§375ΙΠ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
HIP.: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SO.: And what about this?
ψυχὴν κεκτῆσθαι ἵππου, ᾗ ἑκών τις κακῶς ἱππεύσει, ἄμεινον ἢ ᾗ ἄκων;
Is it better to possess a horse's soul with which one will ride badly voluntarily, or with which one will do so involuntarily?
ΙΠ. ἧι ἑκών.
HIP.: The one with which voluntarily.
ΣΩ. ἀμείνων ἄρα ἐστίν.
SO.: Then it is better.
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. τῇ ἀμείνονι ἄρα ψυχῇ ἵππου τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα ταύτης τὰ πονηρὰ ἑκουσίως ἂν ποιοῖ, τῇ δὲ τῆς πονηρᾶς ἀκουσίως;
SO.: Then with the better soul of a horse, one would do the bad works of this soul voluntarily, but with the bad one involuntarily?
ΙΠ. πάνυ γε.
HIP.: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ κυνὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων πάντων;
SO.: And is it not so also for a dog, and for all other animals?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δή;
SO.: And what about this?
ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν ἐκτῆσθαι τοξότου ἄμεινόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἑκουσίως ἁμαρτάνει τοῦ σκοποῦ, ἢ ἥτις ἀκουσίως;
Is it better to possess the soul of a human archer which misses the mark voluntarily, or one which does so involuntarily?
ΙΠ. ἥτις ἑκουσίως.
HIP.: The one which voluntarily.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αὕτη ἀμείνων εἰς τοξικήν ἐστιν;
SO.: And so this one is better for archery?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτάνουσα πονηροτέρα ἢ ἑκουσίως;
SO.: And so a soul that errs involuntarily is worse than one that does so voluntarily?
ΙΠ. ἐν τοξικῇ γε.
HIP.: In archery, at least.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν ἰατρικῇ;
SO.: And what about medicine?
οὐχὶ ἡ ἑκοῦσα κακὰ ἐργαζομένη περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατρικωτέρα;
Is not the one that works bad things on bodies voluntarily more skilled in medicine?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀμείνων ἄρα αὕτη ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μὴ.
SO.: Then this one is better in this art than the one that is not.
ΙΠ. ἀμείνων.
HIP.: Better.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SO.: And what about this?
ἡ κιθαριστικωτέρα καὶ αὐλητικωτέρα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας τε καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, οὐχὶ ἡ ἀμείνων ἑκοῦσα τὰ κακὰ ἐργάζεται καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνει, ἡ δὲ πονηροτέρα ἄκουσα;
With respect to playing the lyre and playing the flute, and all other things regarding arts and sciences, does not the better soul do bad and shameful things and err voluntarily, whereas the worse one does so involuntarily?
ΙΠ. φαίνεται.
HIP.: So it appears.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν που τάς γε τῶν δούλων ψυχὰς κεκτῆσθαι δεξαίμεθʼ ἂν μᾶλλον τὰς ἑκουσίως ἢ τὰς ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτανούσας τε καὶ κακουργούσας, ὡς ἀμείνους οὔσας εἰς ταῦτα.
SO.: Furthermore, surely we would prefer to possess the souls of slaves that err and do evil voluntarily rather than those that do so involuntarily, on the ground that they are better for these things.
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SO.: And what of our own soul?
τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν οὐ βουλοίμεθʼ ἂν ὡς βελτίστην ἐκτῆσθαι;
Would we not wish to possess it in the best possible state?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν βελτίων ἔσται, ἐὰν ἑκοῦσα κακουργῇ τε καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνῃ, ἢ ἐὰν ἄκουσα;
SO.: Will it then be better if it does evil and errs voluntarily, rather than if it does so involuntarily?
ΙΠ. δεινὸν μεντἂν εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ οἱ ἑκόντες ἀδικοῦντες βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ οἱ ἄκοντες.
HIP.: That would be a terrible thing, Socrates, if those who do injustice voluntarily are to be better than those who do so involuntarily.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνονταί γε ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
SO.: But indeed they do appear so from what has been said.
ΙΠ. οὔκουν ἔμοιγε.
HIP.: Not to me, at least.
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δʼ ᾤμην, ὦ Ἱππία, καὶ σοὶ φανῆναι.
SO.: And I thought, Hippias, that it would appear so to you too.
πάλιν δʼ ἀπόκριναι· ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐχὶ ἢ δύναμίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀμφότερα;
But answer again: is not justice either a certain power or knowledge, or both?
ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕν γέ τι τούτων εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην;
Or is it not necessary that justice be at least some one of these?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δύναμίς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δυνατωτέρα ψυχὴ δικαιοτέρα ἐστί;
SO.: Then if justice is a power of the soul, is the more powerful soul more just?
βελτίων γάρ που ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ τοιαύτη.
For surely such a soul appeared to us to be better, my excellent friend.
ΙΠ. ἐφάνη γάρ.
HIP.: Yes, it did appear so.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ ἐπιστήμη;
SO.: And what if it is knowledge?
οὐχ ἡ σοφωτέρα ψυχὴ δικαιοτέρα, ἡ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρα ἀδικωτέρα;
Is not the wiser soul more just, and the more ignorant one more unjust?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ ἀμφότερα;
SO.: And what if it is both?
οὐχ ἡ ἀμφοτέρας ἔχουσα, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δύναμιν, δικαιοτέρα, ἡ δʼ ἀμαθεστέρα ἀδικωτέρα;
Is not the one that has both, knowledge and power, more just, and the more ignorant and weaker one more unjust?
οὐχ οὕτως ἀνάγκη ἔχειν;
Must it not necessarily be so?
ΙΠ. φαίνεται.
HIP.: So it appears.
§376ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ δυνατωτέρα καὶ σοφωτέρα αὕτη ἀμείνων οὖσα ἐφάνη καὶ ἀμφότερα μᾶλλον δυναμένη ποιεῖν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, περὶ πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν;
SO.: Then did this more powerful and wiser soul appear to be better and more capable of doing both, fine things and shameful things, in every activity?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἐργάζηται, ἑκοῦσα ἐργάζεται διὰ δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην· ταῦτα δὲ δικαιοσύνης φαίνεται, ἤτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον.
SO.: Whenever, then, it works shameful things, it does so voluntarily through power and art; and these appear to belong to justice, either both or one of them.
ΙΠ. ἔοικεν.
HIP.: It seems so.
ΣΩ. καὶ τὸ μέν γε ἀδικεῖν κακὰ ποιεῖν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καλά.
SO.: And indeed, doing injustice is doing bad things, whereas not doing injustice is doing fine things.
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἡ δυνατωτέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ψυχή, ὅτανπερ ἀδικῇ, ἑκοῦσα ἀδικήσει, ἡ δὲ πονηρὰ ἄκουσα;
SO.: Then will the more powerful and better soul, whenever it does injustice, do so voluntarily, whereas the bad one will do so involuntarily?
ΙΠ. φαίνεται.
HIP.: So it appears.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὁ τὴν ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων, κακὸς δὲ ὁ τὴν κακήν;
SO.: Is then a good man the one who has a good soul, and a bad man the one who has a bad soul?
ΙΠ. ναί.
HIP.: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθοῦ μὲν ἄρα ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖν, κακοῦ δὲ ἄκοντα, εἴπερ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει.
SO.: It is then the part of a good man to do injustice voluntarily, and of a bad man involuntarily, if indeed the good man has a good soul.
ΙΠ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔχει γε.
HIP.: But indeed he does have it.
ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἄδικα ποιῶν, ὦ Ἱππία, εἴπερ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλος εἴη ἢ ὁ ἀγαθός.
SO.: Therefore, Hippias, the one who errs and does shameful and unjust things voluntarily, if indeed there is any such person, would be no other than the good man.
ΙΠ. οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως σοι συγχωρήσω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα.
HIP.: I do not know how I can agree with you on these things, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Ἱππία·
SO.: Nor do I agree with myself, Hippias.
ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον οὕτω φαίνεσθαι νῦν γε ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου.
Yet it appears necessarily so to us now, at least from the argument.
ὅπερ μέντοι πάλαι ἔλεγον, ἐγὼ περὶ ταῦτα ἄνω καὶ κάτω πλανῶμαι καὶ οὐδέποτε ταὐτά μοι δοκεῖ.
However, as I was saying long ago, I wander up and down about these things, and they never seem the same to me.
καὶ ἐμὲ μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν πλανᾶσθαι οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἰδιώτην· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς πλανήσεσθε οἱ σοφοί, τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ ἡμῖν δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲ παρʼ ὑμᾶς ἀφικόμενοι παυσόμεθα τῆς πλάνης.
And it is no wonder that I wander, or any other ordinary person; but if you wise men are also going to wander, this indeed becomes a terrible thing for us too, if not even by coming to you shall we cease from our wandering.