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μηδʼ εἴ τις ὅτι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι, ἕνεκα τούτων μηδὲν μᾶλλόν ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν ἄν τις ἀποδείξῃ ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιωτέρα γίγνεται·
"Then either let us refute these things as not being well said, or, as long as they are unrefuted, let us never say that the soul is destroyed any the more on account of a fever, or again of any other disease, or again of slaughter, not even if someone should cut the whole body into the smallest pieces, before someone demonstrates that on account of these sufferings of the body, the soul itself becomes more unjust and more impious.
ἀλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ ἰδίου ἑκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου, μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν ἐῶμεν φάναι τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οὐδείς ποτε δείξει, ὡς τῶν ἀποθνῃσκόντων ἀδικώτεραι αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θάνατον γίγνονται. ἐὰν δέ γέ τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾷ ἰέναι καὶ λέγειν ὡς πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος γίγνεται ὁ ἀποθνῄσκων, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζηται ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιώσομέν που, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον τῷ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον, καὶ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἀποκτεινύντος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει, ἀποθνῄσκειν τοὺς λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θᾶττον, τοὺς δʼ ἧττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ὑπʼ ἄλλων δίκην ἐπιτιθέντων ἀποθνῄσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι. μὰ Δίʼ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἄρα πάνδεινον φανεῖται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται τῷ λαμβάνοντι—ἀπαλλαγὴ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κακῶν—ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν φανήσεσθαι πᾶν τοὐναντίον τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτεινῦσαν, εἴπερ οἷόν τε, τὸν δʼ ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν, καὶ πρός γʼ ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον· οὕτω πόρρω που, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι. καλῶς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, λέγεις.
But when an external bad occurs in another thing, while the inherent bad does not occur in each thing, let us not allow anyone to say that either the soul or anything else is destroyed." "But indeed," he said, "no one will ever demonstrate this, that the souls of those who die become more unjust on account of death." "But if someone," I said, "dares to go hand to hand with the argument and say that the dying man becomes more wretched and more unjust, so that he may not be forced to admit that souls are immortal, we shall surely deem, if he who says this speaks the truth, that injustice is deadly to the one who has it, like a disease, and that those who contract it die by this very thing, which kills by its own nature, some more quickly and others more slowly, but not as now, where the unjust die through this on account of others imposing punishment." "By Zeus," he said, "then injustice will not appear to be so very terrible if it is deadly to the one who contracts it—for that would be a release from evils—but rather, I think, it will appear to do quite the opposite, killing others if possible, but making the one who has it very much alive, and besides being alive, keeping him sleepless; so far, it seems, has it pitched its tent from being deadly." "You speak well," I said.
ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανὴ ἥ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχήν, σχολῇ τό γε ἐπʼ ἄλλου ὀλέθρῳ τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλὴν ἐφʼ ᾧ τέτακται. σχολῇ γʼ, ἔφη, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκός.
"For when indeed its own wretchedness and its own bad is not sufficient to kill and destroy the soul, hardly will the bad appointed for the destruction of another thing destroy the soul or anything else, except that for which it was appointed." "Hardly indeed," he said, "as is likely."